Narrative:

During climb out from ZZZ (aircraft was there for contract maintenance on landing gear) got green hydraulic system low ECAM. I (captain) was PNF and performed the ECAM procedures and turned the green hydraulic engine pump off. ECAM directed to turn off ptu also. Aircraft was still in climb to 15000 ft and leveled off at that altitude. Completed ECAM procedure and reviewed inoperative system with first officer. We lost nosewheel steering; #1 thrust reverser; normal brakes; needed to perform alternate gear extension (and would be unable to retract the gear once extended); spoilers #1 and #5 and various other items. We declared an emergency with ATC and told them we had lost 1 hydraulic system. The first officer and I decided that ZZZ1 would be the safest airport in point of time at which to land. This decision was based on the fact that ZZZ1 compared to ZZZ had much longer and wider runways based on no nosewheel steering; no reverse thrust and only alternate brakes. Also; we were now about halfway between the 2 airports. In hindsight also; ZZZ1 had emergency equipment if required. I contacted maintenance control and had them get the dispatcher on the line as well. They acknowledged the choice of ZZZ1. We used the alternate gear extension procedure and performed an uneventful landing in ZZZ1. I flew the approach and landing. We had requested fire fighting equipment in case of any issues with the inoperative nosewheel steering; brakes and reverser. We started the APU during the approach so we could shut down the engines once we had landed. After we stopped on the runway; the fire fighting coordinator spoke with us on a discrete frequency and said everything looked fine (except the gear doors were open; due to gravity gear extension). We were towed to the gate. During postflt inspection; there was hydraulic fluid coming from a fitting on an actuator arm on the right main landing gear. Even more concerning; there was also a grey plastic container measuring about 24 inches long by 12 inches wide by 10 inches high sitting in the wheel well right below the green hydraulic reservoir that apparently had been left there by contract maintenance. Amazingly this container didn't fall out of the wheel well during the approach and landing. During preflight the landing gear doors are closed so you couldn't see this. Someone needs to do something about quality control with contract maintenance. This is 2 major things (not connecting fittings properly and leaving tools behind). Supplemental information from acn 757092: I was the PF for this leg. After takeoff passing approximately 9000 ft in the climb to 15000 ft we got a progression of ecams. Hydraulic G engine #1 pump lo; followed by hydraulic G system lo pr; followed by hydraulic G rsvr lo lvl. I continued to fly while the captain did the ECAM; consulted the FM and coordinated with dispatch. We communicated our problem to ATC; declared an emergency; and continued to ZZZ1. In descent to ZZZ1 and after all coordination was complete I handed control of the aircraft to the captain for the landing. We completed the gravity gear extension early and performed a visual approach. After touchdown and rollout we stopped on the runway for the crash fire rescue equipment to inspect the aircraft. After verification by crash fire rescue equipment that the exterior was not in doubt we connected a towbar and were towed to a gate where we secured the aircraft. Postflt inspection of the aircraft revealed a 3 ft by 1 ft by 1 ft drip pail in the gear bay. Close inspection of the right main landing gear revealed a damaged hydraulic line.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 FLT CREW REPORTS GREEN HYD SYSTEM FAILURE AFTER PICKING ACFT UP FROM CONTRACT MAINTENANCE COMPANY. FLT CREW COMPLIES WITH ECAM PROCEDURES AND DIVERTS TO NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT.

