|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1801 To 2400|
|Locale Reference||airport : lax.airport|
|Altitude||msl single value : 32000|
|Controlling Facilities||tracon : sct.tracon|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||B737-300|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||climbout : intermediate altitude|
|Route In Use||departure : on vectors|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 260|
flight time type : 7500
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : less severe|
|Independent Detector||other flight crewb|
|Resolutory Action||flight crew : landed as precaution|
|Problem Areas||Chart Or Publication|
On initial climb out we were unable to get the landing gear to raise to the 'up' position. After a second attempt; I consulted the QRH and followed the procedures for unable to raise landing gear with the takeoff warning horn silenced. As per the last item; I consulted dispatch and the decision was made to return to lax. After coordinating our return with the first officer; the flight attendants; ATC; the passenger; and lax operations; the workload was reduced to the point that I had time to look at the notes on the l-hand side of the procedures in the QRH. After reading the notes for the applicable procedure; I noticed that note #1 mentioned checking circuit breakers for the other procedure. I checked those as well and they were not tripped. About this time we got an ACARS message from dispatch directing us to check the landing gear latch circuit breaker. Due to time constraints at this point I just started looking for any tripped circuit breaker. I found the 'landing gear latch and pressure warning' circuit breaker tripped at P6-2-C-5. I reset this breaker and contacted dispatch to tell them what we had found. The decision was made to continue back to lax. This circuit breaker was very hard to see because it was next to a blue collared circuit breaker. Both the first officer and I did not see any tripped circuit breakers when we took over that aircraft in lax. The next day I consulted with one of the chief pilots and I learned this was the third incident recently of this type. I again consulted the QRH and it has this circuit breaker listed at being at position P6-2-C-20; not at the position we found it. If this is becoming a recurring problem; then maybe the QRH should mention this circuit breaker in the notes for that applicable procedure and be listed in its correct position. I know that an adequate preflight was made. However; it is possible that it was missed even though there could be another scenario as to the cause of the tripped circuit breaker. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that after consultation with maintenance; the gear override was utilized and the gear retracted. The company indicated that they still preferred that the aircraft return to departure airport.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737-300 FLT CREW UNABLE TO RAISE LNDG GEAR AFTER TKOF. FLT DIVERTED AND RETURNED TO DEP ARPT.
Narrative: ON INITIAL CLBOUT WE WERE UNABLE TO GET THE LNDG GEAR TO RAISE TO THE 'UP' POS. AFTER A SECOND ATTEMPT; I CONSULTED THE QRH AND FOLLOWED THE PROCS FOR UNABLE TO RAISE LNDG GEAR WITH THE TKOF WARNING HORN SILENCED. AS PER THE LAST ITEM; I CONSULTED DISPATCH AND THE DECISION WAS MADE TO RETURN TO LAX. AFTER COORDINATING OUR RETURN WITH THE FO; THE FLT ATTENDANTS; ATC; THE PAX; AND LAX OPS; THE WORKLOAD WAS REDUCED TO THE POINT THAT I HAD TIME TO LOOK AT THE NOTES ON THE L-HAND SIDE OF THE PROCS IN THE QRH. AFTER READING THE NOTES FOR THE APPLICABLE PROC; I NOTICED THAT NOTE #1 MENTIONED CHKING CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR THE OTHER PROC. I CHKED THOSE AS WELL AND THEY WERE NOT TRIPPED. ABOUT THIS TIME WE GOT AN ACARS MESSAGE FROM DISPATCH DIRECTING US TO CHK THE LNDG GEAR LATCH CIRCUIT BREAKER. DUE TO TIME CONSTRAINTS AT THIS POINT I JUST STARTED LOOKING FOR ANY TRIPPED CIRCUIT BREAKER. I FOUND THE 'LNDG GEAR LATCH AND PRESSURE WARNING' CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIPPED AT P6-2-C-5. I RESET THIS BREAKER AND CONTACTED DISPATCH TO TELL THEM WHAT WE HAD FOUND. THE DECISION WAS MADE TO CONTINUE BACK TO LAX. THIS CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS VERY HARD TO SEE BECAUSE IT WAS NEXT TO A BLUE COLLARED CIRCUIT BREAKER. BOTH THE FO AND I DID NOT SEE ANY TRIPPED CIRCUIT BREAKERS WHEN WE TOOK OVER THAT ACFT IN LAX. THE NEXT DAY I CONSULTED WITH ONE OF THE CHIEF PLTS AND I LEARNED THIS WAS THE THIRD INCIDENT RECENTLY OF THIS TYPE. I AGAIN CONSULTED THE QRH AND IT HAS THIS CIRCUIT BREAKER LISTED AT BEING AT POS P6-2-C-20; NOT AT THE POS WE FOUND IT. IF THIS IS BECOMING A RECURRING PROB; THEN MAYBE THE QRH SHOULD MENTION THIS CIRCUIT BREAKER IN THE NOTES FOR THAT APPLICABLE PROC AND BE LISTED IN ITS CORRECT POS. I KNOW THAT AN ADEQUATE PREFLT WAS MADE. HOWEVER; IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT WAS MISSED EVEN THOUGH THERE COULD BE ANOTHER SCENARIO AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE TRIPPED CIRCUIT BREAKER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER STATED THAT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH MAINT; THE GEAR OVERRIDE WAS UTILIZED AND THE GEAR RETRACTED. THE COMPANY INDICATED THAT THEY STILL PREFERRED THAT THE ACFT RETURN TO DEP ARPT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.