|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0001 To 0600|
|Locale Reference||airport : yssy.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||B747-400|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||ground : takeoff roll|
ground : maintenance
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 220|
flight time total : 18000
flight time type : 2500
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : relief pilot|
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 100|
flight time total : 10000
flight time type : 3000
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : less severe|
other anomaly other
|Independent Detector||other other : 3|
|Resolutory Action||flight crew : diverted to another airport|
Departed sydney on runway 34L; takeoff gross weight was 840000 pounds; flaps 10 degrees; V1 154; vr 175; V2 185. Winds were 260 degrees at 8 KTS; clear skies; dry conditions. The #1 first officer made the takeoff. All procedures were followed in accordance with SOP. The aircraft made a normal takeoff with no vibration; noise; or swerves. Departed on a heading of 330 degrees climb out on a radar vector to the north of sydney on an ICAO noise abatement profile; after passing 3000 ft; began the clean-up procedure upon flap retraction schedule. ATC clearance removed any high speed restrs. After passing 5000 ft; the speed was near 320 KIAS; and the after takeoff checklist was complete. We received a call from the aft purser stating that a high pitched vibration was coming from the floor boards near seats 36-40. We began checking all synoptics for indications of problems. Looked at ecs for pack related problems; cycled the pack switches one at a time; since the pack blower fans were in the vicinity of the noise. No change. Checked the hydraulics; pressures and temperatures of all system were normal. Checked all engine indications for any signs of vibration -- there were none. After passing FL180 in the climb; the #2 first officer went to the side of the noise and conducted an investigation. He looked over the flap surfaces and all appeared to be normal. At XA45 we reached cruise altitude; and the noise and vibration subsided. We reviewed all checklists and procedures; and called the dispatcher on the satphone. We discussed in detail any possible scenarios with the maintenance representative and dispatcher. After consultation with all parties including the aft purser; chief purser; flight deck and dispatcher; we continued on. Approximately XC30Z we received an ATC free text message from brisbane ARTCC stating that there was some rubber debris on the runway 34L and was retrieved near the time of our departure. We contacted brisbane ARTCC via satphone; and discussed the situation with them; and they asked us to contact the sydney tower via satphone. We advised dispatch and maintenance again of the news and now began the process of a potential tire failure of unknown damage or problems. We still had no indication of any problem with the tires or wheel well damage; no vibration as if there was a tire failure. We continued on our route of flight at FL320. We requested that the maintenance staff alert the air carrier sydney maintenance staff to see if they could identify the tire carcass for definite indications and what was remaining on the runway. Later on; they stated that there was no staff to investigate and they all went home after our departure. At this time the #1 first officer went to conduct an investigation of the area; and there was vibration only in the floor boards of the area near seats 36-38. The passenger were changed to seats in different areas; but there was no immediate concern for the safety of the operation by all parties. The fuel burn began to increase; at first about 500-700 pounds of more fuel per