Narrative:

During taxi to runway 27 at san the runway advisory alert system electronic callout covered the tower's 'air carrier X taxi into position and hold.' we had to ask for a readback. The runway advisory alert system came within a second of covering the 'cleared for takeoff' clearance. On arrival into ZZZ; the runway advisory alert system electronic callout covered the tower's clearance to 'cross runway 28L' and we again had to ask for a repeat. The runway advisory alert system nearly covered other ATC communications during the 3-LEG day in the aircraft from ZZZ2 to ZZZ1 to san to ZZZ. Although no runway incursions or crew errors resulted from these events; the potential was quite high. I had the exact same issue on a flight out of san during the month of march in a different runway advisory alert system equipped aircraft. In that event; the runway advisory alert system covered the controller's 'taxi into position and hold runway 27 expect an immediate; traffic on a 2 mi final.' we had to ask for a repeat and the runway advisory alert system nearly covered the clearance for immediate takeoff with traffic on short final. This is not a san problem; the runway advisory alert system covers ATC at all airports without discrimination. Remove the runway advisory alert system -- it is a huge distraction during a critical phase of flight and is a safety issue. There are other passive technologies that provide better crew situational awareness while taxiing. The voice alerts are the heart of the runway advisory alert system and they are also the cause of the safety problems inherent in the system. It needs to be removed as soon as possible before it causes a runway incursion or similar event. We must be able to communicate with ATC and the runway advisory alert system prevents that on a regular basis.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-400 FLT CREW REPORTS ATC COM IS FREQUENTLY DISRUPTED BY RAAS ALERTS.

Narrative: DURING TAXI TO RWY 27 AT SAN THE RWY ADVISORY ALERT SYS ELECTRONIC CALLOUT COVERED THE TWR'S 'ACR X TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD.' WE HAD TO ASK FOR A READBACK. THE RWY ADVISORY ALERT SYS CAME WITHIN A SECOND OF COVERING THE 'CLRED FOR TKOF' CLRNC. ON ARR INTO ZZZ; THE RWY ADVISORY ALERT SYS ELECTRONIC CALLOUT COVERED THE TWR'S CLRNC TO 'CROSS RWY 28L' AND WE AGAIN HAD TO ASK FOR A REPEAT. THE RWY ADVISORY ALERT SYS NEARLY COVERED OTHER ATC COMS DURING THE 3-LEG DAY IN THE ACFT FROM ZZZ2 TO ZZZ1 TO SAN TO ZZZ. ALTHOUGH NO RWY INCURSIONS OR CREW ERRORS RESULTED FROM THESE EVENTS; THE POTENTIAL WAS QUITE HIGH. I HAD THE EXACT SAME ISSUE ON A FLT OUT OF SAN DURING THE MONTH OF MARCH IN A DIFFERENT RWY ADVISORY ALERT SYS EQUIPPED ACFT. IN THAT EVENT; THE RWY ADVISORY ALERT SYS COVERED THE CTLR'S 'TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 27 EXPECT AN IMMEDIATE; TFC ON A 2 MI FINAL.' WE HAD TO ASK FOR A REPEAT AND THE RWY ADVISORY ALERT SYS NEARLY COVERED THE CLRNC FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF WITH TFC ON SHORT FINAL. THIS IS NOT A SAN PROB; THE RWY ADVISORY ALERT SYS COVERS ATC AT ALL ARPTS WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION. REMOVE THE RWY ADVISORY ALERT SYS -- IT IS A HUGE DISTR DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT AND IS A SAFETY ISSUE. THERE ARE OTHER PASSIVE TECHNOLOGIES THAT PROVIDE BETTER CREW SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WHILE TAXIING. THE VOICE ALERTS ARE THE HEART OF THE RWY ADVISORY ALERT SYS AND THEY ARE ALSO THE CAUSE OF THE SAFETY PROBS INHERENT IN THE SYS. IT NEEDS TO BE REMOVED ASAP BEFORE IT CAUSES A RWY INCURSION OR SIMILAR EVENT. WE MUST BE ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH ATC AND THE RWY ADVISORY ALERT SYS PREVENTS THAT ON A REGULAR BASIS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.