Narrative:

ILS approach; runway 26L; ZZZZ; jan 2007. Very windy (230/20g35). Tops 5000 ft MSL. IMC conditions throughout vectors; approach and go around. Moderate to severe turbulence throughout. At about 1000 ft AGL received pws (predictive windshear) warning. Executed required go around. Still IMC. Followed map procedure; proceeded straight ahead; leveled off at 3000 ft MSL. Captain (PF) called; 'flaps 3; positive rate; gear up;' at start of go around but first officer did not comply due to confusion over whether this was a windshear procedure (gear and flaps to remain as they were) or a standard go around (gear/flaps up). However; aircraft performance upon go around initiation was very positive and immediate. During end of very rapid climb from 1000 ft MSL to 3000 ft MSL; flaps began to overspd. Relief captain in extra crew seat reiterated call for flap retraction and first officer responded with rapid succession flap retraction to full up. Approaching level off at 3000 ft MSL PF reduced thrust and got no response. Engines were at maximum toga thrust. PF's attention began to be focused exclusively between flying airplane; leveling off; rapidly increasing airspeed and lack of engine response to thrust lever positions to reduce thrust. During this time ATC called for left turn -- first officer verbally responded but PF did not due to task saturation caused by engine thrust problem and rapidly building airspeed. Second ATC call for left turn not responded to for same reason. Third call by ATC for left turn responded to and complied with. By this time; aircraft speed had built up to the point of 'automatic system speed protection feature activation' causing aircraft to climb on its own (against pilot inputs to remain level) in attempt to prevent aircraft overspd. By 3700 ft MSL; engines began to respond -- climb stopped at 4000 ft MSL. ATC observed the climb and recleared us to maintain current altitude of 4000 ft MSL. PF tried multiple times to regain thrust control through throttle reductions as far back as idle and multiple use of automatic-thrust disconnect buttons to no avail. Upon announcing thrust problem to the other pilots; relief captain also tried same things multiple times. Finally; engine response returned. Quality of human performance affected by a) fatigue induced by overnight flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 (8 hours flight). B) moderate to severe turbulence through approach; go around and post go around incident. C) confusion on part of first officer regarding commands for configuration change after windshear-instigated go around.supplemental information from acn 724464: observed winds of 245/70 at 4000 ft; 245/65 at 3000 ft; 245/45 at 1500 ft. Moderate turbulence below 5000 ft. Momentary airspeed fluctuations of +/- 10 KTS observed; once we were descending on the glidescope. No windshear was reported on ZZZZ tower frequency. Shortly after passing 4.0 DME on final; a predictive windshear warning was received; with an area (striped icon) of windshear ahead on final approach displayed on the nd's. The PF (captain) immediately announced his decision to initiate a go around; advanced thrust levers to toga position and called for 'flaps 3;' followed shortly thereafter by 'gear up.' I momentarily thought that the present configuration (gear down; flaps full) should