Narrative:

We arrived with an aircraft which had a duct pressure split in excess of 15 psi. We had written this up in detail. Maintenance looked at the situation and; realizing this problem had been 'fixed' 5 days ago; realized there was a problem the 'fix' didn't address and grounded the plane. Dispatch decided to give us another airplane which was expected to arrive at about XA45 for our continuation to ZZZ. We were up against a very tight scheduling problem as the takeoff curfew is XB00. The station manager (or someone) got us an 'extension' on the curfew to XB15. By the time we got the plane unloaded and reloaded and were nearly finished with our preflight preparations; I noticed the time was XB11. They were just closing the door and I was just getting a clearance. The clearance delivery controller said he saw we had an extension on the curfew till XB20 so it looked possible. We pushed at exactly XB15. We proceeded to run the operation in an extremely hurried manner; maybe dangerously so but the pressure was enormous. From my point of view this is how the situation looks: we have 47 passenger in the plane that really want to get to ZZZ. The plane we're in really needs to get to ZZZ for the following morning's service. If we don't go; all these people need to be accommodated in a hotel and the next morning's ZZZ flight needs to be canceled or delayed while plane and crew movements are performed. My crew needs to be accommodated for the night and relocated to ZZZ the following morning. In other words; the costs and hassle perpetrated upon my struggling airline are enormous; not to mention the terrible inconvenience we put on these 47 passenger and however many are coming back from ZZZ the following morning on this airplane. We divided duties during taxi. The captain did everything we normally do as a crew and I did the performance numbers. ATC was trying to help us by giving us very expedited clrncs. When we got our takeoff clearance; I didn't even have my shoulder harness on yet. I put it on as we entered the runway. I missed the strobe lights; and turning the transponder on. We advanced power and just then 'company' called on communication #2. I was not monitoring this frequency but the captain was. They told us to return to the gate. The captain told them the power was up and we were going. And we went. This is probably the most stressed I have ever been in an airplane. I know full well the danger zone we were in from operating in such a rushed manner. I have read dozens of accident reports whose roots can be traced to exactly this kind of rushing. But I'm telling you; when your momentum is up; your adrenaline is up and the consequences of not proceeding at such a rushed pace are so severe; you just let it go -- this once. I know there are dead people all over the place that wish they had not let it go that one time. I know the danger of this kind of operation yet it seemed nearly impossible to not do what we did. I don't recall having that kind of adrenaline pumping in my veins ever. We were really wound up. After we were up and away and the pace settled into a normal operational pace; the captain and I both looked at each other and acknowledged that we had just operated in a way we had promised ourselves a hundred times we would never do.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CREW ALLOWS THEMSELVES TO BE RUSHED TO TRY TO MEET AN EXTENDED DEPARTURE CURFEW.

