Narrative:

While at FL380 with captain as PF; both primary engine displays flickered off for approximately 1 second and returned to normal. After a moment; EICAS right generator drive and right generator off; right utility bus off; left utility bus off; as well as; overhead right generator control lights illuminated. Performed QRH checklist for right generator drive. As per procedure; disconnected right generator drive. Started APU and observed that both utility buses were now pwred. Advised flight attendants that their galley power should now be normal. Notified maintenance coordinator via ACARS of our status. Approximately 5 mins later; captain observed right oil quantity indicator reading zero. Oil pressure was normal (200 psi) at this time. Approximately 2 mins later; oil pressure began fluctuating; as well as steadily decreasing. Captain received ATC clearance for descent anticipating possible engine failure. During the descent; the right engine oil pressure light on the forward panel started to flicker and soon was fully illuminated. As per QRH low oil pressure procedure right throttle was retarded to idle. Captain took over ATC communications and declared an emergency while first officer advised dispatcher and maintenance coordinator of our status and intention to divert. Dispatcher concurred that ZZZ was close and excellent WX. Captain loaded FMS for the divert while first officer advised flight attendants of intention to divert but that no evacuate/evacuation was expected although emergency equipment would be standing by. First officer subsequently made passenger PA. As directed by QRH; accomplished engine shutdown procedure. Performed descent and approach checklist for 'engine out' ILS runway 25R flaps 20 degree landing. Automatic-brakes set to 2. Captain flew coupled approach to approximately 800 ft AGL. Normal landing and rollout; exited runway at A7 and stopped on taxiway B. Captain then made PA that all was well and fire equipment would be checking right engine. Spoke with a-line and verified all passenger were calm and seated. Airport fire/rescue examined right engine. Upon arrival at gate; maintenance reported internal damage and some metal piercing the engine cowling. Notified maintenance; duty pilot and conference called with chief pilot. Note: I seem to recall a procedure on the boeing 727 to verify that the generator drive has been disconnected. Although we pressed the disconnect switch twice; we had no means in our checklist or EICAS to verify that the procedure has been successful. As to the level of automation; the training with use of the autoplt during engine out operations came in very handy and allowed the PF to easily trim and monitor the aircraft. At one point with autoplt on; we descended about 250 ft below our assigned altitude. Center asked about our altitude and we corrected; although we didn't have an autoplt degraded mode annunciation. Disconnected autoplt; leveled off and reengaged autoplt. The first officer radio calls to company were longer than I expected due to what I believe was the maintenance coordinator's quest for information. I was busy talking to ATC; declaring an emergency and flying. In hindsight we should have shut down the engine a little sooner than we did. Maintenance coordinator advised us on the ground that sometimes the generator drive does not disconnect. My understanding is that this can lead to a fire and I would love to see separate generator drive disconnect lights. With regard to training; the events were very much like my last simulator loe so I had time to think and keep track of where the airplane was; where we were going and how our plan was working. Later when I made a passenger PA; I mentioned that this was just the way we trained for it in the simulator. I was glad that we had the airport fire/rescue standing by and might upon reconsideration; have been towed to the gate by maintenance. Looking at the engine with the cowl open; it was very impressive that the engine had; in fact; ran so long with a zero oil indication. My ZZZ familiarity these last 5 yrs contributed greatly to situation awareness. Also; the fact that most air carrier B757/B767 first officer's have had at least 10 yrs company experience made for comfortable maneuver despite the fact that it was the first time the crew had flown together. I think that our CRM training; both in the classroom and the simulator; helped my performance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 CREW DISCONNECTED A CSD FOLLOWING GENERATOR DRIVE WARNINGS. THE CSD'S DISINTEGRATION CAUSED ENG OIL QUANTITY AND PRESSURE TO DROP REQUIRING AN ENG SHUTDOWN. AN EMER WAS DECLARED; AND A DIVERSION TO A NEARBY ARPT.

