|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1801 To 2400|
|Locale Reference||airport : zzz.airport|
|Altitude||msl single value : 8000|
|Controlling Facilities||artcc : zzz.artcc|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||climbout : vacating altitude|
|Route In Use||departure : on vectors|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 250|
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : less severe|
non adherence : company policies
aircraft equipment problem : less severe
|Independent Detector||aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : master warning|
other flight crewa
|Resolutory Action||flight crew : overcame equipment problem|
Flight Crew Human Performance
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
We were climbing out after departure. At approximately 8000 ft we got a red bleed leak on the left engine and a red master warning. The first officer was the PF so it was my job to deal with the problem. I looked up and noticed that the bleed did not automatically close which told me that the leak was not in the rear avionics. I reached up and shut the left bleed off and pulled out the QRH. At that time the first officer called for the autoplt to be engaged which I selected. I started reading the QRH out loud and I heard a click sound. I looked up and the first officer was no longer flying the airplane but was focused on the bleed leak problem. I had to stop what I was doing; look to see if the plane was correctly climbing and on course; then tell the first officer to fly the plane so that I could deal with the leak; then figure out what switch the first officer flipped; then go back to the QRH and deal with the problem. Valuable time was lost dealing with the bleed leak because the first officer did not remain the PF. I was told previously by this first officer that nobody that they fly with follows the SOP and that it is very difficult to fly with me because I expect the first officer to know and follow the SOP. I can probably agree with the first officer because most first officer's I fly with want to fly as a single pilot and there is no division of labor. The problem arises when there is a malfunction and since the pilots have not built good habits; the cockpit becomes a cluster. I read reports and try to identify if the PF remained the PF and in the cases that they didn't; I have noticed that the result was disciplinary action against the pilots because safety issues were not followed. I just don't understand why so many pilots insist on not following the guidelines of the SOP. I have talked with pilots who left to go fly with air carrier Y and air carrier Z and was told that everyone at the majors takes the SOP seriously; unlike air carrier X. Why is there such a big difference in attitude?
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMB145 CAPT LAMENTS THE LACK OF STANDARDIZATION BY HIS FO DURING QRH PROCEDURES FOR A BLEED AIR LEAK PASSING 8000 FEET IN THE CLIMB.
Narrative: WE WERE CLBING OUT AFTER DEP. AT APPROX 8000 FT WE GOT A RED BLEED LEAK ON THE L ENG AND A RED MASTER WARNING. THE FO WAS THE PF SO IT WAS MY JOB TO DEAL WITH THE PROB. I LOOKED UP AND NOTICED THAT THE BLEED DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY CLOSE WHICH TOLD ME THAT THE LEAK WAS NOT IN THE REAR AVIONICS. I REACHED UP AND SHUT THE L BLEED OFF AND PULLED OUT THE QRH. AT THAT TIME THE FO CALLED FOR THE AUTOPLT TO BE ENGAGED WHICH I SELECTED. I STARTED READING THE QRH OUT LOUD AND I HEARD A CLICK SOUND. I LOOKED UP AND THE FO WAS NO LONGER FLYING THE AIRPLANE BUT WAS FOCUSED ON THE BLEED LEAK PROB. I HAD TO STOP WHAT I WAS DOING; LOOK TO SEE IF THE PLANE WAS CORRECTLY CLBING AND ON COURSE; THEN TELL THE FO TO FLY THE PLANE SO THAT I COULD DEAL WITH THE LEAK; THEN FIGURE OUT WHAT SWITCH THE FO FLIPPED; THEN GO BACK TO THE QRH AND DEAL WITH THE PROB. VALUABLE TIME WAS LOST DEALING WITH THE BLEED LEAK BECAUSE THE FO DID NOT REMAIN THE PF. I WAS TOLD PREVIOUSLY BY THIS FO THAT NOBODY THAT THEY FLY WITH FOLLOWS THE SOP AND THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO FLY WITH ME BECAUSE I EXPECT THE FO TO KNOW AND FOLLOW THE SOP. I CAN PROBABLY AGREE WITH THE FO BECAUSE MOST FO'S I FLY WITH WANT TO FLY AS A SINGLE PLT AND THERE IS NO DIVISION OF LABOR. THE PROB ARISES WHEN THERE IS A MALFUNCTION AND SINCE THE PLTS HAVE NOT BUILT GOOD HABITS; THE COCKPIT BECOMES A CLUSTER. I READ RPTS AND TRY TO IDENT IF THE PF REMAINED THE PF AND IN THE CASES THAT THEY DIDN'T; I HAVE NOTICED THAT THE RESULT WAS DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST THE PLTS BECAUSE SAFETY ISSUES WERE NOT FOLLOWED. I JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY SO MANY PLTS INSIST ON NOT FOLLOWING THE GUIDELINES OF THE SOP. I HAVE TALKED WITH PLTS WHO LEFT TO GO FLY WITH ACR Y AND ACR Z AND WAS TOLD THAT EVERYONE AT THE MAJORS TAKES THE SOP SERIOUSLY; UNLIKE ACR X. WHY IS THERE SUCH A BIG DIFFERENCE IN ATTITUDE?
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.