Narrative:

Departed with flaps 11 degrees for takeoff. During our takeoff roll; tower cleared another flight to takeoff from the parallel runway. Very shortly after we were airborne; tower asked us to begin our assigned left turn to 010 degree heading. Due to the close proximity of the other aircraft; the captain (PF) chose to immediately turn on the autoplt so he could concentrate on locating the departing aircraft. We were in the turn and on speed and he called 'flaps up.' I selected the flaps up. While the flaps were retracting; I noticed the indication needles making bizarre indications. Rather than retracting together; they were retracting at varying rates all the way to 0 degrees. Upon reaching 0 degrees; the left flap actually showed a couple of needle widths above 0 and the right showed around 3. I brought this to the attention of the captain about the time we were looking for the aircraft. Very shortly after hat we had several other duties that kept us busy flying the plane (handoffs; traffic calls; etc). At this time; the autoplt was still on. Somewhere around 10000 ft the captain noted that there was a significant amount of aileron commanded by the autoplt. He then disconnected it; and trimmed the aircraft manually. Around this time we began to discuss the fact that we may have a flap position indicator that was not working correctly. I described what I had seen to him during the flap retraction. Around 15000 ft (approximately) the captain had trimmed the aircraft for level climb flight. He noticed that there was over 2 units of left wing down. We realized this was odd; as the flap position indicator was indicating opposite this. (Later we would be told the indicator needle inputs had been installed backwards). By now we were approaching the flight levels and realized it was indeed a real possibility that we had one or both trailing edge flaps possibly extended. We decided to err on the side of caution had kept the aircraft below any possible slat/flap limit speed of 250 KIAS and .57 mach. In order to do this; we needed to level off early and did so at 20000 ft. At this point we began to evaluate the situation we had. We solicited some input from our jumpseater; who was a mechanic. We rechked to make sure we were reading the trim indicators and the flap indicators correctly. At this point there was no QRH that was applicable to our situation. About this time; we received an unsolicited call from one of the aft flight attendants. She indicated there was a passenger in row X who was a military mechanic and he believed our flaps were asymmetrical. At this point we decided it was a good time to bring maintenance control in on a voice patch. Approximately 5 mins went by before we had voice contact. I described what we had experienced up to that point and asked maintenance control what they thought of the situation. They said they would have to look some things up and would get back with us. The captain and I had also discussed the fact that our fuel was an issue; especially with our significantly lower altitude. We asked dispatch to please rework some figures to see how we would be looking on fuel. The captain and I had both already done some figuring to see if we would be comfortable going to ZZZ and wanted to triple check. What followed was a 10+ min period of time that seemed to drag on and on. We had trouble maintaining contact with dispatch via the radio and while waiting for their input; we ended up having to switch to a different remote entirely. We asked the maintenance controller if he would like us to send the jumpseating mechanic back to survey the flaps while he continued checking manuals. He thought this was a good idea. We sent him back equipped with a digital camera. After some additional time passed; the maintenance controller called back and told us that there was no speed restr on having 2 units of aileron trim on; thus we should climb to our cruise altitude; accelerate and continue. At this point; the captain and I switched duties and he took over the conversation with maintenance control. After a fairly lengthy discussion; the captain made his point that we were concerned about flying around over flap extended airspeed/mach; with part of a flap extended. The 2 of us had a brief discussion about the overall situation to this point. The jumpseater had not yet returned from his inspection. The captain pointed out what he suspected was some minor airframe vibration; likely caused by some flap being extended. I agreed I did feel something minor as well. The mechanic now returned to the flight deck and had some digital pictures to show us. After looking at the pictures it appeared we had approximately a 3 inch discrepancy between the faired left aileron and the left outboard flap edge. At this point; we believed we should plan to land and that due to our fuel burn; that ZZZ1 was our best option. We were discussing fuel with dispatch and were trying to make sure they understood our actual fuel was 1600 pounds less than listed due to the center tank pumps being inoperative and on MEL (1.6 was in the tanks). We then confirmed with dispatch and maintenance control that the best course of action was to land at ZZZ1. The captain also noted that we were now going to be below maximum landing weight by the time we arrived in ZZZ1. At this point I called center and asked to change our destination to ZZZ1 and they cleared us directly to a fix which was less than 20 mi away. We also had a 40+ KT tailwind at this point as well. The landing in ZZZ1 was essentially uneventful. An emergency was not declared; nor was fire and rescue requested. The landing was normal. I don't know what causes md flap asymmetry; but perhaps some practices could be implemented to check the flaps. I'm not sure of this; I'm not a mechanic. The lack of communication between maintenance control; dispatch and us was really a frustrating part of this event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 FLAPS RETRACTED ASYMMETRICALLY AFTER TKOF. FLT CREW LIMITED SPEED DURING CLIMB AND CRUISE AND ELECTED TO DIVERT DUE TO FUEL CONSIDERATIONS.

