Narrative:

This report covers both specific and general items of concern: 1) MEL cards requiring maintenance verification performed by flight crews. MEL card xyz should not be approved for flight crew action -- misunderstanding could quickly lead to injury or damage; and the crew is not trained to know what they are looking for. 2) numerous comments and concerns from maintenance and the overall condition of our aircraft are causing a loss in confidence in the maintenance of our aircraft. 3) introduction of 'pre-dated flight plans.' this is; the date of the flight plan as different from the date of the flight; generating confusion regarding ACARS loading; and ATC clrncs. 4) the flight crew remains the last line of defense against deficiencies in the system. Off the cuff remarks about 'job actions' every time a flight crew has a question is bad for morale; is a form of subtle pilot pushing; and discourages taking the time to resolve items that 'just don't look right.' 5) organizational safety concern due to all of the above. 1 hour prior to scheduled departure; I was unable to call up flight papers in operations. Using the 'today' prompt; I discovered our flight as x-y versus x-z. As I believed this to be an error; I contacted the dispatcher; who informed me that an originating flight would keep the same date through termination; regardless of how many days it operated. We discussed proper ACARS programming and confirming the proper pre departure clearance (the actual date was Z; you load date Y in ACARS; and look for date Z on the pre departure clearance). With the date issue resolved; we were able to print the flight papers. The lpcu was deferred; with an involved crew action. We called maintenance control who agreed this action was inappropriate for the flight crew. Maintenance control said line maintenance would perform the check; and that flight crew actions were printed in the event the aircraft was at a non-maintenance station. As we were scheduled to fly to all maintenance stations; this would not impact us; but again maintenance control agreed that regardless of the station; qualified mechanics should perform the check. (PCU actuators must be verified to operate normally by performing 3 separate flight control checks using a single hydraulic system prior to each departure. Not only is the entire procedure out of the scope of flight crew actions; the first items on the maintenance paperwork are to verify personnel; and equipment are clear of control surfaces and to verify wheels are chocked. This is not contained in the flight crew actions. It would be easy to turn off hydraulics per the 'procedure' and cause injury or damage.) due to the extra time flight planning; we arrived at the gate a little later than normal. The gate agent made an off-the-cuff remark about a 'job action.' I ignored it as I did not hear the entire comment; conducted my normal briefing; and the gate agent quickly realized we were doing all we could to complete the operation. The gate agent became cordial and friendly; and we departed on time. Line maintenance met us on arrival as they had to contact the flight control check prior to our departure. I queried the mechanic about the check for my own education. He also said that a flight crew had no business performing this check. He was helpful and professional; but expressed 'general concern' about the state of maintenance