|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : dtw.airport|
|Controlling Facilities||tracon : d21.tracon|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||SF 340B|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||climbout : takeoff|
|Route In Use||departure sid : earth1|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : less severe|
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : unable|
Flight Crew Human Performance
While the crew was entering waypoints into the FMS; I noticed that the computerized flight plan was missing 2 fixes on the errth 1 SID from dtw. The computerized flight plan listed the route as dtw-errth-cxr; etc; while the SID actually has dtw-ricpo-octas-errth-cxr; etc. At octas; there is a course change from dxo R-095 to yqr R-101. The computerized flight plan misses this turn altogether; and a crew following the computerized flight plan would not be following the SID. I have personally brought this type of error to dispatch's attention numerous times; and have been met with annoyance on their part. I was told that we should 'just follow the chart' and that the computerized flight plan was 'good enough.' I disagree. Following the computerized flight plan could lead a crew to a violation and/or reduced separation and safety. I believe that I have been lucky; so far. Being a dtw based pilot; I am familiar with the SID's and I have detected the errors. A new pilot; or a pilot from another base might make the 'mistake' of following the flight plan and getting themselves into trouble. This dispatch flight plan is leading flight crews down a dangerous path. Even following the below information; you would not detect the flight plan's errors; hence; the need to fix the 'canned departures' now. Take note of this excerpt from guidance on how to not make this error: 'if you are cleared 'as filed;' make sure to verify your FMS waypoints by using the computerized flight plan portion of your dispatch release; and not just the release itself. The computerized flight plan lists each and every waypoint you must include in the FMS; while the release itself only shows the way the flight plan was filed with ATC.' the company has seen a dramatic rise in the number of reports for clearance deviations; particularly while flying the maars 1 departure out of dtw. It appears that crews are proceeding from maars intersection direct to the aco VOR without first proceeding to sphre intersection. This is most likely the result of not programming sphre intersection into the FMS. Please remember prior to departure to verify that the FMS waypoints match exactly with your ATC clearance; and not just the filed flight plan. If you are cleared 'as filed;' make sure to verify your FMS waypoints by using the computerized flight plan portion of your dispatch release; and not just the release itself. The computerized flight plan lists each and every waypoint you must include in the FMS; while the release itself only shows the way the flight plan was filed with ATC. The filed flight plan on the release does not necessarily show all the waypoints you need to navigation to; and could cause you to have a clearance deviation. As another reminder; the fom now requires that any time you receive a rerte (dispatch refiles you or you get a rerte due to WX); you must ask ATC for a full route clearance. When a change to your clearance is made; it is imperative that you get a full route clearance so you know exactly what changes are made. When dispatch or ATC changes your filed flight plan; your computerized flight plan is no longer accurate and could lead to navigation errors. The automation supervisor does not seem to appreciate that all fixes need to be in the computerized flight plan for it to be valid. This is the one piece of paper that crews actually use to plug points into the FMS. If the information does not include the required points; then it reduces safety. I can think of no good reason why the entire flight pan is not included. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter advised the FMS on these airplanes was installed only four months ago and is limited in its functionality. No SID or STAR information is line selectable and there is no provision for company stored routes for commonly flown segments. There is; however; a means available for a flight crew to enter a completed segment to the database that is then selectable by subsequent flight crews on the same route. The obvious potential for a compounded error (the later flight crew selecting a flawed route installed by the earlier) is procedurally addressed by an SOP requiring subsequent users to verify the route fix by fix. Reporter emphasized that the lack of any line selectable procedures is the primary problem which requires; he believes; that the flight plans include all waypoints including those on sids or stars.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: SF340 CAPTAIN ADVISES COMPANY FLT PLANS DO NOT INCLUDE ALL FMS WAYPOINTS NECESSARY TO PROGRAM FILED/CLEARED ROUTES.
