Narrative:

I was working local control. Aircraft X (B737) landed runway 28R; and exited left at E4. Ground control instructed aircraft X to 'taxi to the ramp.' the aircraft taxied east on taxiway east. Aircraft Y (trin) had landed runway 28L nearly simultaneously and exited at taxiway G. This aircraft would be expecting to proceed west on taxiway C to get to the FBO. The pilot called ground control; requesting taxi to the FBO. Ground control instructed aircraft Y to taxi to the ramp; then began to inform the pilot that there was an opposite direction B737 on taxiway C; and that the B737 would be instructed to give way. However; ground control then abruptly told the pilot to disregard the opposite direction traffic. Corrective action: the reason for the 'disregard' was that the controller had gotten up out of his chair to see exactly where the B737 was located. He then realized that aircraft X was not a factor whatsoever (the B737 was on the other side of the airport; on taxiway east; not taxiway C). There was absolutely no safety compromised in this particular instance. As far as mistakes go; at first glance it appears seemingly harmless. Contributing factors: the primary contributing factor is that the controller did not scan the txwys when issuing the clearance to aircraft X to 'taxi to the ramp.' the controller assumed that aircraft X was exiting runway 28L at C4. One factor that influences such assumptions being made is that routinely; aircraft X arrs are assigned a specific runway because their ramp is on that side of the airport (near the intersection of 2 txwys). Obviously; aircraft X had been assigned the north runway due to the much slower single-engine trinidad that was sequenced for the south parallel runway. Human factors: factors affecting the quality of human performance. The main factor that affects our runways and txwys not being scanned in a vigilant manner is the incredibly un-ergonomic design of our new 'state of the art' tower. It is designed in such a way that incredibly huge portions of the middle sections of our runways and txwys are obstructed from view from any one location in the tower cabin attendant. Such a poor design means that; to do the job correctly; one must constantly walk back and forth from the north side of the tower cabin attendant to the south side of the tower cabin attendant in order to maintain constant vigilance. Either that; or one must stand on a platform provided by management. Actions or inactions: management has provided a single 16 inch 'riser' for our use. This device elevates the controller such that all movement areas can be seen with a mere turn of one's head. However; it is rarely used; as it; in and of itself; is incredibly un-ergonomic. (Imagine utilizing your desk if you were seated 16 inches higher than your chair is normally set. How would you easily reach your keyboard; answer your phone; write on your desk; etc?) for a brief time in the late 80's or early 90's; in our 1950 era control tower (which we occupied until just 3 yrs ago); management insisted that local control and ground control controllers shall not be seated while performing control duties. Management's intentions were good (ie; controller should remain constantly vigilant). However; being as one could view all movement areas from a seated position at local control or ground control; such a mandate was ignored. It quietly died away. Now we have an incredibly transformed situation. We have controllers seated at their assigned local control/ground control position; where they cannot maintain constant vigilance even if they stood at those positions. And today; management looks the other way. To say that the safety culture has changed is an understatement. It is not too difficult for me to imagine an airliner landing runway 28R someday; and inexplicably exiting the runway to the right at J4; instead of to the left at E4. Then the pilot calls ground control reporting off the runway; even reporting off at 'juliet four.' the ground control controller is unable to see J4 from his/her seated position; and assumes the pilot exited at E4 (the controller may have even heard 'unintelligible; four;' and makes that assumption of a routine operation). The controller then issues the routine 'taxi to the ramp' clearance; such that the pilot would now have clearance to cross runway 28R. It is then that the stage will be set for what ultimately may be the runway accident that the NTSB has been so concerned about. In my opinion; the conditions have been perfectly created for such a scenario to manifest.