at our air carrier and the number of items which are slipping through the cracks due to a lower level of quality control. He apologized for his comments but said he was appalled at the degradation in our quality control standards. We flew uneventfully to our next stop; where we were also met by maintenance. This was good as we were asked by the outbound crew about performing the flight control check. They also did not understand the procedure and had questions about it. Line maintenance was surprised the required flight control check could be accomplished by the crew. A later flight was idented as a DOT critical flight. Unfortunately; our scheduled arrival at the next stop was after our scheduled departure time; guaranteeing another late departure. The ramp closed for WX; and we were significantly late. On arrival in the next stop; the brake readings on the forward right main truck were 2; 5; 1; and 1. We wrote up the '5' per SOP; but I was concerned we may have had adragging brake; since the brake temperature was so much higher than the other wheels on the same truck and we had used minimal braking on landing and taxi. I relayed this concern to the mechanic as we were getting off the plane. He said it was probably a bad brake; and that we were not maintaining items as we should. He said any extra vigilance on their part was looked at as a 'job action.' though he would not be pressured; some guys are 'too beaten down to care anymore.' he suggested we pay extra attention to the brakes; tire pressures; and tires on the B767; because 'no one is looking at them like we used to. 2 mechanics in 3 days; on 2 different coasts expressed concerns about the quality of our maintenance. Our late arrival caused the minimum 9 hours at the hotel; and a delayed departure out. We landed late in ZZZ; with an aircraft change and; therefore; arrived late to the departure gate. When I arrived at the gate; I was met with a sarcastic look at the watch and; 'oh; you're one of those.' not knowing what that meant; I greeted the gate agent in a friendly manner (on minimum crew rest in the middle of an 8 hour day with lousy WX) and ignored the comment. When our APU failed to start on the first 2 attempts; I called maintenance as we would be out of luck if it failed a third time. Again; I got an under the breath 'messing up the operation' comment from the gate agent. Fortunately; we got the APU started and departed uneventfully. We were at the performance limit for takeoff at 90F. On initial climb out; the first officer remarked that the right engine egt was in the amber band (within limits). The engine stayed within limits; but consistently ran 25 degrees C hotter than the left engine. As we monitored the engine (closely) we both realized that we were losing confidence in the maintenance of our aircraft. The flight crew; mechanics; flight attendants; and gate agents are doing everything they can to make the operation successful. I'm concerned that someone is telling customer service we are on 'a job action.' the individual difficulties described in this report are symptoms of larger organizational problems which are surfacing on the line. This represents a serious erosion in the safety culture at our air carrier. This report is to bring attention to organizational difficulties before they are manifested into an accident. They may have already been manifested in incidents.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757-200 CAPTAIN REPORTS NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF LOW MORALE AMONG PERSONNEL IN OTHER DEPARTMENTS.

