Narrative:

Our passenger arrived at the airplane 2 1/2 hours early for departure. My first officer and I proceeded to ready the aircraft for departure. Prior to engine start; my first officer briefed me on the DVT1 departure procedure and the route of flight. The route was not as filed and there was some confusion as to the idents of some of the vors on the new route. I had my first officer clear the confusion with ATC as I started the engines. While taxiing out for departure; the confusion was sorted out; but we found that we could not find the appropriate high altitude en route chart for the departure area. While trying to find the chart I also noticed that both pilot and copilot map lights were inoperative; making the cockpit darker than normal. I was trying to figure out why both map lights were inoperative while my first officer was still trying to locate the en route chart. This was taking some time and we were #1 in a long line of airplanes waiting for departure so I was starting to feel pressure to get these problems resolved and depart. This was partly due to deer valley tower clearing me for takeoff without us mentioning that we were ready. I notified tower that I was not ready and would need another min or two to get ready. We still could not find any of the high altitude en route charts; so I used a low altitude route chart to find the appropriate fix. I could not find the cause as to the map light outage either. We finally got the route entered into the FMS and finished our taxi checklist. We then informed ATC that we were ready for departure. We were cleared for takeoff and we lined up on the runway. It occurred to me that with all that had just happened that I had forgotten which direction our departure turn was in. Since we were using runway 25L; the heading on the DVT1 departure was 060 degrees so it could have been to either the left or right. As I am applying takeoff power; I asked my first officer which direction the turn was in; and he replied he did not remember and realized that in the search for the en route chart he had momentarily misplaced the departure chart. I elected to continue the takeoff. I do remember that the turn was an immediate turn to 060 degrees but that is the only part of the procedure I remembered. Once airborne we were cleared to contact phx departure control. Before we could check on; I had to make a choice of which direction I had to turn. Remembering that there are some mountains to the north of the airport; I decided that we should turn to the south. As soon as we check on with phx departure; ATC asked us our heading. At that time we were turning through 210 degrees. He then asked us who gave us that turn; then said 'never mind; turn right immediately to a heading of 030 degrees and make it a hard turn.' once we got to the en route phase of flight we looked again at the DVT1 departure and found that the turn was a right turn to a 060 degree heading; not left as I had done. I also found the book with the high altitude en route charts wedged behind the copilot's seat. This event is the classic snowballing event chain that can easily lead to an accident. I was already tired as it was almost XA00 by my body clock and I was just beginning a flight with 3 legs that would last for about 8 hours so I was anxious to get it started. I was mystified and frustrated by both the map lights not working and the missing charts. I was rushed by myself; ATC and to a lesser degree by my passenger showing up 2 1/2 hours early. The lessons to be learned here are as follows: first; when feeling pressured to hurry up; that is the exact time to slow down. I did not heed my own advice of slowing down until I am caught up. Secondly; I will never enter the runway unless I know exactly where I am going and how I am getting there. Third; and I think last -- make sure I know where all the charts are before I start the engines and prepare for flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER PAX AND FLIGHT PLAN DISTRACTIONS; LIGHT JET FLT CREW DEPARTS DVT ON THE DVT1 SID AND FORGETS WHICH DIRECTION TO TURN TO THE 060 DEGREE HEADING. THEY CHOOSE POORLY.