Narrative: DEPARTED WITH FLAPS 11 DEGS FOR TKOF. DURING OUR TKOF ROLL; TWR CLRED ANOTHER FLT TO TKOF FROM THE PARALLEL RWY. VERY SHORTLY AFTER WE WERE AIRBORNE; TWR ASKED US TO BEGIN OUR ASSIGNED L TURN TO 010 DEG HDG. DUE TO THE CLOSE PROX OF THE OTHER ACFT; THE CAPT (PF) CHOSE TO IMMEDIATELY TURN ON THE AUTOPLT SO HE COULD CONCENTRATE ON LOCATING THE DEPARTING ACFT. WE WERE IN THE TURN AND ON SPD AND HE CALLED 'FLAPS UP.' I SELECTED THE FLAPS UP. WHILE THE FLAPS WERE RETRACTING; I NOTICED THE INDICATION NEEDLES MAKING BIZARRE INDICATIONS. RATHER THAN RETRACTING TOGETHER; THEY WERE RETRACTING AT VARYING RATES ALL THE WAY TO 0 DEGS. UPON REACHING 0 DEGS; THE L FLAP ACTUALLY SHOWED A COUPLE OF NEEDLE WIDTHS ABOVE 0 AND THE R SHOWED AROUND 3. I BROUGHT THIS TO THE ATTN OF THE CAPT ABOUT THE TIME WE WERE LOOKING FOR THE ACFT. VERY SHORTLY AFTER HAT WE HAD SEVERAL OTHER DUTIES THAT KEPT US BUSY FLYING THE PLANE (HDOFS; TFC CALLS; ETC). AT THIS TIME; THE AUTOPLT WAS STILL ON. SOMEWHERE AROUND 10000 FT THE CAPT NOTED THAT THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF AILERON COMMANDED BY THE AUTOPLT. HE THEN DISCONNECTED IT; AND TRIMMED THE ACFT MANUALLY. AROUND THIS TIME WE BEGAN TO DISCUSS THE FACT THAT WE MAY HAVE A FLAP POS INDICATOR THAT WAS NOT WORKING CORRECTLY. I DESCRIBED WHAT I HAD SEEN TO HIM DURING THE FLAP RETRACTION. AROUND 15000 FT (APPROX) THE CAPT HAD TRIMMED THE ACFT FOR LEVEL CLB FLT. HE NOTICED THAT THERE WAS OVER 2 UNITS OF L WING DOWN. WE REALIZED THIS WAS ODD; AS THE FLAP POS INDICATOR WAS INDICATING OPPOSITE THIS. (LATER WE WOULD BE TOLD THE INDICATOR NEEDLE INPUTS HAD BEEN INSTALLED BACKWARDS). BY NOW WE WERE APCHING THE FLT LEVELS AND REALIZED IT WAS INDEED A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT WE HAD ONE OR BOTH TRAILING EDGE FLAPS POSSIBLY EXTENDED. WE DECIDED TO ERR ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION HAD KEPT THE ACFT BELOW ANY POSSIBLE SLAT/FLAP LIMIT SPD OF 250 KIAS AND .57 MACH. IN ORDER TO DO THIS; WE NEEDED TO LEVEL OFF EARLY AND DID SO AT 20000 FT. AT THIS POINT WE BEGAN TO EVALUATE THE SITUATION WE HAD. WE SOLICITED SOME INPUT FROM OUR JUMPSEATER; WHO WAS A MECH. WE RECHKED TO MAKE SURE WE WERE READING THE TRIM INDICATORS AND THE FLAP INDICATORS CORRECTLY. AT THIS POINT THERE WAS NO QRH THAT WAS APPLICABLE TO OUR SITUATION. ABOUT THIS TIME; WE RECEIVED AN UNSOLICITED CALL FROM ONE OF THE AFT FLT ATTENDANTS. SHE INDICATED THERE WAS A PAX IN ROW X WHO WAS A MIL MECH AND HE BELIEVED OUR FLAPS WERE ASYMMETRICAL. AT THIS POINT WE DECIDED IT WAS A GOOD TIME TO BRING MAINT CTL IN ON A VOICE PATCH. APPROX 5 MINS WENT BY BEFORE WE HAD VOICE CONTACT. I DESCRIBED WHAT WE HAD EXPERIENCED UP TO THAT POINT AND ASKED MAINT CTL WHAT THEY THOUGHT OF THE SITUATION. THEY SAID THEY WOULD HAVE TO LOOK SOME THINGS UP AND WOULD GET BACK WITH US. THE CAPT AND I HAD ALSO DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT OUR FUEL WAS AN