Narrative: WE ARRIVED WITH AN ACFT WHICH HAD A DUCT PRESSURE SPLIT IN EXCESS OF 15 PSI. WE HAD WRITTEN THIS UP IN DETAIL. MAINT LOOKED AT THE SITUATION AND; REALIZING THIS PROB HAD BEEN 'FIXED' 5 DAYS AGO; REALIZED THERE WAS A PROB THE 'FIX' DIDN'T ADDRESS AND GNDED THE PLANE. DISPATCH DECIDED TO GIVE US ANOTHER AIRPLANE WHICH WAS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE AT ABOUT XA45 FOR OUR CONTINUATION TO ZZZ. WE WERE UP AGAINST A VERY TIGHT SCHEDULING PROB AS THE TKOF CURFEW IS XB00. THE STATION MGR (OR SOMEONE) GOT US AN 'EXTENSION' ON THE CURFEW TO XB15. BY THE TIME WE GOT THE PLANE UNLOADED AND RELOADED AND WERE NEARLY FINISHED WITH OUR PREFLT PREPARATIONS; I NOTICED THE TIME WAS XB11. THEY WERE JUST CLOSING THE DOOR AND I WAS JUST GETTING A CLRNC. THE CLRNC DELIVERY CTLR SAID HE SAW WE HAD AN EXTENSION ON THE CURFEW TILL XB20 SO IT LOOKED POSSIBLE. WE PUSHED AT EXACTLY XB15. WE PROCEEDED TO RUN THE OP IN AN EXTREMELY HURRIED MANNER; MAYBE DANGEROUSLY SO BUT THE PRESSURE WAS ENORMOUS. FROM MY POINT OF VIEW THIS IS HOW THE SITUATION LOOKS: WE HAVE 47 PAX IN THE PLANE THAT REALLY WANT TO GET TO ZZZ. THE PLANE WE'RE IN REALLY NEEDS TO GET TO ZZZ FOR THE FOLLOWING MORNING'S SVC. IF WE DON'T GO; ALL THESE PEOPLE NEED TO BE ACCOMMODATED IN A HOTEL AND THE NEXT MORNING'S ZZZ FLT NEEDS TO BE CANCELED OR DELAYED WHILE PLANE AND CREW MOVEMENTS ARE PERFORMED. MY CREW NEEDS TO BE ACCOMMODATED FOR THE NIGHT AND RELOCATED TO ZZZ THE FOLLOWING MORNING. IN OTHER WORDS; THE COSTS AND HASSLE PERPETRATED UPON MY STRUGGLING AIRLINE ARE ENORMOUS; NOT TO MENTION THE TERRIBLE INCONVENIENCE WE PUT ON THESE 47 PAX AND HOWEVER MANY ARE COMING BACK FROM ZZZ THE FOLLOWING MORNING ON THIS AIRPLANE. WE DIVIDED DUTIES DURING TAXI. THE CAPT DID EVERYTHING WE NORMALLY DO AS A CREW AND I DID THE PERFORMANCE NUMBERS. ATC WAS TRYING TO HELP US BY GIVING US VERY EXPEDITED CLRNCS. WHEN WE GOT OUR TKOF CLRNC; I DIDN'T EVEN HAVE MY SHOULDER HARNESS ON YET. I PUT IT ON AS WE ENTERED THE RWY. I MISSED THE STROBE LIGHTS; AND TURNING THE XPONDER ON. WE ADVANCED PWR AND JUST THEN 'COMPANY' CALLED ON COM #2. I WAS NOT MONITORING THIS FREQ BUT THE CAPT WAS. THEY TOLD US TO RETURN TO THE GATE. THE CAPT TOLD THEM THE PWR WAS UP AND WE WERE GOING. AND WE WENT. THIS IS PROBABLY THE MOST STRESSED I HAVE EVER BEEN IN AN AIRPLANE. I KNOW FULL WELL THE DANGER ZONE WE WERE IN FROM OPERATING IN SUCH A RUSHED MANNER. I HAVE READ DOZENS OF ACCIDENT RPTS WHOSE ROOTS CAN BE TRACED TO EXACTLY THIS KIND OF RUSHING. BUT I'M TELLING YOU; WHEN YOUR MOMENTUM IS UP; YOUR ADRENALINE IS UP AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF NOT PROCEEDING AT SUCH A RUSHED PACE ARE SO SEVERE; YOU JUST LET IT GO -- THIS ONCE. I KNOW THERE ARE DEAD PEOPLE ALL OVER THE PLACE THAT WISH THEY HAD NOT LET IT GO THAT ONE TIME. I KNOW THE DANGER OF THIS KIND OF OP YET IT SEEMED NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE TO NOT DO WHAT WE DID. I DON'T RECALL HAVING THAT KIND OF ADRENALINE PUMPING IN MY VEINS EVER. WE WERE REALLY WOUND UP. AFTER WE WERE UP AND AWAY AND THE PACE SETTLED INTO A NORMAL OPERATIONAL PACE; THE CAPT AND I BOTH LOOKED AT EACH OTHER AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE HAD JUST OPERATED IN A WAY WE HAD PROMISED OURSELVES A HUNDRED TIMES WE WOULD NEVER DO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.