Narrative:

This pairing is a legally scheduled; 4-DAY pairing; that stretches the margin of safety to absolute bare minimums. During the course of this flight; as well as the next night's flight numerous atypical errors occurred due to fatigue and operating 'on the back side of the clock.' for example; the errors included initially setting an incorrect trim setting and difficulty detecting obstacles during taxi. Most errors were trapped by the checklist; but we were relying too heavily on this barrier. I believe several factors are involved that make this pairing unacceptable. First; on duty period 1; we arrived at about XA00 body-time; after 2 long legs; with a 2 hour layover and aircraft change in the middle. Second; on duty period 2; we flew until XT00 with a near-minimum overnight of 9 hours 15 mins. So after very poor rest the first night; we had too-short of rest (less than 8 hours of sleep) the second night. I believe the first duty period is worse than a transatlantic flight; in that the transatlantic flight starts 2 hours later; arrives earlier; and usually has a relief pilot. The best solution to correct this problem is to have a fresh crew (either just out of an overnight; or just starting the trip); fly the flight. As an absolute minimum; eliminate the aircraft change so the crew can get a little rest prior to the next flight. Also after duty period 2; lengthen the overnight; so we don't have 2 consecutive nights of poor rest. In sum; I believe this is the single greatest safety risk in over 30 yrs of flying. It is an 'accident waiting to happen.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 CAPT RPTS AN EXTREMELY FATIGUING TRIP PAIRING.

Narrative: THIS PAIRING IS A LEGALLY SCHEDULED; 4-DAY PAIRING; THAT STRETCHES THE MARGIN OF SAFETY TO ABSOLUTE BARE MINIMUMS. DURING THE COURSE OF THIS FLT; AS WELL AS THE NEXT NIGHT'S FLT NUMEROUS ATYPICAL ERRORS OCCURRED DUE TO FATIGUE AND OPERATING 'ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE CLOCK.' FOR EXAMPLE; THE ERRORS INCLUDED INITIALLY SETTING AN INCORRECT TRIM SETTING AND DIFFICULTY DETECTING OBSTACLES DURING TAXI. MOST ERRORS WERE TRAPPED BY THE CHKLIST; BUT WE WERE RELYING TOO HEAVILY ON THIS BARRIER. I BELIEVE SEVERAL FACTORS ARE INVOLVED THAT MAKE THIS PAIRING UNACCEPTABLE. FIRST; ON DUTY PERIOD 1; WE ARRIVED AT ABOUT XA00 BODY-TIME; AFTER 2 LONG LEGS; WITH A 2 HR LAYOVER AND ACFT CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE. SECOND; ON DUTY PERIOD 2; WE FLEW UNTIL XT00 WITH A NEAR-MINIMUM OVERNIGHT OF 9 HRS 15 MINS. SO AFTER VERY POOR REST THE FIRST NIGHT; WE HAD TOO-SHORT OF REST (LESS THAN 8 HRS OF SLEEP) THE SECOND NIGHT. I BELIEVE THE FIRST DUTY PERIOD IS WORSE THAN A TRANSATLANTIC FLT; IN THAT THE TRANSATLANTIC FLT STARTS 2 HRS LATER; ARRIVES EARLIER; AND USUALLY HAS A RELIEF PLT. THE BEST SOLUTION TO CORRECT THIS PROB IS TO HAVE A FRESH CREW (EITHER JUST OUT OF AN OVERNIGHT; OR JUST STARTING THE TRIP); FLY THE FLT. AS AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM; ELIMINATE THE ACFT CHANGE SO THE CREW CAN GET A LITTLE REST PRIOR TO THE NEXT FLT. ALSO AFTER DUTY PERIOD 2; LENGTHEN THE OVERNIGHT; SO WE DON'T HAVE 2 CONSECUTIVE NIGHTS OF POOR REST. IN SUM; I BELIEVE THIS IS THE SINGLE GREATEST SAFETY RISK IN OVER 30 YRS OF FLYING. IT IS AN 'ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.