hour than what was planned. This raised my alarm for several reasons. Our pet and rd fuel for continuing to destination may be doubtful if the fuel burn was going to remain at that level. This is when we began to check our fuel to destination and look for alternatives. At XE20; or thereabouts; we sent a message to dispatch letting them know of the fuel problem and alerting them to the possibility of diverting into hnl. We continued to receive reports from our aft purser and we continued to keep the chief purser informed of all details and decision making process. At 30 mins prior to crossing 5 mi south latitude; we notified dispatch that the fuel situation now at a point that continuing on to destination would place us in jeopardy of making rd and pet fuel requirements. We decided to divert to hnl. ATC clearance and new flight plan were received from dispatch and we began our journey to hnl. When within radio contact the hnl ARTCC stated that the equipment would be standing by and also a cabin advisory was completed by the cabin staff. We started the descent at 140 NM from hnl; after passing FL270 and at 280 KIAS the noise subsided but was still there. We reviewed all appropriate procedures including the autobrakes being off for the landing and also a flaps 30 degree landing. All speeds and landing distances were calculated. The hnl airport gave us runway 8L for landing and it was nearly 13000 ft in length. At 12000 ft in the descent we placed the hydraulic synoptic in view and lowered the landing gear; all system appeared normal with no loss of fluid or pressure. The gear synoptic stated the same; no problems. After passing 10000 ft and less than 250 KIAS we began selecting the flaps. All tracked normally to the flaps 30 degree position. We were given radar vectors to a final approach of runway 8L and at 6000 ft on the approach and at 16 mi from touchdown we had the landing checklist complete and the aircraft was on the profile on the vref of 150+ 5 KTS at 155 KIAS for a 600000 pounds landing weight. Crossed the fence on the profile; touchdown was smooth with no vibration. The spoilers deployed; and the engine reversers were selected; engine #2 would not go into reverse. Aircraft decelerated normally; and at about 60 KTS the aircraft began to vibrate from the wheel well area. Slowed to less than 20 KTS and exited at taxiway K and came to a stop. Stated to the flight attendants to remain seated. After stopping the aircraft; the fire crew did a quick survey of the aircraft and could find no smoke or fire; but did state that the aft tire on the left side of the body gear looked flat but intact. We left the flaps in the flaps 30 degree position and continued to taxi to the gate. Started the APU and after starting the APU; the bleed isln light illuminated. Stopped at the gate; selected electrical power on the APU; and shut down the engines. The maintenance staff chocked the aircraft and we released the brakes at the gate. Upon inspection by the maintenance staff they notified us of the tire damage; visual inspection of the area. We confirmed the damage of some honeycombing exposed; and the small door attached to the aft landing gear was not in a locked position. However; the tire appeared to be still inflated and only the outer tread was missing. The rest of the tire including all side walls were intact. We wrote up all of the maintenance problems; notified the duty manager and the chief pilot. At all times; I personally never felt the aircraft was in any jeopardy of a safety of flight problem. We were well informed by the aft purser of the situation and we maintained a good discipline of communications with all parties keeping everyone well informed. We never did receive any confirmation from the sydney maintenance staff of the tire carcass; but the sydney airport safety officer and the air carrier maintenance department were communicating with each other about the tire. Supplemental information from acn 737489: it was determined that due to tire failure; damage to the gear door and fuselage had occurred causing the noise and vibration.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B747-400 DEPARTING ON A LONG OVERWATER FLT EXPERIENCES MAIN LNDG GEAR TIRE FAILURE ON TAKEOFF; DAMAGING THE LNDG GEAR DOOR ENOUGH TO AFFECT FUEL BURN. THEY DIVERTED TO ENROUTE AIRPORT FOR MAINTENANCE.
