Narrative:

Shortly after our takeoff; potomac departure cleared us to 17000 ft and direct terpz; at which point the first officer; who was also the PF; began programming the FMC. A very short time later potomac changed the clearance to direct buffr; a fix that neither of us knew. As I searched the chart for buffr; the first officer searched the FMC pages for buffr. Neither of us found buffr so I asked potomac to confirm the fix; and about the same time found buffr on the chart. I then noticed that the aircraft was no longer climbing; but in nearly level flight and the airspeed was increasing rapidly through 235 KTS. I called for the first officer to pull the nose up; which he did; and noted the maximum speed achieved was 261 KTS. This not only exceeded the 250 KT restr; but also oversped the flaps which were still at flaps 1 degree. I need to do a better job of monitoring as the pilot monitoring; and as the captain; not allow a procedural breakdown; such as I did in allowing the first officer to program the FMC while hand flying the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CREW OVERSPEEDS THE FLAPS AND EXCEEDS 250 KTS BELOW 10000 FEET WHILE TRYING TO PROGRAM THE FMS TO GO DIRECT TO BUFFR.

Narrative: SHORTLY AFTER OUR TKOF; POTOMAC DEP CLRED US TO 17000 FT AND DIRECT TERPZ; AT WHICH POINT THE FO; WHO WAS ALSO THE PF; BEGAN PROGRAMMING THE FMC. A VERY SHORT TIME LATER POTOMAC CHANGED THE CLRNC TO DIRECT BUFFR; A FIX THAT NEITHER OF US KNEW. AS I SEARCHED THE CHART FOR BUFFR; THE FO SEARCHED THE FMC PAGES FOR BUFFR. NEITHER OF US FOUND BUFFR SO I ASKED POTOMAC TO CONFIRM THE FIX; AND ABOUT THE SAME TIME FOUND BUFFR ON THE CHART. I THEN NOTICED THAT THE ACFT WAS NO LONGER CLBING; BUT IN NEARLY LEVEL FLT AND THE AIRSPD WAS INCREASING RAPIDLY THROUGH 235 KTS. I CALLED FOR THE FO TO PULL THE NOSE UP; WHICH HE DID; AND NOTED THE MAX SPD ACHIEVED WAS 261 KTS. THIS NOT ONLY EXCEEDED THE 250 KT RESTR; BUT ALSO OVERSPED THE FLAPS WHICH WERE STILL AT FLAPS 1 DEG. I NEED TO DO A BETTER JOB OF MONITORING AS THE PLT MONITORING; AND AS THE CAPT; NOT ALLOW A PROCEDURAL BREAKDOWN; SUCH AS I DID IN ALLOWING THE FO TO PROGRAM THE FMC WHILE HAND FLYING THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.