Narrative:

Prior to an operational error that occurred I was working seca/fremont radar position combined at northern ca TRACON (nct). Licke (the arrival sector for sjc) was the sector that had the operational error that occurred in fremont airspace. During the investigation of the operational error; 11 arrs to sjc (mostly jets) had been descended through fremont airspace by the licke controller prior to the incident. It was believed by the investigators that licke descended aircraft into fremont airspace without coordination. I was contacted by the nct operations manager to see if I had any knowledge of what the licke controller had done. Sjc was landing runway 12. The licke controller advised he had an arrival push coming and requested descent into fremont airspace during the push. An approving acknowledgement was given to licke to descend into fremont airspace during the push. It was evident the push was over prior to being relieved by another controller on the seca/fremont position. The operational error occurred 4 mins after the new fremont controller took the position. One of the issues during this situation is sjc was landing runway 12. The airspace that licke owns during this confign is very restr with adjoining sectors on both sides of the narrow jawws 2 arrival corridor. To compound the issue; the arrs have to be stepped down several times to stay above the MVA's; but to stay below an sfo arrival sector. To effectively flow the sjc arrs; it is crucial to start their descent as soon as feasible. The section of airspace around jawws from 6000 ft to 8000 ft belongs to fremont; but during busy east operations at sjc; licke should have the airspace for better flow. Fremont can utilize the seca airspace 5000 ft and below in that area to accommodate approachs to wvi; sns and mry as well as missed approachs off these airports.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NCT CTLR REPORTS POSSIBLE AIRSPACE VIOLATIONS DISCOVERED DURING OPERROR INVESTIGATION IN ANOTHER SECTOR.

Narrative: PRIOR TO AN OPERROR THAT OCCURRED I WAS WORKING SECA/FREMONT RADAR POS COMBINED AT NORTHERN CA TRACON (NCT). LICKE (THE ARR SECTOR FOR SJC) WAS THE SECTOR THAT HAD THE OPERROR THAT OCCURRED IN FREMONT AIRSPACE. DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF THE OPERROR; 11 ARRS TO SJC (MOSTLY JETS) HAD BEEN DSNDED THROUGH FREMONT AIRSPACE BY THE LICKE CTLR PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT. IT WAS BELIEVED BY THE INVESTIGATORS THAT LICKE DSNDED ACFT INTO FREMONT AIRSPACE WITHOUT COORD. I WAS CONTACTED BY THE NCT OPS MGR TO SEE IF I HAD ANY KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT THE LICKE CTLR HAD DONE. SJC WAS LNDG RWY 12. THE LICKE CTLR ADVISED HE HAD AN ARR PUSH COMING AND REQUESTED DSCNT INTO FREMONT AIRSPACE DURING THE PUSH. AN APPROVING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WAS GIVEN TO LICKE TO DSND INTO FREMONT AIRSPACE DURING THE PUSH. IT WAS EVIDENT THE PUSH WAS OVER PRIOR TO BEING RELIEVED BY ANOTHER CTLR ON THE SECA/FREMONT POS. THE OPERROR OCCURRED 4 MINS AFTER THE NEW FREMONT CTLR TOOK THE POS. ONE OF THE ISSUES DURING THIS SITUATION IS SJC WAS LNDG RWY 12. THE AIRSPACE THAT LICKE OWNS DURING THIS CONFIGN IS VERY RESTR WITH ADJOINING SECTORS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE NARROW JAWWS 2 ARR CORRIDOR. TO COMPOUND THE ISSUE; THE ARRS HAVE TO BE STEPPED DOWN SEVERAL TIMES TO STAY ABOVE THE MVA'S; BUT TO STAY BELOW AN SFO ARR SECTOR. TO EFFECTIVELY FLOW THE SJC ARRS; IT IS CRUCIAL TO START THEIR DSCNT AS SOON AS FEASIBLE. THE SECTION OF AIRSPACE AROUND JAWWS FROM 6000 FT TO 8000 FT BELONGS TO FREMONT; BUT DURING BUSY E OPS AT SJC; LICKE SHOULD HAVE THE AIRSPACE FOR BETTER FLOW. FREMONT CAN UTILIZE THE SECA AIRSPACE 5000 FT AND BELOW IN THAT AREA TO ACCOMMODATE APCHS TO WVI; SNS AND MRY AS WELL AS MISSED APCHS OFF THESE ARPTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.