Narrative: WHILE AT FL380 WITH CAPT AS PF; BOTH PRIMARY ENG DISPLAYS FLICKERED OFF FOR APPROX 1 SECOND AND RETURNED TO NORMAL. AFTER A MOMENT; EICAS R GENERATOR DRIVE AND R GENERATOR OFF; R UTILITY BUS OFF; L UTILITY BUS OFF; AS WELL AS; OVERHEAD R GENERATOR CTL LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. PERFORMED QRH CHKLIST FOR R GENERATOR DRIVE. AS PER PROC; DISCONNECTED R GENERATOR DRIVE. STARTED APU AND OBSERVED THAT BOTH UTILITY BUSES WERE NOW PWRED. ADVISED FLT ATTENDANTS THAT THEIR GALLEY PWR SHOULD NOW BE NORMAL. NOTIFIED MAINT COORDINATOR VIA ACARS OF OUR STATUS. APPROX 5 MINS LATER; CAPT OBSERVED R OIL QUANTITY INDICATOR READING ZERO. OIL PRESSURE WAS NORMAL (200 PSI) AT THIS TIME. APPROX 2 MINS LATER; OIL PRESSURE BEGAN FLUCTUATING; AS WELL AS STEADILY DECREASING. CAPT RECEIVED ATC CLRNC FOR DSCNT ANTICIPATING POSSIBLE ENG FAILURE. DURING THE DSCNT; THE R ENG OIL PRESSURE LIGHT ON THE FORWARD PANEL STARTED TO FLICKER AND SOON WAS FULLY ILLUMINATED. AS PER QRH LOW OIL PRESSURE PROC R THROTTLE WAS RETARDED TO IDLE. CAPT TOOK OVER ATC COMS AND DECLARED AN EMER WHILE FO ADVISED DISPATCHER AND MAINT COORDINATOR OF OUR STATUS AND INTENTION TO DIVERT. DISPATCHER CONCURRED THAT ZZZ WAS CLOSE AND EXCELLENT WX. CAPT LOADED FMS FOR THE DIVERT WHILE FO ADVISED FLT ATTENDANTS OF INTENTION TO DIVERT BUT THAT NO EVAC WAS EXPECTED ALTHOUGH EMER EQUIP WOULD BE STANDING BY. FO SUBSEQUENTLY MADE PAX PA. AS DIRECTED BY QRH; ACCOMPLISHED ENG SHUTDOWN PROC. PERFORMED DSCNT AND APCH CHKLIST FOR 'ENG OUT' ILS RWY 25R FLAPS 20 DEG LNDG. AUTO-BRAKES SET TO 2. CAPT FLEW COUPLED APCH TO APPROX 800 FT AGL. NORMAL LNDG AND ROLLOUT; EXITED RWY AT A7 AND STOPPED ON TXWY B. CAPT THEN MADE PA THAT ALL WAS WELL AND FIRE EQUIP WOULD BE CHKING R ENG. SPOKE WITH A-LINE AND VERIFIED ALL PAX WERE CALM AND SEATED. ARPT FIRE/RESCUE EXAMINED R ENG. UPON ARR AT GATE; MAINT RPTED INTERNAL DAMAGE AND SOME METAL PIERCING THE ENG COWLING. NOTIFIED MAINT; DUTY PLT AND CONFERENCE CALLED WITH CHIEF PLT. NOTE: I SEEM TO RECALL A PROC ON THE BOEING 727 TO VERIFY THAT THE GENERATOR DRIVE HAS BEEN DISCONNECTED. ALTHOUGH WE PRESSED THE DISCONNECT SWITCH TWICE; WE HAD NO MEANS IN OUR CHKLIST OR EICAS TO VERIFY THAT THE PROC HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL. AS TO THE LEVEL OF AUTOMATION; THE TRAINING WITH USE OF THE AUTOPLT DURING ENG OUT OPS CAME IN VERY HANDY AND ALLOWED THE PF TO EASILY TRIM AND MONITOR THE ACFT. AT ONE POINT WITH AUTOPLT ON; WE DSNDED ABOUT 250 FT BELOW OUR ASSIGNED ALT. CTR ASKED ABOUT OUR ALT AND WE CORRECTED; ALTHOUGH WE DIDN'T HAVE AN AUTOPLT DEGRADED MODE ANNUNCIATION. DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT; LEVELED OFF AND REENGAGED AUTOPLT. THE FO RADIO CALLS TO COMPANY WERE LONGER THAN I EXPECTED DUE TO WHAT I BELIEVE WAS THE MAINT COORDINATOR'S QUEST FOR INFO. I WAS BUSY TALKING TO ATC; DECLARING AN EMER AND FLYING. IN HINDSIGHT WE SHOULD HAVE SHUT DOWN THE ENG A LITTLE SOONER THAN WE DID. MAINT COORDINATOR ADVISED US ON THE GND THAT SOMETIMES THE GENERATOR DRIVE DOES NOT DISCONNECT. MY UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THIS CAN LEAD TO A FIRE AND I WOULD LOVE TO SEE SEPARATE GENERATOR DRIVE DISCONNECT LIGHTS. WITH REGARD TO TRAINING; THE EVENTS WERE VERY MUCH LIKE MY LAST SIMULATOR LOE SO I HAD TIME TO THINK AND KEEP TRACK OF WHERE THE AIRPLANE WAS; WHERE WE WERE GOING AND HOW OUR PLAN WAS WORKING. LATER WHEN I MADE A PAX PA; I MENTIONED THAT THIS WAS JUST THE WAY WE TRAINED FOR IT IN THE SIMULATOR. I WAS GLAD THAT WE HAD THE ARPT FIRE/RESCUE STANDING BY AND MIGHT UPON RECONSIDERATION; HAVE BEEN TOWED TO THE GATE BY MAINT. LOOKING AT THE ENG WITH THE COWL OPEN; IT WAS VERY IMPRESSIVE THAT THE ENG HAD; IN FACT; RAN SO LONG WITH A ZERO OIL INDICATION. MY ZZZ FAMILIARITY THESE LAST 5 YRS CONTRIBUTED GREATLY TO SITUATION AWARENESS. ALSO; THE FACT THAT MOST ACR B757/B767 FO'S HAVE HAD AT LEAST 10 YRS COMPANY EXPERIENCE MADE FOR COMFORTABLE MANEUVER DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THE CREW HAD FLOWN TOGETHER. I THINK THAT OUR CRM TRAINING; BOTH IN THE CLASSROOM AND THE SIMULATOR; HELPED MY PERFORMANCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.