Narrative:

I was on a radar vector for an approach into mesa; az (ffz). I was heading south I believe on a 180 degree heading. I was told to descend to 4000 ft MSL. Shortly after leveling at 4000 ft; I received an RA to descend. We immediately descended following our command bars. While the RA was sounding in our headsets and we were descending; we advised ATC of our RA deviation. We eventually reached around 3400 ft MSL. I was very concerned with terrain in the area; considering I was IMC at this time and numerous mountain peaks in the area. We were turned east by ATC instruction. Once the RA was resolved; I turned and started climbing back up to 4000 ft per ATC instructions. Once level at 4000 ft for a short period; about 1 or 2 mins; I was told to immediately climb to 5000 ft for traffic. No RA this time; but a TA. I started the climb immediately with full power and during the climb up I was told the traffic conflict was resolved and descend back down to 4000 ft. I was given another heading for mesa and then eventually cleared for the visual. In the past yr I have received 3 other RA's going into and out of both scottsdale and mesa. It seems to me this is very excessive; considering I have never had another RA anywhere else in the united states. A phoenix controller has mentioned to me in the past that the towers of the other airports are sending traffic into their arrival and departure paths. I would believe there needs to be better communication and practices between the towers of the outlying airports and phoenix approach control. I believe the first RA was a controller fault of simply not seeing the conflict. Traffic was heavy and WX in phoenix caused excessive workload on the controllers. The second conflict; I believe; was caused from both bad controller instructions and separation; and heavy workload on me from trying to deal with getting the plane back into a straight and level situation following the rapid descent from the RA. I had to stop the descent; climb back to 4000 ft and turn -- all while dealing with where terrain was; other traffic; and changing the attitude of the plane. It is simply a perfect example of the error chain of events accident. First the RA; the heavy workload both on pilot and controller; numerous turns; a descent; followed by a leveloff; then followed by an immediate climb. My first officer was doing all the talking to ATC; and I was flying. It was hard to hear instructions from ATC from the numerous RA callouts of the airplane and TA callouts which were shouting quite loud in our headsets -- which made it difficult to understand the instructions given. There was never any indication of pilot fault from the controller; and when handed off to mesa tower we were told 'thanks for your help.' this event made both myself; co-pilot; and passenger uncomfortable from the numerous amount of activity that took place in such a short period. Both pilots and controllers were obviously overloaded during the whole situation; which led to numerous mistakes.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: G150 ARR TO FFZ ON P50 FREQ EXPERIENCED TCAS RA AT 4000 FT IN IMC CONDITIONS; NO TFC ISSUED; NO OPERROR RECORDED.

Narrative: I WAS ON A RADAR VECTOR FOR AN APCH INTO MESA; AZ (FFZ). I WAS HDG S I BELIEVE ON A 180 DEG HDG. I WAS TOLD TO DSND TO 4000 FT MSL. SHORTLY AFTER LEVELING AT 4000 FT; I RECEIVED AN RA TO DSND. WE IMMEDIATELY DSNDED FOLLOWING OUR COMMAND BARS. WHILE THE RA WAS SOUNDING IN OUR HEADSETS AND WE WERE DSNDING; WE ADVISED ATC OF OUR RA DEV. WE EVENTUALLY REACHED AROUND 3400 FT MSL. I WAS VERY CONCERNED WITH TERRAIN IN THE AREA; CONSIDERING I WAS IMC AT THIS TIME AND NUMEROUS MOUNTAIN PEAKS IN THE AREA. WE WERE TURNED E BY ATC INSTRUCTION. ONCE THE RA WAS RESOLVED; I TURNED AND STARTED CLBING BACK UP TO 4000 FT PER ATC INSTRUCTIONS. ONCE LEVEL AT 4000 FT FOR A SHORT PERIOD; ABOUT 1 OR 2 MINS; I WAS TOLD TO IMMEDIATELY CLB TO 5000 FT FOR TFC. NO RA THIS TIME; BUT A TA. I STARTED THE CLB IMMEDIATELY WITH FULL PWR AND DURING THE CLB UP I WAS TOLD THE TFC CONFLICT WAS RESOLVED AND DSND BACK DOWN TO 4000 FT. I WAS GIVEN ANOTHER HDG FOR MESA AND THEN EVENTUALLY CLRED FOR THE VISUAL. IN THE PAST YR I HAVE RECEIVED 3 OTHER RA'S GOING INTO AND OUT OF BOTH SCOTTSDALE AND MESA. IT SEEMS TO ME THIS IS VERY EXCESSIVE; CONSIDERING I HAVE NEVER HAD ANOTHER RA ANYWHERE ELSE IN THE UNITED STATES. A PHOENIX CTLR HAS MENTIONED TO ME IN THE PAST THAT THE TWRS OF THE OTHER ARPTS ARE SENDING TFC INTO THEIR ARR AND DEP PATHS. I WOULD BELIEVE THERE NEEDS TO BE BETTER COM AND PRACTICES BTWN THE TWRS OF THE OUTLYING ARPTS AND PHOENIX APCH CTL. I BELIEVE THE FIRST RA WAS A CTLR FAULT OF SIMPLY NOT SEEING THE CONFLICT. TFC WAS HVY AND WX IN PHOENIX CAUSED EXCESSIVE WORKLOAD ON THE CTLRS. THE SECOND CONFLICT; I BELIEVE; WAS CAUSED FROM BOTH BAD CTLR INSTRUCTIONS AND SEPARATION; AND HVY WORKLOAD ON ME FROM TRYING TO DEAL WITH GETTING THE PLANE BACK INTO A STRAIGHT AND LEVEL SITUATION FOLLOWING THE RAPID DSCNT FROM THE RA. I HAD TO STOP THE DSCNT; CLB BACK TO 4000 FT AND TURN -- ALL WHILE DEALING WITH WHERE TERRAIN WAS; OTHER TFC; AND CHANGING THE ATTITUDE OF THE PLANE. IT IS SIMPLY A PERFECT EXAMPLE OF THE ERROR CHAIN OF EVENTS ACCIDENT. FIRST THE RA; THE HVY WORKLOAD BOTH ON PLT AND CTLR; NUMEROUS TURNS; A DSCNT; FOLLOWED BY A LEVELOFF; THEN FOLLOWED BY AN IMMEDIATE CLB. MY FO WAS DOING ALL THE TALKING TO ATC; AND I WAS FLYING. IT WAS HARD TO HEAR INSTRUCTIONS FROM ATC FROM THE NUMEROUS RA CALLOUTS OF THE AIRPLANE AND TA CALLOUTS WHICH WERE SHOUTING QUITE LOUD IN OUR HEADSETS -- WHICH MADE IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN. THERE WAS NEVER ANY INDICATION OF PLT FAULT FROM THE CTLR; AND WHEN HANDED OFF TO MESA TWR WE WERE TOLD 'THANKS FOR YOUR HELP.' THIS EVENT MADE BOTH MYSELF; CO-PLT; AND PAX UNCOMFORTABLE FROM THE NUMEROUS AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY THAT TOOK PLACE IN SUCH A SHORT PERIOD. BOTH PLTS AND CTLRS WERE OBVIOUSLY OVERLOADED DURING THE WHOLE SITUATION; WHICH LED TO NUMEROUS MISTAKES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.