Narrative: OUR PAX ARRIVED AT THE AIRPLANE 2 1/2 HRS EARLY FOR DEP. MY FO AND I PROCEEDED TO READY THE ACFT FOR DEP. PRIOR TO ENG START; MY FO BRIEFED ME ON THE DVT1 DEP PROC AND THE RTE OF FLT. THE RTE WAS NOT AS FILED AND THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION AS TO THE IDENTS OF SOME OF THE VORS ON THE NEW RTE. I HAD MY FO CLR THE CONFUSION WITH ATC AS I STARTED THE ENGS. WHILE TAXIING OUT FOR DEP; THE CONFUSION WAS SORTED OUT; BUT WE FOUND THAT WE COULD NOT FIND THE APPROPRIATE HIGH ALT ENRTE CHART FOR THE DEP AREA. WHILE TRYING TO FIND THE CHART I ALSO NOTICED THAT BOTH PLT AND COPLT MAP LIGHTS WERE INOP; MAKING THE COCKPIT DARKER THAN NORMAL. I WAS TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHY BOTH MAP LIGHTS WERE INOP WHILE MY FO WAS STILL TRYING TO LOCATE THE ENRTE CHART. THIS WAS TAKING SOME TIME AND WE WERE #1 IN A LONG LINE OF AIRPLANES WAITING FOR DEP SO I WAS STARTING TO FEEL PRESSURE TO GET THESE PROBS RESOLVED AND DEPART. THIS WAS PARTLY DUE TO DEER VALLEY TWR CLRING ME FOR TKOF WITHOUT US MENTIONING THAT WE WERE READY. I NOTIFIED TWR THAT I WAS NOT READY AND WOULD NEED ANOTHER MIN OR TWO TO GET READY. WE STILL COULD NOT FIND ANY OF THE HIGH ALT ENRTE CHARTS; SO I USED A LOW ALT RTE CHART TO FIND THE APPROPRIATE FIX. I COULD NOT FIND THE CAUSE AS TO THE MAP LIGHT OUTAGE EITHER. WE FINALLY GOT THE RTE ENTERED INTO THE FMS AND FINISHED OUR TAXI CHKLIST. WE THEN INFORMED ATC THAT WE WERE READY FOR DEP. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND WE LINED UP ON THE RWY. IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT WITH ALL THAT HAD JUST HAPPENED THAT I HAD FORGOTTEN WHICH DIRECTION OUR DEP TURN WAS IN. SINCE WE WERE USING RWY 25L; THE HDG ON THE DVT1 DEP WAS 060 DEGS SO IT COULD HAVE BEEN TO EITHER THE L OR R. AS I AM APPLYING TKOF PWR; I ASKED MY FO WHICH DIRECTION THE TURN WAS IN; AND HE REPLIED HE DID NOT REMEMBER AND REALIZED THAT IN THE SEARCH FOR THE ENRTE CHART HE HAD MOMENTARILY MISPLACED THE DEP CHART. I ELECTED TO CONTINUE THE TKOF. I DO REMEMBER THAT THE TURN WAS AN IMMEDIATE TURN TO 060 DEGS BUT THAT IS THE ONLY PART OF THE PROC I REMEMBERED. ONCE AIRBORNE WE WERE CLRED TO CONTACT PHX DEP CTL. BEFORE WE COULD CHK ON; I HAD TO MAKE A CHOICE OF WHICH DIRECTION I HAD TO TURN. REMEMBERING THAT THERE ARE SOME MOUNTAINS TO THE N OF THE ARPT; I DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD TURN TO THE S. AS SOON AS WE CHK ON WITH PHX DEP; ATC ASKED US OUR HDG. AT THAT TIME WE WERE TURNING THROUGH 210 DEGS. HE THEN ASKED US WHO GAVE US THAT TURN; THEN SAID 'NEVER MIND; TURN R IMMEDIATELY TO A HDG OF 030 DEGS AND MAKE IT A HARD TURN.' ONCE WE GOT TO THE ENRTE PHASE OF FLT WE LOOKED AGAIN AT THE DVT1 DEP AND FOUND THAT THE TURN WAS A R TURN TO A 060 DEG HDG; NOT L AS I HAD DONE. I ALSO FOUND THE BOOK WITH THE HIGH ALT ENRTE CHARTS WEDGED BEHIND THE COPLT'S SEAT. THIS EVENT IS THE CLASSIC SNOWBALLING EVENT CHAIN THAT CAN EASILY LEAD TO AN ACCIDENT. I WAS ALREADY TIRED AS IT WAS ALMOST XA00 BY MY BODY CLOCK AND I WAS JUST BEGINNING A FLT WITH 3 LEGS THAT WOULD LAST FOR ABOUT 8 HRS SO I WAS ANXIOUS TO GET IT STARTED. I WAS MYSTIFIED AND FRUSTRATED BY BOTH THE MAP LIGHTS NOT WORKING AND THE MISSING CHARTS. I WAS RUSHED BY MYSELF; ATC AND TO A LESSER DEG BY MY PAX SHOWING UP 2 1/2 HRS EARLY. THE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED HERE ARE AS FOLLOWS: FIRST; WHEN FEELING PRESSURED TO HURRY UP; THAT IS THE EXACT TIME TO SLOW DOWN. I DID NOT HEED MY OWN ADVICE OF SLOWING DOWN UNTIL I AM CAUGHT UP. SECONDLY; I WILL NEVER ENTER THE RWY UNLESS I KNOW EXACTLY WHERE I AM GOING AND HOW I AM GETTING THERE. THIRD; AND I THINK LAST -- MAKE SURE I KNOW WHERE ALL THE CHARTS ARE BEFORE I START THE ENGS AND PREPARE FOR FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.