Narrative:

I have been trained to operate within the washington dc ADIZ (wdc ADIZ) but have not done so for several yrs. I am familiar with wdc ADIZ procedures; but recently the size of the ADIZ was reduced; and a larger 'speed ring' was added around the wdc ADIZ. During my planning for this flight; I studied both the current washington dc VFR sectional chart and the current washington dc terminal area chart; as well as the chart printed through the aircraft owner's and pilots association (AOPA) on-line flight planning tool. In all instances; referring to 2w5 on the chart; I mistook the ADIZ boundary for the new speed ring. As a result; I erroneously concluded that my flight to 2w5 would not penetrate the ADIZ. In fact; my flight penetrated the ADIZ. Because I was under the mistaken impression that ADIZ penetration was not a factor for this flight; I did not comply with wdc ADIZ penetration procedures. I obtained 2 duat briefings for this flight; one the night before; one the morning of the flight. My route of flight was omh direct brv direct 2w5 at 2500 ft MSL. I selected this altitude to remain clear of the washington area class B airspace. At departure; immediately upon reaching 2500 ft MSL and trimming the aircraft; I attempted to contact patuxent approach on 120.05 to request VFR flight following but received no response. I then tried to reach potomac approach on 119.85 but received no response. I then tried to reach potomac approach on 124.65. My initial call was 'potomac approach; aircraft X.' potomac approach responded immediately with 'aircraft X.' I replied; 'potomac approach; aircraft X is 7 mi west of brook VOR at 2500 ft inbound for indian head; 2w5; request VFR flight following.' I received no further transmission from potomac approach. Because the frequency was busy; I attempted no further contact with potomac approach. 10 mi from 2w5 I switched to 2w5 CTAF 122.7 to announce my approach. I entered the pattern on a 45 degree downwind. When I was established on downwind and before I turned base; I saw a USCG helicopter above and behind me to the left. The helicopter overflew the airport; descended on my right and flew under me as I turned base. As I turned base; the helicopter became stationary in a hover in a position between me and the runway. As I was preparing to break off the approach; I saw the helicopter pilot look up. I clearly saw a startled expression on his face when he saw me. The helicopter immediately descended and moved to one side; clearing the way for my final approach to the runway. I turned final and landed uneventfully. I estimate that; at our closest; I and the helicopter were no more than 100 ft apart horizontally and approximately 30 vt vertically. At the time of landing; I believe surface wind was less than 5 KTS at 2w5. On rollout; I experienced an unusual 'bobble' that almost upset the aircraft. I was able to maintain control and taxi to parking. I believe the upset was due to rotorwash from the USCG helicopter that was apparently hovering to one side of the runway as I landed and rolled out. I believe a high-wing light aircraft might have been upset by the event. I had several opportunities to avoid the unauthorized incursion into wdc ADIZ airspace and subsequent near collision with a USCG helicopter. These were: 1) I could have studied the various aeronautical charts more closely; tracing the 'speed ring' and ADIZ boundaries for the whole sector of airspace in which I planned to operate. 2) I could have called flight service for a live briefing rather than relying exclusively on duat briefings. A live briefer might have pointed out that 2w5 is still within the wdc ADIZ; despite the recent reduction in the size of the wdc ADIZ. 3) I could have advised potomac approach of my position and intentions prior to changing frequencys to the 2w5 CTAF. Potomac approach might have advised me that I had violated the wdc ADIZ and to monitor the guard frequency to communicate with the intercepting USCG helicopter. Other steps that might have mitigated or eliminated this event are: 1) the USCG helicopter did not intercept me until I was established in the pattern at 2w5. When operating in or close to a civil airport traffic pattern; intercepting military aircraft should monitor the airport frequency and comply with civil airport air traffic reporting procedures. The USCG helicopter in this incident never announced on the CTAF and never established radio contact with me; although I was on the 2w5 CTAF frequency and in the 2w5 pattern the entire time of our encounter. 2) if possible; each duat briefing that touches or involves wdc ADIZ airspace should print -- in a prominent location and typeface -- either: a) a warning that an airport included in the proposed route of flight is within the wdc ADIZ; or B) a list of all airports still within the wdc ADIZ. In my opinion; the former 2(a) in this paragraph -- is the preferred alternative; although the latter -- 2(B) would be helpful.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INEXPERIENCED PRIVATE PLT FAILS TO COMPLY WITH DCADIZ ENTRY PROCEDURES ON FLT TO 2W5.

