Narrative:

I was the pilot monitoring on a flight to ict. We checked on with approach control through approximately 8000-6000 ft MSL. We were being vectored for the visual approach to runway 19L into ict. The navaids and FMS were set up properly for the visual backed up by the ILS runway 19L. The captain had called 'field in sight' to me while over (approximately) bec airport which is 10 NM to the west of ict. In reaction to him having visual contact with the airport; I called 'field in sight' to the approach controller. He then cleared us for the visual and gave us a frequency change to tower. I had also seen an airport that closely resembled ict; which at the time we both thought it was ict. The approach controller cleared us for the visual runway 19L. As we began the base to final leg; I noticed that the localizer was not 'coming alive' then immediately referenced my approach chart; airport diagram; and low en route chart to check for correct frequencys; airport layout; and surrounding airports; respectively. I determined that the airport that we were beginning to turn base to final was iab. I immediately told the captain that we are turning towards the wrong airport. At that point we had turned approximately 15-25 degrees to the left of an on-course heading of 260 degrees and approximately 5 mi away from iab. Almost immediately after we realized we were turning towards the wrong airport; we leveled off and made the heading change back to a base leg heading for runway 19L ict. The controller asked what our heading was. I responded that we are on a heading of 260 degrees. He told us that he was making sure we were not headed for iab. I told him that we took a look at it but we were headed to ict. He responded that an aircraft had mistakenly landed there before. I responded that I could see how that could happen. After reviewing our actions; I believe that we should have monitored the instruments more closely and included the amount of airports and close resemblance of iab to ict in the approach briefing; since iab has parallel runways 19L/19R and there are multiple other airports within a 10 NM vicinity of ict. If in doubt of proper airport identify; it is always good operational practice to query ATC about airport location. I believe that the promoted open communication between the captain and I and adhering to SOP was the key to preventing an inadvertent approach and landing to the wrong airport. Also; I believe that this misident could have been prevented if we had looked more closely at the low en route chart for other airports in close vicinity since wichita; ks; happens to be the 'GA capital of the world.' supplemental information from acn 772253: looking at the en route chart; I can see that there are 9 airports within a 5 mi radius leading to my confusion. Although I had the correct navigation setup; once I had spotted what I believed to be the correct airport; I focused too much outside without backing it up on the instruments.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR CREW CONFUSED IAB RWY 19L WITH ICT RWY 19L WHILE ON FINAL. THE PILOTS RECOGNIZED THE ERROR AS ATC QUESTIONED THEM ABOUT THE ACFT'S POSITION.

Narrative: I WAS THE PLT MONITORING ON A FLT TO ICT. WE CHKED ON WITH APCH CTL THROUGH APPROX 8000-6000 FT MSL. WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 19L INTO ICT. THE NAVAIDS AND FMS WERE SET UP PROPERLY FOR THE VISUAL BACKED UP BY THE ILS RWY 19L. THE CAPT HAD CALLED 'FIELD IN SIGHT' TO ME WHILE OVER (APPROX) BEC ARPT WHICH IS 10 NM TO THE W OF ICT. IN REACTION TO HIM HAVING VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE ARPT; I CALLED 'FIELD IN SIGHT' TO THE APCH CTLR. HE THEN CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL AND GAVE US A FREQ CHANGE TO TWR. I HAD ALSO SEEN AN ARPT THAT CLOSELY RESEMBLED ICT; WHICH AT THE TIME WE BOTH THOUGHT IT WAS ICT. THE APCH CTLR CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL RWY 19L. AS WE BEGAN THE BASE TO FINAL LEG; I NOTICED THAT THE LOC WAS NOT 'COMING ALIVE' THEN IMMEDIATELY REFED MY APCH CHART; ARPT DIAGRAM; AND LOW ENRTE CHART TO CHK FOR CORRECT FREQS; ARPT LAYOUT; AND SURROUNDING ARPTS; RESPECTIVELY. I DETERMINED THAT THE ARPT THAT WE WERE BEGINNING TO TURN BASE TO FINAL WAS IAB. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD THE CAPT THAT WE ARE TURNING TOWARDS THE WRONG ARPT. AT THAT POINT WE HAD TURNED APPROX 15-25 DEGS TO THE L OF AN ON-COURSE HDG OF 260 DEGS AND APPROX 5 MI AWAY FROM IAB. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER WE REALIZED WE WERE TURNING TOWARDS THE WRONG ARPT; WE LEVELED OFF AND MADE THE HDG CHANGE BACK TO A BASE LEG HDG FOR RWY 19L ICT. THE CTLR ASKED WHAT OUR HDG WAS. I RESPONDED THAT WE ARE ON A HDG OF 260 DEGS. HE TOLD US THAT HE WAS MAKING SURE WE WERE NOT HEADED FOR IAB. I TOLD HIM THAT WE TOOK A LOOK AT IT BUT WE WERE HEADED TO ICT. HE RESPONDED THAT AN ACFT HAD MISTAKENLY LANDED THERE BEFORE. I RESPONDED THAT I COULD SEE HOW THAT COULD HAPPEN. AFTER REVIEWING OUR ACTIONS; I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE MONITORED THE INSTS MORE CLOSELY AND INCLUDED THE AMOUNT OF ARPTS AND CLOSE RESEMBLANCE OF IAB TO ICT IN THE APCH BRIEFING; SINCE IAB HAS PARALLEL RWYS 19L/19R AND THERE ARE MULTIPLE OTHER ARPTS WITHIN A 10 NM VICINITY OF ICT. IF IN DOUBT OF PROPER ARPT IDENT; IT IS ALWAYS GOOD OPERATIONAL PRACTICE TO QUERY ATC ABOUT ARPT LOCATION. I BELIEVE THAT THE PROMOTED OPEN COM BTWN THE CAPT AND I AND ADHERING TO SOP WAS THE KEY TO PREVENTING AN INADVERTENT APCH AND LNDG TO THE WRONG ARPT. ALSO; I BELIEVE THAT THIS MISIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED IF WE HAD LOOKED MORE CLOSELY AT THE LOW ENRTE CHART FOR OTHER ARPTS IN CLOSE VICINITY SINCE WICHITA; KS; HAPPENS TO BE THE 'GA CAPITAL OF THE WORLD.' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 772253: LOOKING AT THE ENRTE CHART; I CAN SEE THAT THERE ARE 9 ARPTS WITHIN A 5 MI RADIUS LEADING TO MY CONFUSION. ALTHOUGH I HAD THE CORRECT NAV SETUP; ONCE I HAD SPOTTED WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE THE CORRECT ARPT; I FOCUSED TOO MUCH OUTSIDE WITHOUT BACKING IT UP ON THE INSTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.