Narrative:

I arrive at the aircraft 49 mins before departure time. An avionics technician was inside the aircraft avionics bay area. After 20 mins passed; he finished his inspection and deferment of the autoplt system due to previous write-ups of the autoplt malfunction. At this time; I asked him what was wrong with the autoplt system. He stated; 'the autoplt was malfunctioning due to wiring.' I then asked if he fixed the wiring. He replied; 'there is a cut wire somewhere between avionics bay and the tail of the aircraft leading to the servos.' I then asked if he knew where the cut wire was located. He replied; 'I know the wire is cut; but I do not know the location of the cut wire.' he then stated; 'this was most likely caused by maintenance personnel adding an additional wire to a wire bundle with a metal tool; and in the process cut the wire. But he did not know where or the area the cut was made.' after this conversation; I was deeply concerned with the maintenance status of the aircraft due to the unknown area of the severed wire. At this time; I contacted dispatch; maintenance control; and chief pilot and informed all I was uncomfortable with accepting the aircraft. I was refused by all 3 parties for a new aircraft and I felt greatly pressured to accept the aircraft as is; and was told it would be ok even though there is a cut wire in an unknown area. My crew was present at the aircraft during this process and was very uncomfortable with accepting the aircraft also. After speaking with chief pilot office and avionics technician again; mechanic returned to aircraft and wrote another write-up in the maintenance logbook. I asked him why he was issuing another write-up and he stated; 'he was documenting additional information.' the write-up was as follows: found wire shorted to ground shield between connects 2PLUB and J6CA. 2cag77822wht; 2ca67/a. Did not clear autoplt.' after talking to many sources; including safety department; union representatives; chief pilot; maintenance control; avionics technician and first officer I felt it was unsafe to accept this aircraft due to the unknown area of the cut wire. I fully understand the autoplt was deferred and I would accept an aircraft with a deferred autoplt as I have done many times in the past. Nevertheless; my main concern was the safety of the flight due to the unknown area of the bundle wires. Supplemental information from acn 753262: now we are being told that other wires might be exposed but not cut and we are ok to fly the aircraft in this condition. The possibility for a fire is extreme in this case. This was our main concern -- fire. We felt the aircraft was not airworthy due to the fact that there was a cut wire with an unknown location and the possibility of other wires being chafed. This is not safe. Callback conversation with reporter acn 753264 revealed the following information: reporter stated the erosion of maintenance is a concern. More often he sees discrepancies only being addressed after multiple write-ups on a particular system or item. Reporter also noted the mechanic wrote the additional write-up regarding the 'shorted wire to ground' after he (captain) refused the aircraft on safety concerns. His company was not happy with his refusal of the aircraft for flight and did try disciplinary action as a result. Reporter added that flap failures are common on this aircraft and icing-up of flight control cable pulleys in the wheel well areas have been noted during the winter seasons.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CRJ-200 FLIGHT CREW REFUSED ACFT DUE TO MAINT UNABLE TO LOCATE A CUT WIRE IN AUTOPILOT SYSTEM AND SHORTED WIRE TO GROUND. PILOT'S MAIN CONCERN WAS POTENTIAL FOR FIRE.