Narrative: DEPARTED SYDNEY ON RWY 34L; TKOF GROSS WT WAS 840000 LBS; FLAPS 10 DEGS; V1 154; VR 175; V2 185. WINDS WERE 260 DEGS AT 8 KTS; CLR SKIES; DRY CONDITIONS. THE #1 FO MADE THE TKOF. ALL PROCS WERE FOLLOWED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SOP. THE ACFT MADE A NORMAL TKOF WITH NO VIBRATION; NOISE; OR SWERVES. DEPARTED ON A HDG OF 330 DEGS CLBOUT ON A RADAR VECTOR TO THE N OF SYDNEY ON AN ICAO NOISE ABATEMENT PROFILE; AFTER PASSING 3000 FT; BEGAN THE CLEAN-UP PROC UPON FLAP RETRACTION SCHEDULE. ATC CLRNC REMOVED ANY HIGH SPD RESTRS. AFTER PASSING 5000 FT; THE SPD WAS NEAR 320 KIAS; AND THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST WAS COMPLETE. WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE AFT PURSER STATING THAT A HIGH PITCHED VIBRATION WAS COMING FROM THE FLOOR BOARDS NEAR SEATS 36-40. WE BEGAN CHKING ALL SYNOPTICS FOR INDICATIONS OF PROBS. LOOKED AT ECS FOR PACK RELATED PROBS; CYCLED THE PACK SWITCHES ONE AT A TIME; SINCE THE PACK BLOWER FANS WERE IN THE VICINITY OF THE NOISE. NO CHANGE. CHKED THE HYDS; PRESSURES AND TEMPS OF ALL SYS WERE NORMAL. CHKED ALL ENG INDICATIONS FOR ANY SIGNS OF VIBRATION -- THERE WERE NONE. AFTER PASSING FL180 IN THE CLB; THE #2 FO WENT TO THE SIDE OF THE NOISE AND CONDUCTED AN INVESTIGATION. HE LOOKED OVER THE FLAP SURFACES AND ALL APPEARED TO BE NORMAL. AT XA45 WE REACHED CRUISE ALT; AND THE NOISE AND VIBRATION SUBSIDED. WE REVIEWED ALL CHKLISTS AND PROCS; AND CALLED THE DISPATCHER ON THE SATPHONE. WE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL ANY POSSIBLE SCENARIOS WITH THE MAINT REPRESENTATIVE AND DISPATCHER. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH ALL PARTIES INCLUDING THE AFT PURSER; CHIEF PURSER; FLT DECK AND DISPATCHER; WE CONTINUED ON. APPROX XC30Z WE RECEIVED AN ATC FREE TEXT MESSAGE FROM BRISBANE ARTCC STATING THAT THERE WAS SOME RUBBER DEBRIS ON THE RWY 34L AND WAS RETRIEVED NEAR THE TIME OF OUR DEP. WE CONTACTED BRISBANE ARTCC VIA SATPHONE; AND DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH THEM; AND THEY ASKED US TO CONTACT THE SYDNEY TWR VIA SATPHONE. WE ADVISED DISPATCH AND MAINT AGAIN OF THE NEWS AND NOW BEGAN THE PROCESS OF A POTENTIAL TIRE FAILURE OF UNKNOWN DAMAGE OR PROBS. WE STILL HAD NO INDICATION OF ANY PROB WITH THE TIRES OR WHEEL WELL DAMAGE; NO VIBRATION AS IF THERE WAS A TIRE FAILURE. WE CONTINUED ON OUR RTE OF FLT AT FL320. WE REQUESTED THAT THE MAINT STAFF ALERT THE ACR SYDNEY MAINT STAFF TO SEE IF THEY COULD IDENT THE TIRE CARCASS FOR DEFINITE INDICATIONS AND WHAT WAS REMAINING ON THE RWY. LATER ON; THEY STATED THAT THERE WAS NO STAFF TO INVESTIGATE AND THEY ALL WENT HOME AFTER OUR DEP. AT THIS TIME THE #1 FO WENT TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE AREA; AND THERE WAS VIBRATION ONLY IN THE FLOOR BOARDS OF THE AREA NEAR SEATS 36-38. THE PAX WERE CHANGED TO SEATS IN DIFFERENT AREAS; BUT THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF THE OP BY ALL PARTIES. THE FUEL BURN BEGAN TO INCREASE; AT FIRST ABOUT 500-700 LBS OF MORE FUEL PER HR THAN WHAT WAS PLANNED. THIS RAISED MY ALARM FOR SEVERAL REASONS. OUR PET AND RD FUEL FOR CONTINUING TO DEST MAY BE DOUBTFUL IF THE FUEL BURN WAS GOING TO REMAIN AT THAT LEVEL. THIS IS WHEN WE BEGAN