be maintained as in a windshear recovery maneuver; however a check of the first officer's flight instrument showed that the aircraft was accelerating and climbing. The first officer did not select flaps 3 or the retract the landing gear; in response to the captain's commands to do so. I stated that the flaps were still in the full position. The flap load system relief was activated; and the flaps were retracted automatically from the full position. I stated again that we needed to retract the flaps; and eventually the first officer moved the flap handle to the flaps 3 position. I then stated that we needed to clean the aircraft up; and that the flaps and gear were extended; and that the flaps were being overspeeded. The aircraft was rapidly accelerating as it climbed; and the flap load relief system kept retracting the flaps from the selected positions of the flap handle. Eventually; the flap handle was moved to the clean position; however the landing gear was still extended. I stated that the landing gear was extended; and that we were overspeeding the gear as the airspeed increased above 250 KTS. We were level at 3000 ft. The aircraft was in code 4 turbulence; and there was high level of noise in the cockpit from the air noise of the extended landing gear along with the associated buffeting. The airspeed was increasing rapidly; and the PF stated that he could not get the thrust to come back from toga. I looked at the thrust levers and they were in the idle position. I asked him if he had pushed the automatic-thrust disconnect buttons on the thrust levers; and he stated that he had pushed the buttons multiple times. The airspeed was over 300 KTS and increasing. I was very concerned by the high airspeed and continued acceleration of the aircraft. I glanced at the engine instruments and the engines appeared to be at high thrust level. I stated that the automatic-thrust system might be in toga lock. I asked the PF if he had pushed the automatic-thrust push buttons with the thrust levers in the toga position; and he stated that he had. I said; 'let me try pushing them up;' and I did so quickly. The push buttons were pushed with the thrust levers in the toga position and immediately returned to the idle position. The highest indicated airspeed observed was 360 KTS. Eventually; the thrust decreased and the airspeed was decreasing. High speed protection had apparently been activated and that caused the aircraft to climb from 3000 ft. We were recleared by ATC to maintain 4000 ft; which we did. The landing gear was retracted; but I am unsure at what airspeed. During the initial climb to 3000 ft; we were cleared to turn left; however the turn was delayed due to the rapid sequence of events mentioned above. After the aircraft was level at 4000 ft; and the speed was stabilized; we were vectored for a second ILS approach that resulted in a successful landing.callback conversation with reporter 724468 revealed the following information: reporter stated that the reason for this condition has not been determined; adding a maintenance investigation did not uncover the cause. The reporter stated that this entire crew is going into a simulator and will attempt to reproduce the malfunction under similar wind/turbulence conditions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A330 EXPERIENCED AN UNCANCELABLE TOGA LOCK THRUST CONDITION FOLLOWING A PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR GO AROUND.