Narrative: THIS RPT COVERS BOTH SPECIFIC AND GENERAL ITEMS OF CONCERN: 1) MEL CARDS REQUIRING MAINT VERIFICATION PERFORMED BY FLT CREWS. MEL CARD XYZ SHOULD NOT BE APPROVED FOR FLT CREW ACTION -- MISUNDERSTANDING COULD QUICKLY LEAD TO INJURY OR DAMAGE; AND THE CREW IS NOT TRAINED TO KNOW WHAT THEY ARE LOOKING FOR. 2) NUMEROUS COMMENTS AND CONCERNS FROM MAINT AND THE OVERALL CONDITION OF OUR ACFT ARE CAUSING A LOSS IN CONFIDENCE IN THE MAINT OF OUR ACFT. 3) INTRODUCTION OF 'PRE-DATED FLT PLANS.' THIS IS; THE DATE OF THE FLT PLAN AS DIFFERENT FROM THE DATE OF THE FLT; GENERATING CONFUSION REGARDING ACARS LOADING; AND ATC CLRNCS. 4) THE FLT CREW REMAINS THE LAST LINE OF DEFENSE AGAINST DEFICIENCIES IN THE SYS. OFF THE CUFF REMARKS ABOUT 'JOB ACTIONS' EVERY TIME A FLT CREW HAS A QUESTION IS BAD FOR MORALE; IS A FORM OF SUBTLE PLT PUSHING; AND DISCOURAGES TAKING THE TIME TO RESOLVE ITEMS THAT 'JUST DON'T LOOK RIGHT.' 5) ORGANIZATIONAL SAFETY CONCERN DUE TO ALL OF THE ABOVE. 1 HR PRIOR TO SCHEDULED DEP; I WAS UNABLE TO CALL UP FLT PAPERS IN OPS. USING THE 'TODAY' PROMPT; I DISCOVERED OUR FLT AS X-Y VERSUS X-Z. AS I BELIEVED THIS TO BE AN ERROR; I CONTACTED THE DISPATCHER; WHO INFORMED ME THAT AN ORIGINATING FLT WOULD KEEP THE SAME DATE THROUGH TERMINATION; REGARDLESS OF HOW MANY DAYS IT OPERATED. WE DISCUSSED PROPER ACARS PROGRAMMING AND CONFIRMING THE PROPER PDC (THE ACTUAL DATE WAS Z; YOU LOAD DATE Y IN ACARS; AND LOOK FOR DATE Z ON THE PDC). WITH THE DATE ISSUE RESOLVED; WE WERE ABLE TO PRINT THE FLT PAPERS. THE LPCU WAS DEFERRED; WITH AN INVOLVED CREW ACTION. WE CALLED MAINT CTL WHO AGREED THIS ACTION WAS INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE FLT CREW. MAINT CTL SAID LINE MAINT WOULD PERFORM THE CHK; AND THAT FLT CREW ACTIONS WERE PRINTED IN THE EVENT THE ACFT WAS AT A NON-MAINT STATION. AS WE WERE SCHEDULED TO FLY TO ALL MAINT STATIONS; THIS WOULD NOT IMPACT US; BUT AGAIN MAINT CTL AGREED THAT REGARDLESS OF THE STATION; QUALIFIED MECHS SHOULD PERFORM THE CHK. (PCU ACTUATORS MUST BE VERIFIED TO OPERATE NORMALLY BY PERFORMING 3 SEPARATE FLT CTL CHKS USING A SINGLE HYD SYS PRIOR TO EACH DEP. NOT ONLY IS THE ENTIRE PROC OUT OF THE SCOPE OF FLT CREW ACTIONS; THE FIRST ITEMS ON THE MAINT PAPERWORK ARE TO VERIFY PERSONNEL; AND EQUIP ARE CLR OF CTL SURFACES AND TO VERIFY WHEELS ARE CHOCKED. THIS IS NOT CONTAINED IN THE FLT CREW ACTIONS. IT WOULD BE EASY TO TURN OFF HYDS PER THE 'PROC' AND CAUSE INJURY OR DAMAGE.) DUE TO THE EXTRA TIME FLT PLANNING; WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE A LITTLE LATER THAN NORMAL. THE GATE AGENT MADE AN OFF-THE-CUFF REMARK ABOUT A 'JOB ACTION.' I IGNORED IT AS I DID NOT HEAR THE ENTIRE COMMENT; CONDUCTED MY NORMAL BRIEFING; AND THE GATE AGENT QUICKLY REALIZED WE WERE DOING ALL WE COULD TO COMPLETE THE OP. THE GATE AGENT BECAME CORDIAL AND FRIENDLY; AND WE DEPARTED ON TIME. LINE MAINT MET US ON ARR AS THEY HAD TO CONTACT THE FLT CTL CHK PRIOR TO OUR DEP. I QUERIED THE MECH ABOUT THE CHK FOR MY OWN EDUCATION. HE ALSO SAID THAT A FLT CREW HAD NO BUSINESS PERFORMING THIS CHK. HE WAS HELPFUL AND PROFESSIONAL; BUT EXPRESSED 'GENERAL CONCERN' ABOUT THE STATE OF MAINT AT OUR ACR AND THE NUMBER OF ITEMS WHICH ARE SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS DUE TO A LOWER LEVEL OF QUALITY CTL. HE APOLOGIZED FOR HIS COMMENTS BUT SAID HE WAS APPALLED AT THE DEGRADATION IN OUR QUALITY CTL STANDARDS. WE FLEW UNEVENTFULLY TO OUR NEXT STOP; WHERE WE WERE ALSO MET BY MAINT. THIS WAS GOOD AS WE WERE ASKED BY THE OUTBOUND CREW ABOUT PERFORMING THE FLT CTL CHK. THEY ALSO DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE PROC AND HAD QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. LINE MAINT WAS SURPRISED THE REQUIRED FLT CTL CHK COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE CREW. A LATER FLT WAS IDENTED AS A DOT CRITICAL FLT. UNFORTUNATELY; OUR SCHEDULED ARR AT THE NEXT STOP WAS AFTER OUR SCHEDULED DEP TIME; GUARANTEEING ANOTHER LATE DEP. THE RAMP CLOSED FOR WX; AND WE WERE SIGNIFICANTLY LATE. ON ARR IN THE NEXT STOP; THE BRAKE READINGS ON THE FORWARD R MAIN TRUCK WERE 2; 5; 1; AND 1. WE WROTE UP THE '5' PER SOP; BUT I WAS CONCERNED WE MAY HAVE HAD ADRAGGING BRAKE; SINCE THE BRAKE TEMP WAS SO MUCH HIGHER THAN THE OTHER WHEELS ON THE SAME TRUCK AND WE HAD USED MINIMAL BRAKING ON LNDG AND TAXI. I RELAYED THIS CONCERN TO THE MECH AS WE WERE GETTING OFF THE PLANE. HE SAID IT WAS PROBABLY A BAD BRAKE; AND THAT WE WERE NOT MAINTAINING ITEMS AS WE SHOULD. HE SAID ANY EXTRA VIGILANCE ON THEIR PART WAS LOOKED AT AS A 'JOB ACTION.' THOUGH HE WOULD NOT BE PRESSURED; SOME GUYS ARE 'TOO BEATEN DOWN TO CARE ANYMORE.' HE SUGGESTED WE PAY EXTRA ATTN TO THE BRAKES; TIRE PRESSURES; AND TIRES ON THE B767; BECAUSE 'NO ONE IS LOOKING AT THEM LIKE WE USED TO. 2 MECHS IN 3 DAYS; ON 2 DIFFERENT COASTS EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT THE QUALITY OF OUR MAINT. OUR LATE ARR CAUSED THE MINIMUM 9 HRS AT THE HOTEL; AND A DELAYED DEP OUT. WE LANDED LATE IN ZZZ; WITH AN ACFT CHANGE AND; THEREFORE; ARRIVED LATE TO THE DEP GATE. WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE GATE; I WAS MET WITH A SARCASTIC LOOK AT THE WATCH AND; 'OH; YOU'RE ONE OF THOSE.' NOT KNOWING WHAT THAT MEANT; I GREETED THE GATE AGENT IN A FRIENDLY MANNER (ON MINIMUM CREW REST IN THE MIDDLE OF AN 8 HR DAY WITH LOUSY WX) AND IGNORED THE COMMENT. WHEN OUR APU FAILED TO START ON THE FIRST 2 ATTEMPTS; I CALLED MAINT AS WE WOULD BE OUT OF LUCK IF IT FAILED A THIRD TIME. AGAIN; I GOT AN UNDER THE BREATH 'MESSING UP THE OP' COMMENT FROM THE GATE AGENT. FORTUNATELY; WE GOT THE APU STARTED AND DEPARTED UNEVENTFULLY. WE WERE AT THE PERFORMANCE LIMIT FOR TKOF AT 90F. ON INITIAL CLBOUT; THE FO REMARKED THAT THE R ENG EGT WAS IN THE AMBER BAND (WITHIN LIMITS). THE ENG STAYED WITHIN LIMITS; BUT CONSISTENTLY RAN 25 DEGS C HOTTER THAN THE L ENG. AS WE MONITORED THE ENG (CLOSELY) WE BOTH REALIZED THAT WE WERE LOSING CONFIDENCE IN THE MAINT OF OUR ACFT. THE FLT CREW; MECHS; FLT ATTENDANTS; AND GATE AGENTS ARE DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO MAKE THE OP SUCCESSFUL. I'M CONCERNED THAT SOMEONE IS TELLING CUSTOMER SVC WE ARE ON 'A JOB ACTION.' THE INDIVIDUAL DIFFICULTIES DESCRIBED IN THIS RPT ARE SYMPTOMS OF LARGER ORGANIZATIONAL PROBS WHICH ARE SURFACING ON THE LINE. THIS REPRESENTS A SERIOUS EROSION IN THE SAFETY CULTURE AT OUR ACR. THIS RPT IS TO BRING ATTN TO ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFICULTIES BEFORE THEY ARE MANIFESTED INTO AN ACCIDENT. THEY MAY HAVE ALREADY BEEN MANIFESTED IN INCIDENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.