Narrative:

After being cleared for the teb 5 departure off runway 24; I; the PIC briefed the departure procedure; which is quite complex; with the sic. The departure procedure involves flying the runway heading to a level-off at 1500 ft MSL; followed by a heading turn to 280 degrees while monitoring distance to a point 4.5 DME from the VOR; followed by another short climb to 2000 ft MSL. After leveling off at 1500 ft MSL; and when the CDI (based on FMS input) turned to the new heading; I interpreted this as the time to start the climb to 2000 ft MSL; instead of ensuring that the aircraft had passed the 4.5 DME position. I do not believe that the aircraft was more than about 120 ft into the early second climb short of the 4.5 DME before ATC cleared us to 6000 ft MSL. I believe there are a few changes that could help safeguard reoccurrences. These include methodically reviewing the departure procedures; making use of the automation sooner in the sequence of events (engaging the autopilot sooner); and possibly reevaluating the departure procedure itself. Because of the complex nature of teb's departure procedures; I suspect that unintentional deviations from it are a common occurrence.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FALCON 2000 FLT CREW INITIATED CLB FROM 1500 FT TOO EARLY ON TEB DEP.

Narrative: AFTER BEING CLEARED FOR THE TEB 5 DEP OFF RWY 24; I; THE PIC BRIEFED THE DEP PROC; WHICH IS QUITE COMPLEX; WITH THE SIC. THE DEP PROC INVOLVES FLYING THE RWY HDG TO A LEVEL-OFF AT 1500 FT MSL; FOLLOWED BY A HDG TURN TO 280 DEGS WHILE MONITORING DISTANCE TO A POINT 4.5 DME FROM THE VOR; FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER SHORT CLIMB TO 2000 FT MSL. AFTER LEVELING OFF AT 1500 FT MSL; AND WHEN THE CDI (BASED ON FMS INPUT) TURNED TO THE NEW HDG; I INTERPRETED THIS AS THE TIME TO START THE CLB TO 2000 FT MSL; INSTEAD OF ENSURING THAT THE ACFT HAD PASSED THE 4.5 DME POSITION. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ACFT WAS MORE THAN ABOUT 120 FT INTO THE EARLY SECOND CLB SHORT OF THE 4.5 DME BEFORE ATC CLRED US TO 6000 FT MSL. I BELIEVE THERE ARE A FEW CHANGES THAT COULD HELP SAFEGUARD REOCCURRENCES. THESE INCLUDE METHODICALLY REVIEWING THE DEP PROCS; MAKING USE OF THE AUTOMATION SOONER IN THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (ENGAGING THE AUTOPILOT SOONER); AND POSSIBLY REEVALUATING THE DEP PROC ITSELF. BECAUSE OF THE COMPLEX NATURE OF TEB'S DEP PROCS; I SUSPECT THAT UNINTENTIONAL DEVS FROM IT ARE A COMMON OCCURRENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.