ISSUE; ESPECIALLY WITH OUR SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER ALT. WE ASKED DISPATCH TO PLEASE REWORK SOME FIGURES TO SEE HOW WE WOULD BE LOOKING ON FUEL. THE CAPT AND I HAD BOTH ALREADY DONE SOME FIGURING TO SEE IF WE WOULD BE COMFORTABLE GOING TO ZZZ AND WANTED TO TRIPLE CHK. WHAT FOLLOWED WAS A 10+ MIN PERIOD OF TIME THAT SEEMED TO DRAG ON AND ON. WE HAD TROUBLE MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH DISPATCH VIA THE RADIO AND WHILE WAITING FOR THEIR INPUT; WE ENDED UP HAVING TO SWITCH TO A DIFFERENT REMOTE ENTIRELY. WE ASKED THE MAINT CTLR IF HE WOULD LIKE US TO SEND THE JUMPSEATING MECH BACK TO SURVEY THE FLAPS WHILE HE CONTINUED CHKING MANUALS. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS A GOOD IDEA. WE SENT HIM BACK EQUIPPED WITH A DIGITAL CAMERA. AFTER SOME ADDITIONAL TIME PASSED; THE MAINT CTLR CALLED BACK AND TOLD US THAT THERE WAS NO SPD RESTR ON HAVING 2 UNITS OF AILERON TRIM ON; THUS WE SHOULD CLB TO OUR CRUISE ALT; ACCELERATE AND CONTINUE. AT THIS POINT; THE CAPT AND I SWITCHED DUTIES AND HE TOOK OVER THE CONVERSATION WITH MAINT CTL. AFTER A FAIRLY LENGTHY DISCUSSION; THE CAPT MADE HIS POINT THAT WE WERE CONCERNED ABOUT FLYING AROUND OVER FLAP EXTENDED AIRSPD/MACH; WITH PART OF A FLAP EXTENDED. THE 2 OF US HAD A BRIEF DISCUSSION ABOUT THE OVERALL SITUATION TO THIS POINT. THE JUMPSEATER HAD NOT YET RETURNED FROM HIS INSPECTION. THE CAPT POINTED OUT WHAT HE SUSPECTED WAS SOME MINOR AIRFRAME VIBRATION; LIKELY CAUSED BY SOME FLAP BEING EXTENDED. I AGREED I DID FEEL SOMETHING MINOR AS WELL. THE MECH NOW RETURNED TO THE FLT DECK AND HAD SOME DIGITAL PICTURES TO SHOW US. AFTER LOOKING AT THE PICTURES IT APPEARED WE HAD APPROX A 3 INCH DISCREPANCY BTWN THE FAIRED L AILERON AND THE L OUTBOARD FLAP EDGE. AT THIS POINT; WE BELIEVED WE SHOULD PLAN TO LAND AND THAT DUE TO OUR FUEL BURN; THAT ZZZ1 WAS OUR BEST OPTION. WE WERE DISCUSSING FUEL WITH DISPATCH AND WERE TRYING TO MAKE SURE THEY UNDERSTOOD OUR ACTUAL FUEL WAS 1600 LBS LESS THAN LISTED DUE TO THE CTR TANK PUMPS BEING INOP AND ON MEL (1.6 WAS IN THE TANKS). WE THEN CONFIRMED WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL THAT THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO LAND AT ZZZ1. THE CAPT ALSO NOTED THAT WE WERE NOW GOING TO BE BELOW MAX LNDG WT BY THE TIME WE ARRIVED IN ZZZ1. AT THIS POINT I CALLED CTR AND ASKED TO CHANGE OUR DEST TO ZZZ1 AND THEY CLRED US DIRECTLY TO A FIX WHICH WAS LESS THAN 20 MI AWAY. WE ALSO HAD A 40+ KT TAILWIND AT THIS POINT AS WELL. THE LNDG IN ZZZ1 WAS ESSENTIALLY UNEVENTFUL. AN EMER WAS NOT DECLARED; NOR WAS FIRE AND RESCUE REQUESTED. THE LNDG WAS NORMAL. I DON'T KNOW WHAT CAUSES MD FLAP ASYMMETRY; BUT PERHAPS SOME PRACTICES COULD BE IMPLEMENTED TO CHK THE FLAPS. I'M NOT SURE OF THIS; I'M NOT A MECH. THE LACK OF COM BTWN MAINT CTL; DISPATCH AND US WAS REALLY A FRUSTRATING PART OF THIS EVENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.