TO CHK OUR FUEL TO DEST AND LOOK FOR ALTERNATIVES. AT XE20; OR THEREABOUTS; WE SENT A MESSAGE TO DISPATCH LETTING THEM KNOW OF THE FUEL PROB AND ALERTING THEM TO THE POSSIBILITY OF DIVERTING INTO HNL. WE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE RPTS FROM OUR AFT PURSER AND WE CONTINUED TO KEEP THE CHIEF PURSER INFORMED OF ALL DETAILS AND DECISION MAKING PROCESS. AT 30 MINS PRIOR TO XING 5 MI S LATITUDE; WE NOTIFIED DISPATCH THAT THE FUEL SITUATION NOW AT A POINT THAT CONTINUING ON TO DEST WOULD PLACE US IN JEOPARDY OF MAKING RD AND PET FUEL REQUIREMENTS. WE DECIDED TO DIVERT TO HNL. ATC CLRNC AND NEW FLT PLAN WERE RECEIVED FROM DISPATCH AND WE BEGAN OUR JOURNEY TO HNL. WHEN WITHIN RADIO CONTACT THE HNL ARTCC STATED THAT THE EQUIP WOULD BE STANDING BY AND ALSO A CABIN ADVISORY WAS COMPLETED BY THE CABIN STAFF. WE STARTED THE DSCNT AT 140 NM FROM HNL; AFTER PASSING FL270 AND AT 280 KIAS THE NOISE SUBSIDED BUT WAS STILL THERE. WE REVIEWED ALL APPROPRIATE PROCS INCLUDING THE AUTOBRAKES BEING OFF FOR THE LNDG AND ALSO A FLAPS 30 DEG LNDG. ALL SPDS AND LNDG DISTANCES WERE CALCULATED. THE HNL ARPT GAVE US RWY 8L FOR LNDG AND IT WAS NEARLY 13000 FT IN LENGTH. AT 12000 FT IN THE DSCNT WE PLACED THE HYD SYNOPTIC IN VIEW AND LOWERED THE LNDG GEAR; ALL SYS APPEARED NORMAL WITH NO LOSS OF FLUID OR PRESSURE. THE GEAR SYNOPTIC STATED THE SAME; NO PROBS. AFTER PASSING 10000 FT AND LESS THAN 250 KIAS WE BEGAN SELECTING THE FLAPS. ALL TRACKED NORMALLY TO THE FLAPS 30 DEG POS. WE WERE GIVEN RADAR VECTORS TO A FINAL APCH OF RWY 8L AND AT 6000 FT ON THE APCH AND AT 16 MI FROM TOUCHDOWN WE HAD THE LNDG CHKLIST COMPLETE AND THE ACFT WAS ON THE PROFILE ON THE VREF OF 150+ 5 KTS AT 155 KIAS FOR A 600000 LBS LNDG WT. CROSSED THE FENCE ON THE PROFILE; TOUCHDOWN WAS SMOOTH WITH NO VIBRATION. THE SPOILERS DEPLOYED; AND THE ENG REVERSERS WERE SELECTED; ENG #2 WOULD NOT GO INTO REVERSE. ACFT DECELERATED NORMALLY; AND AT ABOUT 60 KTS THE ACFT BEGAN TO VIBRATE FROM THE WHEEL WELL AREA. SLOWED TO LESS THAN 20 KTS AND EXITED AT TXWY K AND CAME TO A STOP. STATED TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO REMAIN SEATED. AFTER STOPPING THE ACFT; THE FIRE CREW DID A QUICK SURVEY OF THE ACFT AND COULD FIND NO SMOKE OR FIRE; BUT DID STATE THAT THE AFT TIRE ON THE L SIDE OF THE BODY GEAR LOOKED FLAT BUT INTACT. WE LEFT THE FLAPS IN THE FLAPS 30 DEG POS AND CONTINUED TO TAXI TO THE GATE. STARTED THE APU AND AFTER STARTING THE APU; THE BLEED ISLN LIGHT ILLUMINATED. STOPPED AT THE GATE; SELECTED ELECTRICAL PWR ON THE APU; AND SHUT DOWN THE ENGS. THE MAINT STAFF CHOCKED THE ACFT AND WE RELEASED THE BRAKES AT THE GATE. UPON INSPECTION BY THE MAINT STAFF THEY NOTIFIED US OF THE TIRE DAMAGE; VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE AREA. WE CONFIRMED THE DAMAGE OF SOME HONEYCOMBING EXPOSED; AND THE SMALL DOOR ATTACHED TO THE AFT LNDG GEAR WAS NOT IN A LOCKED POS. HOWEVER; THE TIRE APPEARED TO BE STILL INFLATED AND ONLY THE OUTER TREAD WAS MISSING. THE REST OF THE TIRE INCLUDING ALL SIDE WALLS WERE INTACT. WE WROTE UP ALL OF THE MAINT PROBS; NOTIFIED THE DUTY MGR AND THE CHIEF PLT. AT ALL TIMES; I PERSONALLY NEVER FELT THE ACFT WAS IN ANY JEOPARDY OF A SAFETY OF FLT PROB. WE WERE WELL INFORMED BY THE AFT PURSER OF THE SITUATION AND WE MAINTAINED A GOOD DISCIPLINE OF COMS WITH ALL PARTIES KEEPING EVERYONE WELL INFORMED. WE NEVER DID RECEIVE ANY CONFIRMATION FROM THE SYDNEY MAINT STAFF OF THE TIRE CARCASS; BUT THE SYDNEY ARPT SAFETY OFFICER AND THE ACR MAINT DEPT WERE COMMUNICATING WITH EACH OTHER ABOUT THE TIRE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 737489: IT WAS DETERMINED THAT DUE TO TIRE FAILURE; DAMAGE TO THE GEAR DOOR AND FUSELAGE HAD OCCURRED CAUSING THE NOISE AND VIBRATION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.