Narrative:

The jet stream was causing a lot of high altitude turbulence and chop of up to moderate degree or greater. Thus frequency congestion and workload was high with aircraft requesting many turbulence reports and altitude changes. A flight was handed off to us from sector 17 (mcw hi) at FL280 on a southerly heading; negative rvsm requesting an exception clearance to FL300 into rvsm airspace. The sector team questioned the pilot as to whether he was an excepted rvsm aircraft and we got confusing and unclr responses. I asked the pilot if he was a 'manufacturer aircraft being flown for development/certification' and he did not answer in the affirmative. I asked the front line manager (flm) whether or not this aircraft was an exception and if I could clear him into rvsm airspace. He gave no definite answer initially until pressed by my d-side; to which the flm said we could climb the aircraft into rvsm airspace; considering him a 'manufacturer aircraft being flown for development/certification' as specified in the 7110.65. However; I then challenged the flm as I know of no aircraft manufacturers located in ZZZ; and the flm said he would make some phone calls for clarification. In rvsm training we had all been instructed that non-excepted aircraft could never be cleared into rvsm airspace regardless of the circumstances; so the sector team felt it necessary to ensure that the aircraft was indeed an exception. Accordingly we stood by for further direction from the flm. However none would come and eventually aircraft X asked for and received a clearance back to ZZZ without receiving a clearance into rvsm airspace. Subsequently there was an 'investigation' into the incident and it appears that FAA management is trying to blame me for not clearing aircraft X into rvsm airspace as an excepted aircraft. Considering I was receiving contradictory and indecisive direction on the flight at the time from the flm; I erred on the side of safety and caution and the training I had received and didn't clear the aircraft into rvsm airspace. At no time did the flm order me to climb the aircraft into rvsm airspace as he obviously didn't want to be held accountable for that decision either. There needs to be additional training and procedures for excepted rvsm aircraft in the 'manufacturer aircraft being flown for development/certification' category. Further; there needs to be prescribed phraseology to ascertain whether aircraft meet the requisite qualifications for entry into rvsm airspace so there is no confusion for either flight crews or controllers. This incident highlights the clearly hostile stance FAA management currently shows towards the controller workforce. They obviously are unwilling to accept any real responsibility for real-time judgement calls involving air traffic or otherwise give clear direction; and are later willing to deflect blame for system shortcomings onto controllers. I feel persecuted for making safety my first priority and following the 7110.65 and my training in this matter. The current FAA environment has made controllers distraction; uneasy and more prone to errors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZMP CTLR DESCRIBED CONFUSING SITUATION REGARDING APPLICATION OF RVSM 'EXCEPTION' RULES; CITING LACK OF TRAINING/PROCS AND MGMNT DECISIONS AS CONTRIBUTORY.

Narrative: THE JET STREAM WAS CAUSING A LOT OF HIGH ALT TURB AND CHOP OF UP TO MODERATE DEG OR GREATER. THUS FREQ CONGESTION AND WORKLOAD WAS HIGH WITH ACFT REQUESTING MANY TURB RPTS AND ALT CHANGES. A FLT WAS HANDED OFF TO US FROM SECTOR 17 (MCW HI) AT FL280 ON A SOUTHERLY HDG; NEGATIVE RVSM REQUESTING AN EXCEPTION CLRNC TO FL300 INTO RVSM AIRSPACE. THE SECTOR TEAM QUESTIONED THE PLT AS TO WHETHER HE WAS AN EXCEPTED RVSM ACFT AND WE GOT CONFUSING AND UNCLR RESPONSES. I ASKED THE PLT IF HE WAS A 'MANUFACTURER ACFT BEING FLOWN FOR DEVELOPMENT/CERTIFICATION' AND HE DID NOT ANSWER IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. I ASKED THE FRONT LINE MGR (FLM) WHETHER OR NOT THIS ACFT WAS AN EXCEPTION AND IF I COULD CLR HIM INTO RVSM AIRSPACE. HE GAVE NO DEFINITE ANSWER INITIALLY UNTIL PRESSED BY MY D-SIDE; TO WHICH THE FLM SAID WE COULD CLB THE ACFT INTO RVSM AIRSPACE; CONSIDERING HIM A 'MANUFACTURER ACFT BEING FLOWN FOR DEVELOPMENT/CERTIFICATION' AS SPECIFIED IN THE 7110.65. HOWEVER; I THEN CHALLENGED THE FLM AS I KNOW OF NO ACFT MANUFACTURERS LOCATED IN ZZZ; AND THE FLM SAID HE WOULD MAKE SOME PHONE CALLS FOR CLARIFICATION. IN RVSM TRAINING WE HAD ALL BEEN INSTRUCTED THAT NON-EXCEPTED ACFT COULD NEVER BE CLRED INTO RVSM AIRSPACE REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES; SO THE SECTOR TEAM FELT IT NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE ACFT WAS INDEED AN EXCEPTION. ACCORDINGLY WE STOOD BY FOR FURTHER DIRECTION FROM THE FLM. HOWEVER NONE WOULD COME AND EVENTUALLY ACFT X ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED A CLRNC BACK TO ZZZ WITHOUT RECEIVING A CLRNC INTO RVSM AIRSPACE. SUBSEQUENTLY THERE WAS AN 'INVESTIGATION' INTO THE INCIDENT AND IT APPEARS THAT FAA MGMNT IS TRYING TO BLAME ME FOR NOT CLRING ACFT X INTO RVSM AIRSPACE AS AN EXCEPTED ACFT. CONSIDERING I WAS RECEIVING CONTRADICTORY AND INDECISIVE DIRECTION ON THE FLT AT THE TIME FROM THE FLM; I ERRED ON THE SIDE OF SAFETY AND CAUTION AND THE TRAINING I HAD RECEIVED AND DIDN'T CLR THE ACFT INTO RVSM AIRSPACE. AT NO TIME DID THE FLM ORDER ME TO CLB THE ACFT INTO RVSM AIRSPACE AS HE OBVIOUSLY DIDN'T WANT TO BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THAT DECISION EITHER. THERE NEEDS TO BE ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND PROCS FOR EXCEPTED RVSM ACFT IN THE 'MANUFACTURER ACFT BEING FLOWN FOR DEVELOPMENT/CERTIFICATION' CATEGORY. FURTHER; THERE NEEDS TO BE PRESCRIBED PHRASEOLOGY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ACFT MEET THE REQUISITE QUALIFICATIONS FOR ENTRY INTO RVSM AIRSPACE SO THERE IS NO CONFUSION FOR EITHER FLT CREWS OR CTLRS. THIS INCIDENT HIGHLIGHTS THE CLEARLY HOSTILE STANCE FAA MGMNT CURRENTLY SHOWS TOWARDS THE CTLR WORKFORCE. THEY OBVIOUSLY ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT ANY REAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR REAL-TIME JUDGEMENT CALLS INVOLVING AIR TFC OR OTHERWISE GIVE CLR DIRECTION; AND ARE LATER WILLING TO DEFLECT BLAME FOR SYS SHORTCOMINGS ONTO CTLRS. I FEEL PERSECUTED FOR MAKING SAFETY MY FIRST PRIORITY AND FOLLOWING THE 7110.65 AND MY TRAINING IN THIS MATTER. THE CURRENT FAA ENVIRONMENT HAS MADE CTLRS DISTR; UNEASY AND MORE PRONE TO ERRORS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.