Narrative:

Airbus was cleared to climb reference us; and may have cut that a little close; perhaps overestimating its ability to climb above us before crossing. (Perhaps the controller meant for the bus to climb after passing us; not try to climb above us before getting there.) ultimately; he passed below us and to our right. We did not hear the airbus report having gotten a TCAS TA or RA. Approaching mco from over leese; we were being vectored for a left downwind to runway 36R. Level at 9000 ft on a heading of about 120 degrees. Approach control pointed out airbus traffic east of us at about our 10-11 O'clock position; wbound; climbing to 8000 ft. We reported the traffic in sight and the airbus reported us in sight. At that point; the controller cleared the airbus to climb to 12000 ft reference us; and cleared us to turn to 180 degrees at our discretion. It appeared that our path would cross that of the airbus; that turning to 180 degrees would only make it worse; and that it was very unlikely that the airbus would be able to climb through our altitude before crossing our path. The captain recommended delaying the turn and I agreed. We received a TA; and almost immediately received an RA telling us to climb. We climbed; and based on our visual assessment of the situation; also turned left to avoid the airbus. We immediately reported the RA and I believe the captain made a comment about how that hadn't worked out very well. The controller commented that he understood that when we get an RA; our hands are tied. Actually; we were considering an avoidance maneuver as the TCAS went off; so it didn't appear to be a 'nuisance' warning at all. We got an RA. We climbed the aircraft as the RA requested and steered the airplane slightly left. Once clear of the conflict we returned to 9000 ft and commenced the turn to 180 degrees. Giving visual climbs at night is unnecessary and dangerous. The controller could have left the airbus at 8000 ft for an additional 20-30 seconds maximum; and we would have been clear of each other. Supplemental information from acn 726752: we were vectored for a very close-in right downwind to runway 36R at mco; and then were cleared for the visual just outside the FAF. As the bank angle approached 30 degrees; the captain pointed it out to me (PF) to 'watch the bank angle.' I decreased the bank angle and looked outside to fly to the runway. A moment later the 'bank angle' alert sounded and I immediately decreased the angle of bank and continued the approach without incident. The bank angle alert sounded. It was a momentary exceedance of bank angle which was quickly and smoothly corrected.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 FLT CREW HAS A TCAS RA DURING APCH TO MCO AND EXCEEDS BANK ANGLE DURING THE SUBSEQUENT APCH.

Narrative: AIRBUS WAS CLRED TO CLB REF US; AND MAY HAVE CUT THAT A LITTLE CLOSE; PERHAPS OVERESTIMATING ITS ABILITY TO CLB ABOVE US BEFORE XING. (PERHAPS THE CTLR MEANT FOR THE BUS TO CLB AFTER PASSING US; NOT TRY TO CLB ABOVE US BEFORE GETTING THERE.) ULTIMATELY; HE PASSED BELOW US AND TO OUR R. WE DID NOT HEAR THE AIRBUS RPT HAVING GOTTEN A TCAS TA OR RA. APCHING MCO FROM OVER LEESE; WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR A L DOWNWIND TO RWY 36R. LEVEL AT 9000 FT ON A HDG OF ABOUT 120 DEGS. APCH CTL POINTED OUT AIRBUS TFC E OF US AT ABOUT OUR 10-11 O'CLOCK POS; WBOUND; CLBING TO 8000 FT. WE RPTED THE TFC IN SIGHT AND THE AIRBUS RPTED US IN SIGHT. AT THAT POINT; THE CTLR CLRED THE AIRBUS TO CLB TO 12000 FT REF US; AND CLRED US TO TURN TO 180 DEGS AT OUR DISCRETION. IT APPEARED THAT OUR PATH WOULD CROSS THAT OF THE AIRBUS; THAT TURNING TO 180 DEGS WOULD ONLY MAKE IT WORSE; AND THAT IT WAS VERY UNLIKELY THAT THE AIRBUS WOULD BE ABLE TO CLB THROUGH OUR ALT BEFORE XING OUR PATH. THE CAPT RECOMMENDED DELAYING THE TURN AND I AGREED. WE RECEIVED A TA; AND ALMOST IMMEDIATELY RECEIVED AN RA TELLING US TO CLB. WE CLBED; AND BASED ON OUR VISUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION; ALSO TURNED L TO AVOID THE AIRBUS. WE IMMEDIATELY RPTED THE RA AND I BELIEVE THE CAPT MADE A COMMENT ABOUT HOW THAT HADN'T WORKED OUT VERY WELL. THE CTLR COMMENTED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WHEN WE GET AN RA; OUR HANDS ARE TIED. ACTUALLY; WE WERE CONSIDERING AN AVOIDANCE MANEUVER AS THE TCAS WENT OFF; SO IT DIDN'T APPEAR TO BE A 'NUISANCE' WARNING AT ALL. WE GOT AN RA. WE CLBED THE ACFT AS THE RA REQUESTED AND STEERED THE AIRPLANE SLIGHTLY L. ONCE CLR OF THE CONFLICT WE RETURNED TO 9000 FT AND COMMENCED THE TURN TO 180 DEGS. GIVING VISUAL CLBS AT NIGHT IS UNNECESSARY AND DANGEROUS. THE CTLR COULD HAVE LEFT THE AIRBUS AT 8000 FT FOR AN ADDITIONAL 20-30 SECONDS MAX; AND WE WOULD HAVE BEEN CLR OF EACH OTHER. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 726752: WE WERE VECTORED FOR A VERY CLOSE-IN R DOWNWIND TO RWY 36R AT MCO; AND THEN WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL JUST OUTSIDE THE FAF. AS THE BANK ANGLE APCHED 30 DEGS; THE CAPT POINTED IT OUT TO ME (PF) TO 'WATCH THE BANK ANGLE.' I DECREASED THE BANK ANGLE AND LOOKED OUTSIDE TO FLY TO THE RWY. A MOMENT LATER THE 'BANK ANGLE' ALERT SOUNDED AND I IMMEDIATELY DECREASED THE ANGLE OF BANK AND CONTINUED THE APCH WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE BANK ANGLE ALERT SOUNDED. IT WAS A MOMENTARY EXCEEDANCE OF BANK ANGLE WHICH WAS QUICKLY AND SMOOTHLY CORRECTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.