Narrative: I HAVE BEEN TRAINED TO OPERATE WITHIN THE WASHINGTON DC ADIZ (WDC ADIZ) BUT HAVE NOT DONE SO FOR SEVERAL YRS. I AM FAMILIAR WITH WDC ADIZ PROCS; BUT RECENTLY THE SIZE OF THE ADIZ WAS REDUCED; AND A LARGER 'SPD RING' WAS ADDED AROUND THE WDC ADIZ. DURING MY PLANNING FOR THIS FLT; I STUDIED BOTH THE CURRENT WASHINGTON DC VFR SECTIONAL CHART AND THE CURRENT WASHINGTON DC TERMINAL AREA CHART; AS WELL AS THE CHART PRINTED THROUGH THE ACFT OWNER'S AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION (AOPA) ON-LINE FLT PLANNING TOOL. IN ALL INSTANCES; REFERRING TO 2W5 ON THE CHART; I MISTOOK THE ADIZ BOUNDARY FOR THE NEW SPD RING. AS A RESULT; I ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT MY FLT TO 2W5 WOULD NOT PENETRATE THE ADIZ. IN FACT; MY FLT PENETRATED THE ADIZ. BECAUSE I WAS UNDER THE MISTAKEN IMPRESSION THAT ADIZ PENETRATION WAS NOT A FACTOR FOR THIS FLT; I DID NOT COMPLY WITH WDC ADIZ PENETRATION PROCS. I OBTAINED 2 DUAT BRIEFINGS FOR THIS FLT; ONE THE NIGHT BEFORE; ONE THE MORNING OF THE FLT. MY RTE OF FLT WAS OMH DIRECT BRV DIRECT 2W5 AT 2500 FT MSL. I SELECTED THIS ALT TO REMAIN CLR OF THE WASHINGTON AREA CLASS B AIRSPACE. AT DEP; IMMEDIATELY UPON REACHING 2500 FT MSL AND TRIMMING THE ACFT; I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT PATUXENT APCH ON 120.05 TO REQUEST VFR FLT FOLLOWING BUT RECEIVED NO RESPONSE. I THEN TRIED TO REACH POTOMAC APCH ON 119.85 BUT RECEIVED NO RESPONSE. I THEN TRIED TO REACH POTOMAC APCH ON 124.65. MY INITIAL CALL WAS 'POTOMAC APCH; ACFT X.' POTOMAC APCH RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY WITH 'ACFT X.' I REPLIED; 'POTOMAC APCH; ACFT X IS 7 MI W OF BROOK VOR AT 2500 FT INBOUND FOR INDIAN HEAD; 2W5; REQUEST VFR FLT FOLLOWING.' I RECEIVED NO FURTHER XMISSION FROM POTOMAC APCH. BECAUSE THE FREQ WAS BUSY; I ATTEMPTED NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH POTOMAC APCH. 10 MI FROM 2W5 I SWITCHED TO 2W5 CTAF 122.7 TO ANNOUNCE MY APCH. I ENTERED THE PATTERN ON A 45 DEG DOWNWIND. WHEN I WAS ESTABLISHED ON DOWNWIND AND BEFORE I TURNED BASE; I SAW A USCG HELI ABOVE AND BEHIND ME TO THE L. THE HELI OVERFLEW THE ARPT; DSNDED ON MY R AND FLEW UNDER ME AS I TURNED BASE. AS I TURNED BASE; THE HELI BECAME STATIONARY IN A HOVER IN A POS BTWN ME AND THE RWY. AS I WAS PREPARING TO BREAK OFF THE APCH; I SAW THE HELI PLT LOOK UP. I CLRLY SAW A STARTLED EXPRESSION ON HIS FACE WHEN HE SAW ME. THE HELI IMMEDIATELY DSNDED AND MOVED TO ONE SIDE; CLRING THE WAY FOR MY FINAL