Narrative:

We pushed back on time at ZZZ and started both engines since it was first flight. All was normal. I saluted the ground crew; they disconnected and left. My first officer then ran through the remainder of the after start check. When she got to the autobrakes she was unable to arm them. She tried several times and each time we got the automatic brake fail message on the oap and the switch returned to the off position. I distinctly remember looking at the oap each time she tried to arm the system and seeing only 3 messages. APU generator off bus; parking brakes and autobrake fail. There were no other messages. I asked her to check the MEL to see if we could placard the system. We could not so I returned to the gate. At the gate with the door open; I left the aircraft and went up the jetbridge to call dispatch and let him know what was happening. I returned around 10 mins later and stopped on the jetbridge to talk with the mechanic about the status of the aircraft. He told me they were putting the autobrake system on MEL. He had a copy of the MEL in his hand so I asked to specifically look through the 'copy' for any 'O' procedures unique to the MEL. On the last line of the last page I saw that the autospoiler system also would be inoperative due to this MEL and we were not to arm it for takeoff or landing. I thanked him for his efforts and went back into the cockpit to wait for the new release and logbook. I told my first officer about the autospoiler system also being inoperative due to this MEL. We re-accomplished the entire before start check since we'd left the airplane. So here we were almost 1 hour late and my frustration level had really begun to climb. Here's what I was dealing with over the 4 day trip and in particular the last day. 1) operations in ZZZ making a lot of extra work for me due to clerical errors. 2) maintenance problems with the jet. 3) pressure from the passenger via the flight attendants about why we're still at the gate; why aren't we leaving; etc. 4) a very new (only a month on the line after a 4 1/2 yr furlough) first officer who I really had to watch closely and 'coach' through every one of her lndgs. 5) a real problem with stress/fatigue due to less than optimal sleep at the hotel. Evidently; the hotel was hosting a national dance competition and a youth hockey tournament for boys and girls ages 8-13. They were running up and down the halls until well after XA00 screaming and playing. We also had the time change. 6) my own overriding desire to get the job done and get the passenger safely to the destination. Finally; all the pieces of the puzzle arrived and we pushed off the gate a second time; disconnected and started normally. This time; however; we noticed 4 new messages on the oap that were not there the first time we pushed and started. We had the antiskid inoperative messages. My first officer and I discussed this at great length and finally reached a consensus that this indication must be as a result of the MEL since neither one of us had physically turned off the antiskid switch and those messages had not been there previously. For whatever reason; I don't know why -- maybe expectation or just the overall human dynamic that had been created this morning; it never occurred to me to call maintenance. My first officer and I discussed as well that we'd both flown many yrs in the air force in airplanes not equipped with antiskid and that this shouldn't be a problem. WX was nice in ZZZ1 and we'd just be overly cautious on the landing roll with the brakes. We thoroughly briefed the departure and took off and flew to ZZZ1. All was well (in our minds) until the point where we touched down on the runway in ZZZ1. I was flying the aircraft and touched down in the touchdown zone smoothly and on speed. After lowering the nose to the runway; I reached for the spoiler handle and pulled it full aft. It sprung out of the gate to the retracted position. I did it again and again it sprung out of deployed. I quickly told the first officer to grab it and hold it fully deployed. She did. I then deployed the thrust reversers. It was during the iterations of trying to get the spoilers out that I heard on the radio a call from an X airplane that we had a tire smoking. I hadn't even touched the brakes yet. My heels were still on the floor. As soon as I put out the thrust reversers; I raised my feet to the brake pedals and cautiously applied brake pressure. At no time did I ever feel/see/sense any sort of directional control problem with the aircraft and if it were not for the radio call I would not have known we'd had a problem. I slowed the jet and exited the runway at the second high speed. Tower asked me what I wanted to do and I said; 'well; please tell me what you see.' he put the binoculars on me and said he saw no smoke. The airplane behind me said it appeared I had a flat tire. I said stand by and had the first officer call maintenance to see if I would be ok to taxi on one main tire. They said yes. We taxied back and parked at the gate. Again; it felt like a normal MD88 taxiing and we noticed nothing abnormal on the way in.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD88 WITH AN INOP AUTO-BRAKE AND AN ANTI-SKID MALFUNCTION ANNUNCIATED HAS A BRAKE LOCK AND THE TIRE FAIL ON LANDING.

