|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : zzz.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Operator||general aviation : personal|
|Make Model Name||Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 91|
|Flight Phase||landing : roll|
|Function||flight crew : single pilot|
|Qualification||pilot : instrument|
pilot : private
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 3|
flight time total : 1142
flight time type : 380
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : critical|
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : detected after the fact|
Flight Crew Human Performance
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
I recently made a part 91 VFR pleasure flight; in my personal aircraft; to an uncontrolled airport. As I approached the field; AWOS was reporting winds at 18 KTS gusting to 31 KTS; and I had been experiencing enough turbulence that the ride was not pleasant. On 1 occasion during the flight; about 10 mins from landing; the autoplt automatically disengaged via the g-switch acceleration sensor. Although I did not lose control of the aircraft during this event; maintaining aircraft control was a primary focus during my approach to landing. This aircraft is equipped with a landing gear warning system to help prevent an inadvertent gear-up landing. Retarding the throttle from cruise setting normally produces a loud; intermittent tone through the aircraft speakers. 1 week prior to the incident flight; I made a local flight to practice flight procedures and verify aircraft system operations. During this practice flight; the landing gear warning system performed as intended during each of several lndgs; sounding loudly as the throttle was retarded. On approach during the incident flight; as I retarded the throttle; the gear warning system did not sound and I did not notice the failure of this important warning system. Instead; I continued slowing the plane; adding flaps; and minding aircraft control right down to a gear-up landing. My attention to aircraft control apparently allowed for a (relatively) soft impact; and the damage to the aircraft was confined to the propeller and aircraft skin. In a typical approach; as I lower the gear; I check for a green indicator light and visually verify gear down only after the warning horn is silent and the mechanical sound and motion of the gear extension mechanism stops. (I wouldn't trust an attempted verification before then.) in this case; the first did not occur; and neither did the second. After clearing the plane from the runway; an a&P lowered the gear (it functioned normally); but discovered a broken solder connection on the landing gear warning system (it did not function). Would I have lowered the gear if the gear warning system had been screaming in my ears as usual? I'd like to think I would; but the incident certainly would not have happened if I had independently verified gear extension as I approached landing. A number of if-only scenarios could have saved me from this incident: in an IFR approach; I lower the gear at a predetermined point in the approach. Same with a standard pattern approach; but this was a straight-in approach. I'll revise or restrict my straight-in approachs. Even with the retractable gear; this is a relatively simple airplane to land. Does it justify reading through a written pre-landing checklist? My answer today would be yes; but at least 1 authority/authorized has said that using a written or mnemonic checklist should be taught but any type of checklist can be interrupted by distrs. However; even that is taught and practiced by instructors. Will I ever make another landing without thinking about this one? No; but that's one very expensive lesson. For me; it will be more written checklists; a more reliable mnemonic procedure for gear down verification; more practice with distrs; and more vigilance.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: C182 PILOT REPORTS MAKING GEAR UP LANDING AFTER LANDING GEAR WARNING HORN FAILS TO SOUND WHEN THROTTLE IS RETARDED DURING THE APPROACH.