APCH TO THE RWY. I TURNED FINAL AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. I ESTIMATE THAT; AT OUR CLOSEST; I AND THE HELI WERE NO MORE THAN 100 FT APART HORIZLY AND APPROX 30 VT VERTLY. AT THE TIME OF LNDG; I BELIEVE SURFACE WIND WAS LESS THAN 5 KTS AT 2W5. ON ROLLOUT; I EXPERIENCED AN UNUSUAL 'BOBBLE' THAT ALMOST UPSET THE ACFT. I WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN CTL AND TAXI TO PARKING. I BELIEVE THE UPSET WAS DUE TO ROTORWASH FROM THE USCG HELI THAT WAS APPARENTLY HOVERING TO ONE SIDE OF THE RWY AS I LANDED AND ROLLED OUT. I BELIEVE A HIGH-WING LIGHT ACFT MIGHT HAVE BEEN UPSET BY THE EVENT. I HAD SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES TO AVOID THE UNAUTH INCURSION INTO WDC ADIZ AIRSPACE AND SUBSEQUENT NEAR COLLISION WITH A USCG HELI. THESE WERE: 1) I COULD HAVE STUDIED THE VARIOUS AERO CHARTS MORE CLOSELY; TRACING THE 'SPD RING' AND ADIZ BOUNDARIES FOR THE WHOLE SECTOR OF AIRSPACE IN WHICH I PLANNED TO OPERATE. 2) I COULD HAVE CALLED FLT SVC FOR A LIVE BRIEFING RATHER THAN RELYING EXCLUSIVELY ON DUAT BRIEFINGS. A LIVE BRIEFER MIGHT HAVE POINTED OUT THAT 2W5 IS STILL WITHIN THE WDC ADIZ; DESPITE THE RECENT REDUCTION IN THE SIZE OF THE WDC ADIZ. 3) I COULD HAVE ADVISED POTOMAC APCH OF MY POS AND INTENTIONS PRIOR TO CHANGING FREQS TO THE 2W5 CTAF. POTOMAC APCH MIGHT HAVE ADVISED ME THAT I HAD VIOLATED THE WDC ADIZ AND TO MONITOR THE GUARD FREQ TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE INTERCEPTING USCG HELI. OTHER STEPS THAT MIGHT HAVE MITIGATED OR ELIMINATED THIS EVENT ARE: 1) THE USCG HELI DID NOT INTERCEPT ME UNTIL I WAS ESTABLISHED IN THE PATTERN AT 2W5. WHEN OPERATING IN OR CLOSE TO A CIVIL ARPT TFC PATTERN; INTERCEPTING MIL ACFT SHOULD MONITOR THE ARPT FREQ AND COMPLY WITH CIVIL ARPT AIR TFC RPTING PROCS. THE USCG HELI IN THIS INCIDENT NEVER ANNOUNCED ON THE CTAF AND NEVER ESTABLISHED RADIO CONTACT WITH ME; ALTHOUGH I WAS ON THE 2W5 CTAF FREQ AND IN THE 2W5 PATTERN THE ENTIRE TIME OF OUR ENCOUNTER. 2) IF POSSIBLE; EACH DUAT BRIEFING THAT TOUCHES OR INVOLVES WDC ADIZ AIRSPACE SHOULD PRINT -- IN A PROMINENT LOCATION AND TYPEFACE -- EITHER: A) A WARNING THAT AN ARPT INCLUDED IN THE PROPOSED RTE OF FLT IS WITHIN THE WDC ADIZ; OR B) A LIST OF ALL ARPTS STILL WITHIN THE WDC ADIZ. IN MY OPINION; THE FORMER 2(A) IN THIS PARAGRAPH -- IS THE PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE; ALTHOUGH THE LATTER -- 2(B) WOULD BE HELPFUL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.