Narrative: WE PUSHED BACK ON TIME AT ZZZ AND STARTED BOTH ENGS SINCE IT WAS FIRST FLT. ALL WAS NORMAL. I SALUTED THE GND CREW; THEY DISCONNECTED AND LEFT. MY FO THEN RAN THROUGH THE REMAINDER OF THE AFTER START CHK. WHEN SHE GOT TO THE AUTOBRAKES SHE WAS UNABLE TO ARM THEM. SHE TRIED SEVERAL TIMES AND EACH TIME WE GOT THE AUTO BRAKE FAIL MESSAGE ON THE OAP AND THE SWITCH RETURNED TO THE OFF POS. I DISTINCTLY REMEMBER LOOKING AT THE OAP EACH TIME SHE TRIED TO ARM THE SYS AND SEEING ONLY 3 MESSAGES. APU GENERATOR OFF BUS; PARKING BRAKES AND AUTOBRAKE FAIL. THERE WERE NO OTHER MESSAGES. I ASKED HER TO CHK THE MEL TO SEE IF WE COULD PLACARD THE SYS. WE COULD NOT SO I RETURNED TO THE GATE. AT THE GATE WITH THE DOOR OPEN; I LEFT THE ACFT AND WENT UP THE JETBRIDGE TO CALL DISPATCH AND LET HIM KNOW WHAT WAS HAPPENING. I RETURNED AROUND 10 MINS LATER AND STOPPED ON THE JETBRIDGE TO TALK WITH THE MECH ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE ACFT. HE TOLD ME THEY WERE PUTTING THE AUTOBRAKE SYS ON MEL. HE HAD A COPY OF THE MEL IN HIS HAND SO I ASKED TO SPECIFICALLY LOOK THROUGH THE 'COPY' FOR ANY 'O' PROCS UNIQUE TO THE MEL. ON THE LAST LINE OF THE LAST PAGE I SAW THAT THE AUTOSPOILER SYS ALSO WOULD BE INOP DUE TO THIS MEL AND WE WERE NOT TO ARM IT FOR TKOF OR LNDG. I THANKED HIM FOR HIS EFFORTS AND WENT BACK INTO THE COCKPIT TO WAIT FOR THE NEW RELEASE AND LOGBOOK. I TOLD MY FO ABOUT THE AUTOSPOILER SYS ALSO BEING INOP DUE TO THIS MEL. WE RE-ACCOMPLISHED THE ENTIRE BEFORE START CHK SINCE WE'D LEFT THE AIRPLANE. SO HERE WE WERE ALMOST 1 HR LATE AND MY FRUSTRATION LEVEL HAD REALLY BEGUN TO CLB. HERE'S WHAT I WAS DEALING WITH OVER THE 4 DAY TRIP AND IN PARTICULAR THE LAST DAY. 1) OPS IN ZZZ MAKING A LOT OF EXTRA WORK FOR ME DUE TO CLERICAL ERRORS. 2) MAINT PROBS WITH THE JET. 3) PRESSURE FROM THE PAX VIA THE FLT ATTENDANTS ABOUT WHY WE'RE STILL AT THE GATE; WHY AREN'T WE LEAVING; ETC. 4) A VERY NEW (ONLY A MONTH ON THE LINE AFTER A 4 1/2 YR FURLOUGH) FO WHO I REALLY HAD TO WATCH CLOSELY AND 'COACH' THROUGH EVERY ONE OF HER LNDGS. 5) A REAL PROB WITH STRESS/FATIGUE DUE TO LESS THAN OPTIMAL SLEEP AT THE HOTEL. EVIDENTLY; THE HOTEL WAS HOSTING A NATIONAL DANCE COMPETITION AND A YOUTH HOCKEY TOURNAMENT FOR BOYS AND GIRLS AGES 8-13. THEY WERE RUNNING UP AND DOWN THE HALLS UNTIL WELL AFTER XA00 SCREAMING AND PLAYING. WE ALSO HAD THE TIME CHANGE. 