Narrative: I RECENTLY MADE A PART 91 VFR PLEASURE FLT; IN MY PERSONAL ACFT; TO AN UNCTLED ARPT. AS I APCHED THE FIELD; AWOS WAS RPTING WINDS AT 18 KTS GUSTING TO 31 KTS; AND I HAD BEEN EXPERIENCING ENOUGH TURB THAT THE RIDE WAS NOT PLEASANT. ON 1 OCCASION DURING THE FLT; ABOUT 10 MINS FROM LNDG; THE AUTOPLT AUTOMATICALLY DISENGAGED VIA THE G-SWITCH ACCELERATION SENSOR. ALTHOUGH I DID NOT LOSE CTL OF THE ACFT DURING THIS EVENT; MAINTAINING ACFT CTL WAS A PRIMARY FOCUS DURING MY APCH TO LNDG. THIS ACFT IS EQUIPPED WITH A LNDG GEAR WARNING SYS TO HELP PREVENT AN INADVERTENT GEAR-UP LNDG. RETARDING THE THROTTLE FROM CRUISE SETTING NORMALLY PRODUCES A LOUD; INTERMITTENT TONE THROUGH THE ACFT SPEAKERS. 1 WK PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT FLT; I MADE A LCL FLT TO PRACTICE FLT PROCS AND VERIFY ACFT SYS OPS. DURING THIS PRACTICE FLT; THE LNDG GEAR WARNING SYS PERFORMED AS INTENDED DURING EACH OF SEVERAL LNDGS; SOUNDING LOUDLY AS THE THROTTLE WAS RETARDED. ON APCH DURING THE INCIDENT FLT; AS I RETARDED THE THROTTLE; THE GEAR WARNING SYS DID NOT SOUND AND I DID NOT NOTICE THE FAILURE OF THIS IMPORTANT WARNING SYS. INSTEAD; I CONTINUED SLOWING THE PLANE; ADDING FLAPS; AND MINDING ACFT CTL RIGHT DOWN TO A GEAR-UP LNDG. MY ATTN TO ACFT CTL APPARENTLY ALLOWED FOR A (RELATIVELY) SOFT IMPACT; AND THE DAMAGE TO THE ACFT WAS CONFINED TO THE PROP AND ACFT SKIN. IN A TYPICAL APCH; AS I LOWER THE GEAR; I CHK FOR A GREEN INDICATOR LIGHT AND VISUALLY VERIFY GEAR DOWN ONLY AFTER THE WARNING HORN IS SILENT AND THE MECHANICAL SOUND AND MOTION OF THE GEAR EXTENSION MECHANISM STOPS. (I WOULDN'T TRUST AN ATTEMPTED VERIFICATION BEFORE THEN.) IN THIS CASE; THE FIRST DID NOT OCCUR; AND NEITHER DID THE SECOND. AFTER CLRING THE PLANE FROM THE RWY; AN A&P LOWERED THE GEAR (IT FUNCTIONED NORMALLY); BUT DISCOVERED A BROKEN SOLDER CONNECTION ON THE LNDG GEAR WARNING SYS (IT DID NOT FUNCTION). WOULD I HAVE LOWERED THE GEAR IF THE GEAR WARNING SYS HAD BEEN SCREAMING IN MY EARS AS USUAL? I'D LIKE TO THINK I WOULD; BUT THE INCIDENT CERTAINLY WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED IF I HAD INDEPENDENTLY VERIFIED GEAR EXTENSION AS I APCHED LNDG. A NUMBER OF IF-ONLY SCENARIOS COULD HAVE SAVED ME FROM THIS INCIDENT: IN AN IFR APCH; I LOWER THE GEAR AT A PREDETERMINED POINT IN THE APCH. SAME WITH A STANDARD PATTERN APCH; BUT THIS WAS A STRAIGHT-IN APCH. I'LL REVISE OR RESTRICT MY STRAIGHT-IN APCHS. EVEN WITH THE RETRACTABLE GEAR; THIS IS A RELATIVELY SIMPLE AIRPLANE TO LAND. DOES IT JUSTIFY READING THROUGH A WRITTEN PRE-LNDG CHKLIST? MY ANSWER TODAY WOULD BE YES; BUT AT LEAST 1 AUTH HAS SAID THAT USING A WRITTEN OR MNEMONIC CHKLIST SHOULD BE TAUGHT BUT ANY TYPE OF CHKLIST CAN BE INTERRUPTED BY DISTRS. HOWEVER; EVEN THAT IS TAUGHT AND PRACTICED BY INSTRUCTORS. WILL I EVER MAKE ANOTHER LNDG WITHOUT THINKING ABOUT THIS ONE? NO; BUT THAT'S ONE VERY EXPENSIVE LESSON. FOR ME; IT WILL BE MORE WRITTEN CHKLISTS; A MORE RELIABLE MNEMONIC PROC FOR GEAR DOWN VERIFICATION; MORE PRACTICE WITH DISTRS; AND MORE VIGILANCE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.