Narrative: DURING CLBOUT FROM ZZZ (ACFT WAS THERE FOR CONTRACT MAINT ON LNDG GEAR) GOT GREEN HYD SYS LOW ECAM. I (CAPT) WAS PNF AND PERFORMED THE ECAM PROCS AND TURNED THE GREEN HYD ENG PUMP OFF. ECAM DIRECTED TO TURN OFF PTU ALSO. ACFT WAS STILL IN CLB TO 15000 FT AND LEVELED OFF AT THAT ALT. COMPLETED ECAM PROC AND REVIEWED INOP SYS WITH FO. WE LOST NOSEWHEEL STEERING; #1 THRUST REVERSER; NORMAL BRAKES; NEEDED TO PERFORM ALTERNATE GEAR EXTENSION (AND WOULD BE UNABLE TO RETRACT THE GEAR ONCE EXTENDED); SPOILERS #1 AND #5 AND VARIOUS OTHER ITEMS. WE DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC AND TOLD THEM WE HAD LOST 1 HYD SYS. THE FO AND I DECIDED THAT ZZZ1 WOULD BE THE SAFEST ARPT IN POINT OF TIME AT WHICH TO LAND. THIS DECISION WAS BASED ON THE FACT THAT ZZZ1 COMPARED TO ZZZ HAD MUCH LONGER AND WIDER RWYS BASED ON NO NOSEWHEEL STEERING; NO REVERSE THRUST AND ONLY ALTERNATE BRAKES. ALSO; WE WERE NOW ABOUT HALFWAY BTWN THE 2 ARPTS. IN HINDSIGHT ALSO; ZZZ1 HAD EMER EQUIP IF REQUIRED. I CONTACTED MAINT CTL AND HAD THEM GET THE DISPATCHER ON THE LINE AS WELL. THEY ACKNOWLEDGED THE CHOICE OF ZZZ1. WE USED THE ALTERNATE GEAR EXTENSION PROC AND PERFORMED AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG IN ZZZ1. I FLEW THE APCH AND LNDG. WE HAD REQUESTED FIRE FIGHTING EQUIP IN CASE OF ANY ISSUES WITH THE INOP NOSEWHEEL STEERING; BRAKES AND REVERSER. WE STARTED THE APU DURING THE APCH SO WE COULD SHUT DOWN THE ENGS ONCE WE HAD LANDED. AFTER WE STOPPED ON THE RWY; THE FIRE FIGHTING COORDINATOR SPOKE WITH US ON A DISCRETE FREQ AND SAID EVERYTHING LOOKED FINE (EXCEPT THE GEAR DOORS WERE OPEN; DUE TO GRAVITY GEAR EXTENSION). WE WERE TOWED TO THE GATE. DURING POSTFLT INSPECTION; THERE WAS HYD FLUID COMING FROM A FITTING ON AN ACTUATOR ARM ON THE R MAIN LNDG GEAR. EVEN MORE CONCERNING; THERE WAS ALSO A GREY PLASTIC CONTAINER MEASURING ABOUT 24 INCHES LONG BY 12 INCHES WIDE BY 10 INCHES HIGH SITTING IN THE WHEEL WELL RIGHT BELOW THE GREEN HYD RESERVOIR THAT APPARENTLY HAD BEEN LEFT THERE BY CONTRACT MAINT. AMAZINGLY THIS CONTAINER DIDN'T FALL OUT OF THE WHEEL WELL DURING THE APCH AND LNDG. DURING PREFLT THE LNDG GEAR DOORS ARE CLOSED SO YOU COULDN'T SEE THIS. SOMEONE NEEDS TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT QUALITY CTL WITH CONTRACT MAINT. THIS IS 2 MAJOR THINGS (NOT CONNECTING FITTINGS PROPERLY AND LEAVING TOOLS BEHIND). SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 757092: I WAS THE PF FOR THIS LEG. AFTER TKOF PASSING APPROX 9000 FT IN THE CLB TO 15000 FT WE GOT A PROGRESSION OF ECAMS. HYD G ENG #1 PUMP LO; FOLLOWED BY HYD G SYS LO PR; FOLLOWED BY HYD G RSVR LO LVL. I CONTINUED TO FLY WHILE THE CAPT DID THE ECAM; CONSULTED THE FM AND COORDINATED WITH DISPATCH. WE COMMUNICATED OUR PROB TO ATC; DECLARED AN EMER; AND CONTINUED TO ZZZ1. IN DSCNT TO ZZZ1 AND AFTER ALL COORD WAS COMPLETE I HANDED CTL OF THE ACFT TO THE CAPT FOR THE LNDG. WE COMPLETED THE GRAVITY GEAR EXTENSION EARLY AND PERFORMED A VISUAL APCH. AFTER TOUCHDOWN AND ROLLOUT WE STOPPED ON THE RWY FOR THE CFR TO INSPECT THE ACFT. AFTER VERIFICATION BY CFR THAT THE EXTERIOR WAS NOT IN DOUBT WE CONNECTED A TOWBAR AND WERE TOWED TO A GATE WHERE WE SECURED THE ACFT. POSTFLT INSPECTION OF THE ACFT REVEALED A 3 FT BY 1 FT BY 1 FT DRIP PAIL IN THE GEAR BAY. CLOSE INSPECTION OF THE R MAIN LNDG GEAR REVEALED A DAMAGED HYD LINE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.