Narrative: I ARRIVE AT THE ACFT 49 MINS BEFORE DEP TIME. AN AVIONICS TECHNICIAN WAS INSIDE THE ACFT AVIONICS BAY AREA. AFTER 20 MINS PASSED; HE FINISHED HIS INSPECTION AND DEFERMENT OF THE AUTOPLT SYS DUE TO PREVIOUS WRITE-UPS OF THE AUTOPLT MALFUNCTION. AT THIS TIME; I ASKED HIM WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE AUTOPLT SYS. HE STATED; 'THE AUTOPLT WAS MALFUNCTIONING DUE TO WIRING.' I THEN ASKED IF HE FIXED THE WIRING. HE REPLIED; 'THERE IS A CUT WIRE SOMEWHERE BTWN AVIONICS BAY AND THE TAIL OF THE ACFT LEADING TO THE SERVOS.' I THEN ASKED IF HE KNEW WHERE THE CUT WIRE WAS LOCATED. HE REPLIED; 'I KNOW THE WIRE IS CUT; BUT I DO NOT KNOW THE LOCATION OF THE CUT WIRE.' HE THEN STATED; 'THIS WAS MOST LIKELY CAUSED BY MAINT PERSONNEL ADDING AN ADDITIONAL WIRE TO A WIRE BUNDLE WITH A METAL TOOL; AND IN THE PROCESS CUT THE WIRE. BUT HE DID NOT KNOW WHERE OR THE AREA THE CUT WAS MADE.' AFTER THIS CONVERSATION; I WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH THE MAINT STATUS OF THE ACFT DUE TO THE UNKNOWN AREA OF THE SEVERED WIRE. AT THIS TIME; I CONTACTED DISPATCH; MAINT CTL; AND CHIEF PLT AND INFORMED ALL I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH ACCEPTING THE ACFT. I WAS REFUSED BY ALL 3 PARTIES FOR A NEW ACFT AND I FELT GREATLY PRESSURED TO ACCEPT THE ACFT AS IS; AND WAS TOLD IT WOULD BE OK EVEN THOUGH THERE IS A CUT WIRE IN AN UNKNOWN AREA. MY CREW WAS PRESENT AT THE ACFT DURING THIS PROCESS AND WAS VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH ACCEPTING THE ACFT ALSO. AFTER SPEAKING WITH CHIEF PLT OFFICE AND AVIONICS TECHNICIAN AGAIN; MECH RETURNED TO ACFT AND WROTE ANOTHER WRITE-UP IN THE MAINT LOGBOOK. I ASKED HIM WHY HE WAS ISSUING ANOTHER WRITE-UP AND HE STATED; 'HE WAS DOCUMENTING ADDITIONAL INFO.' THE WRITE-UP WAS AS FOLLOWS: FOUND WIRE SHORTED TO GND SHIELD BTWN CONNECTS 2PLUB AND J6CA. 2CAG77822WHT; 2CA67/A. DID NOT CLR AUTOPLT.' AFTER TALKING TO MANY SOURCES; INCLUDING SAFETY DEPT; UNION REPRESENTATIVES; CHIEF PLT; MAINT CTL; AVIONICS TECHNICIAN AND FO I FELT IT WAS UNSAFE TO ACCEPT THIS ACFT DUE TO THE UNKNOWN AREA OF THE CUT WIRE. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE AUTOPLT WAS DEFERRED AND I WOULD ACCEPT AN ACFT WITH A DEFERRED AUTOPLT AS I HAVE DONE MANY TIMES IN THE PAST. NEVERTHELESS; MY MAIN CONCERN WAS THE SAFETY OF THE FLT DUE TO THE UNKNOWN AREA OF THE BUNDLE WIRES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 753262: NOW WE ARE BEING TOLD THAT OTHER WIRES MIGHT BE EXPOSED BUT NOT CUT AND WE ARE OK TO FLY THE ACFT IN THIS CONDITION. THE POSSIBILITY FOR A FIRE IS EXTREME IN THIS CASE. THIS WAS OUR MAIN CONCERN -- FIRE. WE FELT THE ACFT WAS NOT AIRWORTHY DUE TO THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A CUT WIRE WITH AN UNKNOWN LOCATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER WIRES BEING CHAFED. THIS IS NOT SAFE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 753264 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THE EROSION OF MAINT IS A CONCERN. MORE OFTEN HE SEES DISCREPANCIES ONLY BEING ADDRESSED AFTER MULTIPLE WRITE-UPS ON A PARTICULAR SYSTEM OR ITEM. REPORTER ALSO NOTED THE MECHANIC WROTE THE ADDITIONAL WRITE-UP REGARDING THE 'SHORTED WIRE TO GROUND' AFTER HE (CAPTAIN) REFUSED THE ACFT ON SAFETY CONCERNS. HIS COMPANY WAS NOT HAPPY WITH HIS REFUSAL OF THE ACFT FOR FLIGHT AND DID TRY DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS A RESULT. REPORTER ADDED THAT FLAP FAILURES ARE COMMON ON THIS ACFT AND ICING-UP OF FLIGHT CONTROL CABLE PULLEYS IN THE WHEEL WELL AREAS HAVE BEEN NOTED DURING THE WINTER SEASONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.