6) MY OWN OVERRIDING DESIRE TO GET THE JOB DONE AND GET THE PAX SAFELY TO THE DEST. FINALLY; ALL THE PIECES OF THE PUZZLE ARRIVED AND WE PUSHED OFF THE GATE A SECOND TIME; DISCONNECTED AND STARTED NORMALLY. THIS TIME; HOWEVER; WE NOTICED 4 NEW MESSAGES ON THE OAP THAT WERE NOT THERE THE FIRST TIME WE PUSHED AND STARTED. WE HAD THE ANTISKID INOP MESSAGES. MY FO AND I DISCUSSED THIS AT GREAT LENGTH AND FINALLY REACHED A CONSENSUS THAT THIS INDICATION MUST BE AS A RESULT OF THE MEL SINCE NEITHER ONE OF US HAD PHYSICALLY TURNED OFF THE ANTISKID SWITCH AND THOSE MESSAGES HAD NOT BEEN THERE PREVIOUSLY. FOR WHATEVER REASON; I DON'T KNOW WHY -- MAYBE EXPECTATION OR JUST THE OVERALL HUMAN DYNAMIC THAT HAD BEEN CREATED THIS MORNING; IT NEVER OCCURRED TO ME TO CALL MAINT. MY FO AND I DISCUSSED AS WELL THAT WE'D BOTH FLOWN MANY YRS IN THE AIR FORCE IN AIRPLANES NOT EQUIPPED WITH ANTISKID AND THAT THIS SHOULDN'T BE A PROB. WX WAS NICE IN ZZZ1 AND WE'D JUST BE OVERLY CAUTIOUS ON THE LNDG ROLL WITH THE BRAKES. WE THOROUGHLY BRIEFED THE DEP AND TOOK OFF AND FLEW TO ZZZ1. ALL WAS WELL (IN OUR MINDS) UNTIL THE POINT WHERE WE TOUCHED DOWN ON THE RWY IN ZZZ1. I WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND TOUCHED DOWN IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE SMOOTHLY AND ON SPD. AFTER LOWERING THE NOSE TO THE RWY; I REACHED FOR THE SPOILER HANDLE AND PULLED IT FULL AFT. IT SPRUNG OUT OF THE GATE TO THE RETRACTED POS. I DID IT AGAIN AND AGAIN IT SPRUNG OUT OF DEPLOYED. I QUICKLY TOLD THE FO TO GRAB IT AND HOLD IT FULLY DEPLOYED. SHE DID. I THEN DEPLOYED THE THRUST REVERSERS. IT WAS DURING THE ITERATIONS OF TRYING TO GET THE SPOILERS OUT THAT I HEARD ON THE RADIO A CALL FROM AN X AIRPLANE THAT WE HAD A TIRE SMOKING. I HADN'T EVEN TOUCHED THE BRAKES YET. MY HEELS WERE STILL ON THE FLOOR. AS SOON AS I PUT OUT THE THRUST REVERSERS; I RAISED MY FEET TO THE BRAKE PEDALS AND CAUTIOUSLY APPLIED BRAKE PRESSURE. AT NO TIME DID I EVER FEEL/SEE/SENSE ANY SORT OF DIRECTIONAL CTL PROB WITH THE ACFT AND IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE RADIO CALL I WOULD NOT HAVE KNOWN WE'D HAD A PROB. I SLOWED THE JET AND EXITED THE RWY AT THE SECOND HIGH SPD. TWR ASKED ME WHAT I WANTED TO DO AND I SAID; 'WELL; PLEASE TELL ME WHAT YOU SEE.' HE PUT THE BINOCULARS ON ME AND SAID HE SAW NO SMOKE. THE AIRPLANE BEHIND ME SAID IT APPEARED I HAD A FLAT TIRE. I SAID STAND BY AND HAD THE FO CALL MAINT TO SEE IF I WOULD BE OK TO TAXI ON ONE MAIN TIRE. THEY SAID YES. WE TAXIED BACK AND PARKED AT THE GATE. AGAIN; IT FELT LIKE A NORMAL MD88 TAXIING AND WE NOTICED NOTHING ABNORMAL ON THE WAY IN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.