Narrative: ILS APCH; RWY 26L; ZZZZ; JAN 2007. VERY WINDY (230/20G35). TOPS 5000 FT MSL. IMC CONDITIONS THROUGHOUT VECTORS; APCH AND GO AROUND. MODERATE TO SEVERE TURB THROUGHOUT. AT ABOUT 1000 FT AGL RECEIVED PWS (PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR) WARNING. EXECUTED REQUIRED GO AROUND. STILL IMC. FOLLOWED MAP PROC; PROCEEDED STRAIGHT AHEAD; LEVELED OFF AT 3000 FT MSL. CAPT (PF) CALLED; 'FLAPS 3; POSITIVE RATE; GEAR UP;' AT START OF GO AROUND BUT FO DID NOT COMPLY DUE TO CONFUSION OVER WHETHER THIS WAS A WINDSHEAR PROC (GEAR AND FLAPS TO REMAIN AS THEY WERE) OR A STANDARD GO AROUND (GEAR/FLAPS UP). HOWEVER; ACFT PERFORMANCE UPON GO AROUND INITIATION WAS VERY POSITIVE AND IMMEDIATE. DURING END OF VERY RAPID CLB FROM 1000 FT MSL TO 3000 FT MSL; FLAPS BEGAN TO OVERSPD. RELIEF CAPT IN EXTRA CREW SEAT REITERATED CALL FOR FLAP RETRACTION AND FO RESPONDED WITH RAPID SUCCESSION FLAP RETRACTION TO FULL UP. APCHING LEVEL OFF AT 3000 FT MSL PF REDUCED THRUST AND GOT NO RESPONSE. ENGS WERE AT MAX TOGA THRUST. PF'S ATTENTION BEGAN TO BE FOCUSED EXCLUSIVELY BETWEEN FLYING AIRPLANE; LEVELING OFF; RAPIDLY INCREASING AIRSPD AND LACK OF ENG RESPONSE TO THRUST LEVER POSITIONS TO REDUCE THRUST. DURING THIS TIME ATC CALLED FOR LEFT TURN -- FO VERBALLY RESPONDED BUT PF DID NOT DUE TO TASK SATURATION CAUSED BY ENG THRUST PROB AND RAPIDLY BUILDING AIRSPD. SECOND ATC CALL FOR LEFT TURN NOT RESPONDED TO FOR SAME REASON. THIRD CALL BY ATC FOR LEFT TURN RESPONDED TO AND COMPLIED WITH. BY THIS TIME; ACFT SPD HAD BUILT UP TO THE POINT OF 'AUTO SYSTEM SPD PROTECTION FEATURE ACTIVATION' CAUSING ACFT TO CLB ON ITS OWN (AGAINST PLT INPUTS TO REMAIN LEVEL) IN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT ACFT OVERSPD. BY 3700 FT MSL; ENGS BEGAN TO RESPOND -- CLB STOPPED AT 4000 FT MSL. ATC OBSERVED THE CLB AND RECLEARED US TO MAINTAIN CURRENT ALT OF 4000 FT MSL. PF TRIED MULTIPLE TIMES TO REGAIN THRUST CTL THROUGH THROTTLE REDUCTIONS AS FAR BACK AS IDLE AND MULTIPLE USE OF AUTO-THRUST DISCONNECT BUTTONS TO NO AVAIL. UPON ANNOUNCING THRUST PROB TO THE OTHER PLTS; RELIEF CAPT ALSO TRIED SAME THINGS MULTIPLE TIMES. FINALLY; ENG RESPONSE RETURNED. QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE AFFECTED BY A) FATIGUE INDUCED BY OVERNIGHT FLT FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1 (8 HOURS FLT). B) MODERATE TO SEVERE TURB THROUGH APCH; GO AROUND AND POST GO AROUND INCIDENT. C) CONFUSION ON PART OF FO REGARDING COMMANDS FOR CONFIGURATION CHANGE AFTER WINDSHEAR-INSTIGATED GO AROUND.SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 724464: OBSERVED WINDS OF 245/70 AT 4000 FT; 245/65 AT 3000 FT; 245/45 AT 1500 FT. MODERATE TURB BELOW 5000 FT. MOMENTARY AIRSPD FLUCTUATIONS OF +/- 10 KTS OBSERVED; ONCE WE WERE DSNDING ON THE GLIDESCOPE. NO WINDSHEAR WAS RPTED ON ZZZZ TWR FREQ. SHORTLY AFTER PASSING 4.0 DME ON FINAL; A PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR WARNING WAS RECEIVED; WITH AN AREA (STRIPED ICON) OF WINDSHEAR AHEAD ON FINAL APCH DISPLAYED ON THE ND'S. THE PF (CAPT) IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED HIS DECISION TO INITIATE A GO AROUND; ADVANCED THRUST LEVERS TO TOGA POSITION AND CALLED FOR 'FLAPS 3;' FOLLOWED SHORTLY THEREAFTER BY 'GEAR