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| Attributes | |
| ACN | 739660 | 
| Time | |
| Date | 200705 | 
| Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 | 
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport | 
| State Reference | US | 
| Altitude | agl single value : 0 | 
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier | 
| Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 135 ER&LR | 
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 | 
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier | 
| Function | maintenance : technician | 
| Qualification | technician : powerplant technician : airframe  | 
| ASRS Report | 739660 | 
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier | 
| Function | maintenance : technician | 
| Qualification | technician : powerplant technician : airframe  | 
| ASRS Report | 739431 | 
| Events | |
| Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure  | 
| Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : oil consumption trend analysis | 
| Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact other  | 
| Consequence | other other other  | 
| Factors | |
| Maintenance | contributing factor : engineering procedure contributing factor : schedule pressure contributing factor : manuals performance deficiency : fault isolation performance deficiency : inspection performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements  | 
| Supplementary | |
| Problem Areas | Aircraft Chart Or Publication Maintenance Human Performance  | 
| Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance | 
| Situations | |
| Publication | Engineering Notice | 
Narrative:
I believe there was a miscom between mechanics and a miscom between mechanics and leadership. I assisted mr X in complying with an oil check work card on aircraft X. I svced the #2 engine with 12 pints of oil. Mr X svced the #1 engine with 4 pints. I signed the section of the oil check work card. I notified mr X that I svced the #2 engine and that it required 12 pints and per the engineering note; the aircraft requires additional inspection. Mr X acknowledged my information and said that the last time the oil check was complied with was 26 hours ago. Mr X said that the engineering note stated anything over 20 hours since last service was ok. Mr X then called the lead mechanic to confirm this information. The lead arrived at the aircraft. Mr X told him the situation and told the lead it had been 26 hours since the last engine oil service. The lead told mr X that anything over 20 hours was ok so if it was 26 hours the hours are well within limits. Mr X then finished up the paperwork and called the aircraft good to go. The aircraft continued on as an airworthy aircraft. From my understanding; maintenance operations researched the oil trend and grounded the aircraft the next morning. The aircraft was taken to the hangar; what was done with the aircraft I am not aware of. I believe there should be a more defined reference as to the procedures for high oil consumption and there should only be 1 reference -- that way there is no doubt on which reference to use.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A EMB135 ACFT #2 ENG REQUIRED 12 PINTS OF OIL SINCE LAST FLIGHT. ACFT RELEASED FOR SERVICE; FLEW AS AIRWORTHY; BUT LATER GROUNDED AFTER OIL TREND ANALYSIS.
Narrative: I BELIEVE THERE WAS A MISCOM BTWN MECHS AND A MISCOM BTWN MECHS AND LEADERSHIP. I ASSISTED MR X IN COMPLYING WITH AN OIL CHK WORK CARD ON ACFT X. I SVCED THE #2 ENG WITH 12 PINTS OF OIL. MR X SVCED THE #1 ENG WITH 4 PINTS. I SIGNED THE SECTION OF THE OIL CHK WORK CARD. I NOTIFIED MR X THAT I SVCED THE #2 ENG AND THAT IT REQUIRED 12 PINTS AND PER THE ENGINEERING NOTE; THE ACFT REQUIRES ADDITIONAL INSPECTION. MR X ACKNOWLEDGED MY INFO AND SAID THAT THE LAST TIME THE OIL CHK WAS COMPLIED WITH WAS 26 HRS AGO. MR X SAID THAT THE ENGINEERING NOTE STATED ANYTHING OVER 20 HRS SINCE LAST SVC WAS OK. MR X THEN CALLED THE LEAD MECH TO CONFIRM THIS INFO. THE LEAD ARRIVED AT THE ACFT. MR X TOLD HIM THE SITUATION AND TOLD THE LEAD IT HAD BEEN 26 HRS SINCE THE LAST ENG OIL SVC. THE LEAD TOLD MR X THAT ANYTHING OVER 20 HRS WAS OK SO IF IT WAS 26 HRS THE HRS ARE WELL WITHIN LIMITS. MR X THEN FINISHED UP THE PAPERWORK AND CALLED THE ACFT GOOD TO GO. THE ACFT CONTINUED ON AS AN AIRWORTHY ACFT. FROM MY UNDERSTANDING; MAINT OPS RESEARCHED THE OIL TREND AND GNDED THE ACFT THE NEXT MORNING. THE ACFT WAS TAKEN TO THE HANGAR; WHAT WAS DONE WITH THE ACFT I AM NOT AWARE OF. I BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE A MORE DEFINED REF AS TO THE PROCS FOR HIGH OIL CONSUMPTION AND THERE SHOULD ONLY BE 1 REF -- THAT WAY THERE IS NO DOUBT ON WHICH REF TO USE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.