Narrative:

I was the PNF out of ZZZ at XA10Z on feb/mon/07. In the climb through 5000 ft out of ZZZ this morning; we received EICAS messages main and backup trim were inoperative. We leveled off at the assigned 8000 ft and notified ATC. After completing the checklist we were able to fix the trim problem and both trims were working properly. We notified company and continued to the destination. EICAS messages were our first warning. We both checked the trim on our yokes separately and checked the backup trim on the center console; finding them inoperative. Completed the QRH checklist and notified ATC and company. Preventive maintenance. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the first warning was an EICAS message 'main and backup trim inoperative.' forward yoke pressure was held by the captain to prevent rapid climbing. The QRH procedure of resetting the circuit breakers was the fix as both system became operative. The procedure must have restarted the stabilizer trim computer.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB145 ON CLBOUT AT 5000 FT HAD EICAS MESSAGE 'MAIN AND BACKUP TRIM INOP.' FORWARD YOKE PRESSURE REQUIRED. RAN QRH CHKLIST; RESET CIRCUIT BREAKERS. MAIN AND BACKUP TRIM OK.

Narrative: I WAS THE PNF OUT OF ZZZ AT XA10Z ON FEB/MON/07. IN THE CLB THROUGH 5000 FT OUT OF ZZZ THIS MORNING; WE RECEIVED EICAS MESSAGES MAIN AND BACKUP TRIM WERE INOP. WE LEVELED OFF AT THE ASSIGNED 8000 FT AND NOTIFIED ATC. AFTER COMPLETING THE CHKLIST WE WERE ABLE TO FIX THE TRIM PROB AND BOTH TRIMS WERE WORKING PROPERLY. WE NOTIFIED COMPANY AND CONTINUED TO THE DEST. EICAS MESSAGES WERE OUR FIRST WARNING. WE BOTH CHKED THE TRIM ON OUR YOKES SEPARATELY AND CHKED THE BACKUP TRIM ON THE CTR CONSOLE; FINDING THEM INOP. COMPLETED THE QRH CHKLIST AND NOTIFIED ATC AND COMPANY. PREVENTIVE MAINT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FIRST WARNING WAS AN EICAS MESSAGE 'MAIN AND BACKUP TRIM INOP.' FORWARD YOKE PRESSURE WAS HELD BY THE CAPT TO PREVENT RAPID CLBING. THE QRH PROC OF RESETTING THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS WAS THE FIX AS BOTH SYS BECAME OPERATIVE. THE PROC MUST HAVE RESTARTED THE STABILIZER TRIM COMPUTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.