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CMH LCL CTLR DESCRIBED POTENTIAL CONFLICT EVENT WHEN GND CTL FAILED TO SCAN MOVEMENT SURFACE PRIOR TO ISSUING TAXI CLRNC; ADDING HUMAN FACTOR COMMENTARY.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING LCL CTL. ACFT X (B737) LANDED RWY 28R; AND EXITED L AT E4. GND CTL INSTRUCTED ACFT X TO 'TAXI TO THE RAMP.' THE ACFT TAXIED E ON TXWY E. ACFT Y (TRIN) HAD LANDED RWY 28L NEARLY SIMULTANEOUSLY AND EXITED AT TXWY G. THIS ACFT WOULD BE EXPECTING TO PROCEED W ON TXWY C TO GET TO THE FBO. THE PLT CALLED GND CTL; REQUESTING TAXI TO THE FBO. GND CTL INSTRUCTED ACFT Y TO TAXI TO THE RAMP; THEN BEGAN TO INFORM THE PLT THAT THERE WAS AN OPPOSITE DIRECTION B737 ON TXWY C; AND THAT THE B737 WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO GIVE WAY. HOWEVER; GND CTL THEN ABRUPTLY TOLD THE PLT TO DISREGARD THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC. CORRECTIVE ACTION: THE REASON FOR THE 'DISREGARD' WAS THAT THE CTLR HAD GOTTEN UP OUT OF HIS CHAIR TO SEE EXACTLY WHERE THE B737 WAS LOCATED. HE THEN REALIZED THAT ACFT X WAS NOT A FACTOR WHATSOEVER (THE B737 WAS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ARPT; ON TXWY E; NOT TXWY C). THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO SAFETY COMPROMISED IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE. AS FAR AS MISTAKES GO; AT FIRST GLANCE IT APPEARS SEEMINGLY HARMLESS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS THAT THE CTLR DID NOT SCAN THE TXWYS WHEN ISSUING THE CLRNC TO ACFT X TO 'TAXI TO THE RAMP.' THE CTLR ASSUMED THAT ACFT X WAS EXITING RWY 28L AT C4. ONE FACTOR THAT INFLUENCES SUCH ASSUMPTIONS BEING MADE IS THAT ROUTINELY; ACFT X ARRS ARE ASSIGNED A SPECIFIC RWY BECAUSE THEIR RAMP IS ON THAT SIDE OF THE ARPT (NEAR THE INTXN OF 2 TXWYS). OBVIOUSLY; ACFT X HAD BEEN ASSIGNED THE N RWY DUE TO THE MUCH SLOWER SINGLE-ENG TRINIDAD THAT WAS SEQUENCED FOR THE S PARALLEL RWY. HUMAN FACTORS: FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE. THE MAIN FACTOR THAT AFFECTS OUR RWYS AND TXWYS NOT BEING SCANNED IN A VIGILANT MANNER IS THE INCREDIBLY UN-ERGONOMIC DESIGN OF OUR NEW 'STATE OF THE ART' TWR. IT IS DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY THAT INCREDIBLY HUGE PORTIONS OF THE MIDDLE SECTIONS OF OUR RWYS AND TXWYS ARE OBSTRUCTED FROM VIEW FROM ANY ONE LOCATION IN THE TWR CAB. SUCH A POOR DESIGN MEANS THAT; TO DO THE JOB CORRECTLY; ONE MUST CONSTANTLY WALK BACK AND FORTH FROM THE N SIDE OF THE TWR CAB TO THE S SIDE OF THE TWR CAB IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN CONSTANT VIGILANCE. EITHER THAT; OR ONE MUST STAND ON A PLATFORM PROVIDED BY MGMNT. ACTIONS OR INACTIONS: MGMNT HAS PROVIDED A SINGLE 16 INCH 'RISER' FOR OUR USE. THIS DEVICE ELEVATES THE CTLR SUCH THAT ALL MOVEMENT AREAS CAN BE SEEN WITH A MERE TURN OF ONE'S HEAD. HOWEVER; IT IS RARELY USED; AS IT; IN AND OF ITSELF; IS INCREDIBLY UN-ERGONOMIC. (IMAGINE UTILIZING YOUR DESK IF YOU WERE SEATED 16 INCHES HIGHER THAN YOUR CHAIR IS NORMALLY SET. HOW WOULD YOU EASILY REACH YOUR KEYBOARD; ANSWER YOUR PHONE; WRITE ON YOUR DESK; ETC?) FOR A BRIEF TIME IN THE LATE 80'S OR EARLY 90'S; IN OUR 1950 ERA CTL TWR (WHICH WE OCCUPIED UNTIL JUST 3 YRS AGO); MGMNT INSISTED THAT LCL CTL AND GND CTL CTLRS SHALL NOT BE SEATED WHILE PERFORMING CTL DUTIES. MGMNT'S INTENTIONS WERE GOOD (IE; CTLR SHOULD REMAIN CONSTANTLY VIGILANT). HOWEVER; BEING AS ONE COULD VIEW ALL MOVEMENT AREAS FROM A SEATED POS AT LCL CTL OR GND CTL; SUCH A MANDATE WAS IGNORED. IT QUIETLY DIED AWAY. NOW WE HAVE AN INCREDIBLY TRANSFORMED SITUATION. WE HAVE CTLRS SEATED AT THEIR ASSIGNED LCL CTL/GND CTL POS; WHERE THEY CANNOT MAINTAIN CONSTANT VIGILANCE EVEN IF THEY STOOD AT THOSE POSITIONS. AND TODAY; MGMNT LOOKS THE OTHER WAY. TO SAY THAT THE SAFETY CULTURE HAS CHANGED IS AN UNDERSTATEMENT. IT IS NOT TOO DIFFICULT FOR ME TO IMAGINE AN AIRLINER LNDG RWY 28R SOMEDAY; AND INEXPLICABLY EXITING THE RWY TO THE R AT J4; INSTEAD OF TO THE L AT E4. THEN THE PLT CALLS GND CTL RPTING OFF THE RWY; EVEN RPTING OFF AT 'JULIET FOUR.' THE GND CTL CTLR IS UNABLE TO SEE J4 FROM HIS/HER SEATED POS; AND ASSUMES THE PLT EXITED AT E4 (THE CTLR MAY HAVE EVEN HEARD 'UNINTELLIGIBLE; FOUR;' AND MAKES THAT ASSUMPTION OF A ROUTINE OP). THE CTLR THEN ISSUES THE ROUTINE 'TAXI TO THE RAMP' CLRNC; SUCH THAT THE PLT WOULD NOW HAVE CLRNC TO CROSS RWY 28R. IT IS THEN THAT THE STAGE WILL BE SET FOR WHAT ULTIMATELY MAY BE THE RWY ACCIDENT THAT THE NTSB HAS BEEN SO CONCERNED ABOUT. IN MY OPINION; THE CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN PERFECTLY CREATED FOR SUCH A SCENARIO TO MANIFEST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.