Narrative:

En-route to mez; memphis center instructed us to hold at rich mountain (pgo) VOR to await an IFR departure from mez. We entered holding and were told to expect the VOR/DME-a approach. We requested the ILS runway 27 due to the rate of deterioration of ceiling and visibility; but were denied by ATC. Memphis center told us that he was only authorized to approve the VOR/DME-a during IMC conditions and scheduled use of the hog MOA (hog MOA overlies mez). After the IFR departure cleared from mez; we executed the VOR/DME-a approach; and subsequently went missed approach when unable to visually acquire the airfield. We were cleared to return to the rich mountain (pgo) VOR to hold and wait until the hog MOA went 'cold.' we repeated our requests for the ILS; but again were told that the 'hot' MOA and IMC conditions precluded any clearance other than the VOR/DME-a. While we were holding at rich mountain VOR; memphis center cleared us direct to meana LOM/IAF to hold in anticipation of the airspace handoff. Our holding clearance was to hold on the 269 bearing from meana LOM/IAF; left turns; at 5000 feet. It was at that point that our situational awareness; crew communication and awareness; and overall task saturation took its toll. We incorrectly entered holding at meana LOM/IAF on the 089 bearing from; left turns; at 5000 feet. Shortly thereafter we were cleared for the full procedure turn ILS runway 27. We executed the full procedure turn and landed at mez without further incident. Our scenario could've turned out much worse. All the ingredients for a CFIT were present: mountainous terrain; IMC conditions; lack of effective communications and coordination between aircrew and ATC (we could not comprehend the unavailability of a precision approach during IMC conditions); and the deterioration of crew coordination and mounting frustrations. Contributing factors: although we had been thorough in our flight planning for the trip to mez; we never anticipated the scenario as it occurred. The lack of published information (FLIP; NOTAMS; airfield directories; approach chart) concerning the airspace conflicts in mena; arkansas is very frustrating. Our risk assessment and analysis was based on the information at hand. Had we known of the peculiarities of the airspace; we could've amended our planned arrival time. I would like to add that I am not questioning the professionalism of the memphis center controller. He was as professional and as helpful as he could be; given his limited approach approval authority. I also believe that MOA's provide valuable training airspace for our military pilots; and I am not advocating a reduction in the hog MOA. Recommendations: 1) publish a NOTAM that addresses the conflict between scheduled MOA times and the unavailability of the ILS approach at mez. 2) publish a note or caution on the approach plates serving mez that addresses the conflict between scheduled MOA times and the unavailability of the ILS approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MEDIUM LARGE TRANSPORT WAS DENIED ILS APCH DUE TO ACTIVE MOA. IN ANTICIPATION OF CLRNC FOR THE APCH; HOLDING CLRNC WAS ISSUED. THE FLT CREW ESTABLISHED HOLDING ON THE WRONG BEARING FROM THE NDB.

Narrative: EN-ROUTE TO MEZ; MEMPHIS CENTER INSTRUCTED US TO HOLD AT RICH MOUNTAIN (PGO) VOR TO AWAIT AN IFR DEPARTURE FROM MEZ. WE ENTERED HOLDING AND WERE TOLD TO EXPECT THE VOR/DME-A APPROACH. WE REQUESTED THE ILS RWY 27 DUE TO THE RATE OF DETERIORATION OF CEILING AND VISIBILITY; BUT WERE DENIED BY ATC. MEMPHIS CENTER TOLD US THAT HE WAS ONLY AUTHORIZED TO APPROVE THE VOR/DME-A DURING IMC CONDITIONS AND SCHEDULED USE OF THE HOG MOA (HOG MOA OVERLIES MEZ). AFTER THE IFR DEPARTURE CLEARED FROM MEZ; WE EXECUTED THE VOR/DME-A APPROACH; AND SUBSEQUENTLY WENT MISSED APPROACH WHEN UNABLE TO VISUALLY ACQUIRE THE AIRFIELD. WE WERE CLEARED TO RETURN TO THE RICH MOUNTAIN (PGO) VOR TO HOLD AND WAIT UNTIL THE HOG MOA WENT 'COLD.' WE REPEATED OUR REQUESTS FOR THE ILS; BUT AGAIN WERE TOLD THAT THE 'HOT' MOA AND IMC CONDITIONS PRECLUDED ANY CLEARANCE OTHER THAN THE VOR/DME-A. WHILE WE WERE HOLDING AT RICH MOUNTAIN VOR; MEMPHIS CENTER CLEARED US DIRECT TO MEANA LOM/IAF TO HOLD IN ANTICIPATION OF THE AIRSPACE HANDOFF. OUR HOLDING CLEARANCE WAS TO HOLD ON THE 269 BEARING FROM MEANA LOM/IAF; LEFT TURNS; AT 5000 FEET. IT WAS AT THAT POINT THAT OUR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS; CREW COMMUNICATION AND AWARENESS; AND OVERALL TASK SATURATION TOOK ITS TOLL. WE INCORRECTLY ENTERED HOLDING AT MEANA LOM/IAF ON THE 089 BEARING FROM; LEFT TURNS; AT 5000 FEET. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE WERE CLEARED FOR THE FULL PROCEDURE TURN ILS RWY 27. WE EXECUTED THE FULL PROCEDURE TURN AND LANDED AT MEZ WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. OUR SCENARIO COULD'VE TURNED OUT MUCH WORSE. ALL THE INGREDIENTS FOR A CFIT WERE PRESENT: MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN; IMC CONDITIONS; LACK OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATIONS AND COORDINATION BETWEEN AIRCREW AND ATC (WE COULD NOT COMPREHEND THE UNAVAILABILITY OF A PRECISION APPROACH DURING IMC CONDITIONS); AND THE DETERIORATION OF CREW COORDINATION AND MOUNTING FRUSTRATIONS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: ALTHOUGH WE HAD BEEN THOROUGH IN OUR FLIGHT PLANNING FOR THE TRIP TO MEZ; WE NEVER ANTICIPATED THE SCENARIO AS IT OCCURRED. THE LACK OF PUBLISHED INFORMATION (FLIP; NOTAMS; AIRFIELD DIRECTORIES; APPROACH CHART) CONCERNING THE AIRSPACE CONFLICTS IN MENA; ARKANSAS IS VERY FRUSTRATING. OUR RISK ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS WAS BASED ON THE INFORMATION AT HAND. HAD WE KNOWN OF THE PECULIARITIES OF THE AIRSPACE; WE COULD'VE AMENDED OUR PLANNED ARRIVAL TIME. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT I AM NOT QUESTIONING THE PROFESSIONALISM OF THE MEMPHIS CENTER CONTROLLER. HE WAS AS PROFESSIONAL AND AS HELPFUL AS HE COULD BE; GIVEN HIS LIMITED APPROACH APPROVAL AUTHORITY. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT MOA'S PROVIDE VALUABLE TRAINING AIRSPACE FOR OUR MILITARY PILOTS; AND I AM NOT ADVOCATING A REDUCTION IN THE HOG MOA. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) PUBLISH A NOTAM THAT ADDRESSES THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SCHEDULED MOA TIMES AND THE UNAVAILABILITY OF THE ILS APPROACH AT MEZ. 2) PUBLISH A NOTE OR CAUTION ON THE APPROACH PLATES SERVING MEZ THAT ADDRESSES THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SCHEDULED MOA TIMES AND THE UNAVAILABILITY OF THE ILS APPROACH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.