Narrative:

Dangerous operation by fueler. Initial aircraft status: inoperative APU. The very first NOTAM for ZZZ states; 'avoid sending aircraft with inoperative APU's to ZZZ.' 'ZZZ all mobile aircraft units OTS no estimate for a return to service. If possible; avoid sending aircraft with inoperative APU's to ZZZ. Coordination needed between dispatch and operations.' in our case; the company got an extension from the FAA to continue the deferral. Following engine start; on initial taxi we got EICAS oil filter bypass #4 engine. Conferred with maintenance who directed we return to the gate to have the chip detector checked and filter replaced with the APU inoperative; we were directed by ground staff to keep #1 engine running until they could get ground power connected to the aircraft. The fueler drove the fuel truck and parked between #1 and #2 engines while #1 engine was still running; then was observed by observer airport operations getting out of the truck and walking around the operating engine. This had the potential to be a fatal mistake. Even a personal item (hat; clipboard; pen; etc) could have become FOD and caused cancellation of the flight. Learned; subsequently; that fueler is not a company employee -- the fueling has been outsourced. Suggest fueling staff be given training of hazards and dangers associated with operating near an operating engine; so as to avoid possible loss of life.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-400 CAPT REPORTS A GROUND EMPLOYEE COMING DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO A RUNNING ENGINE ON THE RAMP AT LAX.

Narrative: DANGEROUS OP BY FUELER. INITIAL ACFT STATUS: INOP APU. THE VERY FIRST NOTAM FOR ZZZ STATES; 'AVOID SENDING ACFT WITH INOP APU'S TO ZZZ.' 'ZZZ ALL MOBILE ACFT UNITS OTS NO ESTIMATE FOR A RETURN TO SVC. IF POSSIBLE; AVOID SENDING ACFT WITH INOP APU'S TO ZZZ. COORD NEEDED BTWN DISPATCH AND OPS.' IN OUR CASE; THE COMPANY GOT AN EXTENSION FROM THE FAA TO CONTINUE THE DEFERRAL. FOLLOWING ENG START; ON INITIAL TAXI WE GOT EICAS OIL FILTER BYPASS #4 ENG. CONFERRED WITH MAINT WHO DIRECTED WE RETURN TO THE GATE TO HAVE THE CHIP DETECTOR CHKED AND FILTER REPLACED WITH THE APU INOP; WE WERE DIRECTED BY GND STAFF TO KEEP #1 ENG RUNNING UNTIL THEY COULD GET GND PWR CONNECTED TO THE ACFT. THE FUELER DROVE THE FUEL TRUCK AND PARKED BTWN #1 AND #2 ENGS WHILE #1 ENG WAS STILL RUNNING; THEN WAS OBSERVED BY OBSERVER ARPT OPS GETTING OUT OF THE TRUCK AND WALKING AROUND THE OPERATING ENG. THIS HAD THE POTENTIAL TO BE A FATAL MISTAKE. EVEN A PERSONAL ITEM (HAT; CLIPBOARD; PEN; ETC) COULD HAVE BECOME FOD AND CAUSED CANCELLATION OF THE FLT. LEARNED; SUBSEQUENTLY; THAT FUELER IS NOT A COMPANY EMPLOYEE -- THE FUELING HAS BEEN OUTSOURCED. SUGGEST FUELING STAFF BE GIVEN TRAINING OF HAZARDS AND DANGERS ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATING NEAR AN OPERATING ENG; SO AS TO AVOID POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.