UP.' I MOMENTARILY THOUGHT THAT THE PRESENT CONFIGURATION (GEAR DOWN; FLAPS FULL) SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AS IN A WINDSHEAR RECOVERY MANEUVER; HOWEVER A CHK OF THE FO'S FLT INSTRUMENT SHOWED THAT THE ACFT WAS ACCELERATING AND CLBING. THE FO DID NOT SELECT FLAPS 3 OR THE RETRACT THE LNDG GEAR; IN RESPONSE TO THE CAPT'S COMMANDS TO DO SO. I STATED THAT THE FLAPS WERE STILL IN THE FULL POSITION. THE FLAP LOAD SYSTEM RELIEF WAS ACTIVATED; AND THE FLAPS WERE RETRACTED AUTOMATICALLY FROM THE FULL POSITION. I STATED AGAIN THAT WE NEEDED TO RETRACT THE FLAPS; AND EVENTUALLY THE FO MOVED THE FLAP HANDLE TO THE FLAPS 3 POSITION. I THEN STATED THAT WE NEEDED TO CLEAN THE ACFT UP; AND THAT THE FLAPS AND GEAR WERE EXTENDED; AND THAT THE FLAPS WERE BEING OVERSPEEDED. THE ACFT WAS RAPIDLY ACCELERATING AS IT CLBED; AND THE FLAP LOAD RELIEF SYSTEM KEPT RETRACTING THE FLAPS FROM THE SELECTED POSITIONS OF THE FLAP HANDLE. EVENTUALLY; THE FLAP HANDLE WAS MOVED TO THE CLEAN POSITION; HOWEVER THE LNDG GEAR WAS STILL EXTENDED. I STATED THAT THE LNDG GEAR WAS EXTENDED; AND THAT WE WERE OVERSPEEDING THE GEAR AS THE AIRSPD INCREASED ABOVE 250 KTS. WE WERE LEVEL AT 3000 FT. THE ACFT WAS IN CODE 4 TURB; AND THERE WAS HIGH LEVEL OF NOISE IN THE COCKPIT FROM THE AIR NOISE OF THE EXTENDED LNDG GEAR ALONG WITH THE ASSOCIATED BUFFETING. THE AIRSPD WAS INCREASING RAPIDLY; AND THE PF STATED THAT HE COULD NOT GET THE THRUST TO COME BACK FROM TOGA. I LOOKED AT THE THRUST LEVERS AND THEY WERE IN THE IDLE POSITION. I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD PUSHED THE AUTO-THRUST DISCONNECT BUTTONS ON THE THRUST LEVERS; AND HE STATED THAT HE HAD PUSHED THE BUTTONS MULTIPLE TIMES. THE AIRSPD WAS OVER 300 KTS AND INCREASING. I WAS VERY CONCERNED BY THE HIGH AIRSPD AND CONTINUED ACCELERATION OF THE ACFT. I GLANCED AT THE ENG INSTRUMENTS AND THE ENGS APPEARED TO BE AT HIGH THRUST LEVEL. I STATED THAT THE AUTO-THRUST SYSTEM MIGHT BE IN TOGA LOCK. I ASKED THE PF IF HE HAD PUSHED THE AUTO-THRUST PUSH BUTTONS WITH THE THRUST LEVERS IN THE TOGA POSITION; AND HE STATED THAT HE HAD. I SAID; 'LET ME TRY PUSHING THEM UP;' AND I DID SO QUICKLY. THE PUSH BUTTONS WERE PUSHED WITH THE THRUST LEVERS IN THE TOGA POSITION AND IMMEDIATELY RETURNED TO THE IDLE POSITION. THE HIGHEST INDICATED AIRSPD OBSERVED WAS 360 KTS. EVENTUALLY; THE THRUST DECREASED AND THE AIRSPD WAS DECREASING. HIGH SPD PROTECTION HAD APPARENTLY BEEN ACTIVATED AND THAT CAUSED THE ACFT TO CLB FROM 3000 FT. WE WERE RECLEARED BY ATC TO MAINTAIN 4000 FT; WHICH WE DID. THE LNDG GEAR WAS RETRACTED; BUT I AM UNSURE AT WHAT AIRSPD. DURING THE INITIAL CLB TO 3000 FT; WE WERE CLRED TO TURN LEFT; HOWEVER THE TURN WAS DELAYED DUE TO THE RAPID SEQUENCE OF EVENTS MENTIONED ABOVE. AFTER THE ACFT WAS LEVEL AT 4000 FT; AND THE SPD WAS STABILIZED; WE WERE VECTORED FOR A SECOND ILS APCH THAT RESULTED IN A SUCCESSFUL LNDG.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR 724468 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE REASON FOR THIS CONDITION HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED; ADDING A MAINT INVESTIGATION DID NOT UNCOVER THE CAUSE. THE RPTR STATED THAT THIS ENTIRE CREW IS GOING INTO A SIMULATOR AND WILL ATTEMPT TO REPRODUCE THE MALFUNCTION UNDER SIMILAR WIND/TURB CONDITIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.