Narrative:

Operations agent handed me the load sheet at the cabin entrance. I needed to document a revision to his copy of the release for an MEL that had been corrected. The operations agent did not have his copy of the release; or paper in his hand to write down information; so I ripped off a corner of my release and copied the information for him to xfer to his release that was at the top of the jetway. I returned to the cockpit; placed the load sheet above the radar screen for the first officer to begin his opc inputs. I manned the left seat; completed my before start flows and began review of the load sheet while the first officer was still completing his duties. I verified the fuel added on the load sheet (always my first step; so I can catch the operations agent before the main cabin door is closed); and then the service interphone from the flight attendants rang. I answered and then the flight attendant said 'never mind; we have the snacks.' returning to the load sheet; I noticed the first officer was just getting the clearance. Instead of continuing my review of the load sheet; I began entering the data in the FMC from the load sheet. He finished the clearance; and then we did the 'before start originating' then 'before push' checklists. After completion of the checklists; we completed the predep brief then pushed. Takeoff; climb out uneventful. After airborne passing FL210 on the departure; we discussed the MEL limitations (leading edge flap extend light with associated airspeed limitations). I handed him the MEL sheet from the mid-console storage area (where the QRH's are located) for his review. At that time I pulled out a load sheet and noticed my name and flight number were not correct on the load sheet. We reviewed the numbers on the load sheet and searched the cockpit and came to the realization the operations agent had given us the load sheet for his next flight from that gate. Upon arrival at destination; I notified the operations agent that we had the wrong load sheet. He said he knew; but since it was also a 300 load sheet; he didn't bother calling us. I explained to him the importance of having the right load sheet for each flight. 1) continue with your flows; or restart the flow in progress once distraction. 2) let the other crew member perform their duties and do not intercede with help to expedite the final FMC/opc calculations. This was our first leg together and there were some 'out of the ordinary' things happening with a first officer change; MEL signoffs; crew brief and distrs from the cabin at critical times in the pre-push chain of events.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 CREW DEPARTED WITH AN INCORRECT RELEASE FOLLOWING A HURRIED PREFLT AND DISRUPTED COCKPIT FLOW CHK.

Narrative: OPS AGENT HANDED ME THE LOAD SHEET AT THE CABIN ENTRANCE. I NEEDED TO DOCUMENT A REVISION TO HIS COPY OF THE RELEASE FOR AN MEL THAT HAD BEEN CORRECTED. THE OPS AGENT DID NOT HAVE HIS COPY OF THE RELEASE; OR PAPER IN HIS HAND TO WRITE DOWN INFO; SO I RIPPED OFF A CORNER OF MY RELEASE AND COPIED THE INFO FOR HIM TO XFER TO HIS RELEASE THAT WAS AT THE TOP OF THE JETWAY. I RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT; PLACED THE LOAD SHEET ABOVE THE RADAR SCREEN FOR THE FO TO BEGIN HIS OPC INPUTS. I MANNED THE L SEAT; COMPLETED MY BEFORE START FLOWS AND BEGAN REVIEW OF THE LOAD SHEET WHILE THE FO WAS STILL COMPLETING HIS DUTIES. I VERIFIED THE FUEL ADDED ON THE LOAD SHEET (ALWAYS MY FIRST STEP; SO I CAN CATCH THE OPS AGENT BEFORE THE MAIN CABIN DOOR IS CLOSED); AND THEN THE SVC INTERPHONE FROM THE FLT ATTENDANTS RANG. I ANSWERED AND THEN THE FLT ATTENDANT SAID 'NEVER MIND; WE HAVE THE SNACKS.' RETURNING TO THE LOAD SHEET; I NOTICED THE FO WAS JUST GETTING THE CLRNC. INSTEAD OF CONTINUING MY REVIEW OF THE LOAD SHEET; I BEGAN ENTERING THE DATA IN THE FMC FROM THE LOAD SHEET. HE FINISHED THE CLRNC; AND THEN WE DID THE 'BEFORE START ORIGINATING' THEN 'BEFORE PUSH' CHKLISTS. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE CHKLISTS; WE COMPLETED THE PREDEP BRIEF THEN PUSHED. TKOF; CLBOUT UNEVENTFUL. AFTER AIRBORNE PASSING FL210 ON THE DEP; WE DISCUSSED THE MEL LIMITATIONS (LEADING EDGE FLAP EXTEND LIGHT WITH ASSOCIATED AIRSPD LIMITATIONS). I HANDED HIM THE MEL SHEET FROM THE MID-CONSOLE STORAGE AREA (WHERE THE QRH'S ARE LOCATED) FOR HIS REVIEW. AT THAT TIME I PULLED OUT A LOAD SHEET AND NOTICED MY NAME AND FLT NUMBER WERE NOT CORRECT ON THE LOAD SHEET. WE REVIEWED THE NUMBERS ON THE LOAD SHEET AND SEARCHED THE COCKPIT AND CAME TO THE REALIZATION THE OPS AGENT HAD GIVEN US THE LOAD SHEET FOR HIS NEXT FLT FROM THAT GATE. UPON ARR AT DEST; I NOTIFIED THE OPS AGENT THAT WE HAD THE WRONG LOAD SHEET. HE SAID HE KNEW; BUT SINCE IT WAS ALSO A 300 LOAD SHEET; HE DIDN'T BOTHER CALLING US. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING THE RIGHT LOAD SHEET FOR EACH FLT. 1) CONTINUE WITH YOUR FLOWS; OR RESTART THE FLOW IN PROGRESS ONCE DISTR. 2) LET THE OTHER CREW MEMBER PERFORM THEIR DUTIES AND DO NOT INTERCEDE WITH HELP TO EXPEDITE THE FINAL FMC/OPC CALCULATIONS. THIS WAS OUR FIRST LEG TOGETHER AND THERE WERE SOME 'OUT OF THE ORDINARY' THINGS HAPPENING WITH A FO CHANGE; MEL SIGNOFFS; CREW BRIEF AND DISTRS FROM THE CABIN AT CRITICAL TIMES IN THE PRE-PUSH CHAIN OF EVENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.