Narrative: WHILE THE CREW WAS ENTERING WAYPOINTS INTO THE FMS; I NOTICED THAT THE COMPUTERIZED FLT PLAN WAS MISSING 2 FIXES ON THE ERRTH 1 SID FROM DTW. THE COMPUTERIZED FLT PLAN LISTED THE RTE AS DTW-ERRTH-CXR; ETC; WHILE THE SID ACTUALLY HAS DTW-RICPO-OCTAS-ERRTH-CXR; ETC. AT OCTAS; THERE IS A COURSE CHANGE FROM DXO R-095 TO YQR R-101. THE COMPUTERIZED FLT PLAN MISSES THIS TURN ALTOGETHER; AND A CREW FOLLOWING THE COMPUTERIZED FLT PLAN WOULD NOT BE FOLLOWING THE SID. I HAVE PERSONALLY BROUGHT THIS TYPE OF ERROR TO DISPATCH'S ATTN NUMEROUS TIMES; AND HAVE BEEN MET WITH ANNOYANCE ON THEIR PART. I WAS TOLD THAT WE SHOULD 'JUST FOLLOW THE CHART' AND THAT THE COMPUTERIZED FLT PLAN WAS 'GOOD ENOUGH.' I DISAGREE. FOLLOWING THE COMPUTERIZED FLT PLAN COULD LEAD A CREW TO A VIOLATION AND/OR REDUCED SEPARATION AND SAFETY. I BELIEVE THAT I HAVE BEEN LUCKY; SO FAR. BEING A DTW BASED PLT; I AM FAMILIAR WITH THE SID'S AND I HAVE DETECTED THE ERRORS. A NEW PLT; OR A PLT FROM ANOTHER BASE MIGHT MAKE THE 'MISTAKE' OF FOLLOWING THE FLT PLAN AND GETTING THEMSELVES INTO TROUBLE. THIS DISPATCH FLT PLAN IS LEADING FLT CREWS DOWN A DANGEROUS PATH. EVEN FOLLOWING THE BELOW INFO; YOU WOULD NOT DETECT THE FLT PLAN'S ERRORS; HENCE; THE NEED TO FIX THE 'CANNED DEPS' NOW. TAKE NOTE OF THIS EXCERPT FROM GUIDANCE ON HOW TO NOT MAKE THIS ERROR: 'IF YOU ARE CLRED 'AS FILED;' MAKE SURE TO VERIFY YOUR FMS WAYPOINTS BY USING THE COMPUTERIZED FLT PLAN PORTION OF YOUR DISPATCH RELEASE; AND NOT JUST THE RELEASE ITSELF. THE COMPUTERIZED FLT PLAN LISTS EACH AND EVERY WAYPOINT YOU MUST INCLUDE IN THE FMS; WHILE THE RELEASE ITSELF ONLY SHOWS THE WAY THE FLT PLAN WAS FILED WITH ATC.' THE COMPANY HAS SEEN A DRAMATIC RISE IN THE NUMBER OF RPTS FOR CLRNC DEVS; PARTICULARLY WHILE FLYING THE MAARS 1 DEP OUT OF DTW. IT APPEARS THAT CREWS ARE PROCEEDING FROM MAARS INTXN DIRECT TO THE ACO VOR WITHOUT FIRST PROCEEDING TO SPHRE INTXN. THIS IS MOST LIKELY THE RESULT OF NOT PROGRAMMING SPHRE INTXN INTO THE FMS. PLEASE REMEMBER PRIOR TO DEP TO VERIFY THAT THE FMS WAYPOINTS MATCH EXACTLY WITH YOUR ATC CLRNC; AND NOT JUST THE FILED FLT PLAN. IF YOU ARE CLRED 'AS FILED;' MAKE SURE TO VERIFY YOUR FMS WAYPOINTS BY USING THE COMPUTERIZED FLT PLAN PORTION OF YOUR DISPATCH RELEASE; AND NOT JUST THE RELEASE ITSELF. THE COMPUTERIZED FLT PLAN LISTS EACH AND EVERY WAYPOINT YOU MUST INCLUDE IN THE FMS; WHILE THE RELEASE ITSELF ONLY SHOWS THE WAY THE FLT PLAN WAS FILED WITH ATC. THE FILED FLT PLAN ON THE RELEASE DOES NOT NECESSARILY SHOW ALL THE WAYPOINTS YOU NEED TO NAV TO; AND COULD CAUSE YOU TO HAVE A CLRNC DEV. AS ANOTHER REMINDER; THE FOM NOW REQUIRES THAT ANY TIME YOU RECEIVE A RERTE (DISPATCH REFILES YOU OR YOU GET A RERTE DUE TO WX); YOU MUST ASK ATC FOR A FULL RTE CLRNC. WHEN A CHANGE TO YOUR CLRNC IS MADE; IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT YOU GET A FULL RTE CLRNC SO YOU KNOW EXACTLY WHAT CHANGES ARE MADE. WHEN DISPATCH OR ATC CHANGES YOUR FILED FLT PLAN; YOUR COMPUTERIZED FLT PLAN IS NO LONGER ACCURATE AND COULD LEAD TO NAV ERRORS. THE AUTOMATION SUPVR DOES NOT SEEM TO APPRECIATE THAT ALL FIXES NEED TO BE IN THE COMPUTERIZED FLT PLAN FOR IT TO BE VALID. THIS IS THE ONE PIECE OF PAPER THAT CREWS ACTUALLY USE TO PLUG POINTS INTO THE FMS. IF THE INFO DOES NOT INCLUDE THE REQUIRED POINTS; THEN IT REDUCES SAFETY. I CAN THINK OF NO GOOD REASON WHY THE ENTIRE FLT PAN IS NOT INCLUDED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER ADVISED THE FMS ON THESE AIRPLANES WAS INSTALLED ONLY FOUR MONTHS AGO AND IS LIMITED IN ITS FUNCTIONALITY. NO SID OR STAR INFORMATION IS LINE SELECTABLE AND THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR COMPANY STORED ROUTES FOR COMMONLY FLOWN SEGMENTS. THERE IS; HOWEVER; A MEANS AVAILABLE FOR A FLT CREW TO ENTER A COMPLETED SEGMENT TO THE DATABASE THAT IS THEN SELECTABLE BY SUBSEQUENT FLT CREWS ON THE SAME ROUTE. THE OBVIOUS POTENTIAL FOR A COMPOUNDED ERROR (THE LATER FLT CREW SELECTING A FLAWED ROUTE INSTALLED BY THE EARLIER) IS PROCEDURALLY ADDRESSED BY AN SOP REQUIRING SUBSEQUENT USERS TO VERIFY THE ROUTE FIX BY FIX. REPORTER EMPHASIZED THAT THE LACK OF ANY LINE SELECTABLE PROCEDURES IS THE PRIMARY PROBLEM WHICH REQUIRES; HE BELIEVES; THAT THE FLT PLANS INCLUDE ALL WAYPOINTS INCLUDING THOSE ON SIDS OR STARS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.