Narrative:

Contract maintenance was working on a bleed air and pressurization MEL at the gate when we were given the airplane. The first officer and I read through the MEL paperwork given to us with the release and WX. After reading the write-up and discussing it with the first officer; I further read the MEL/appendix. As a new captain; I still wanted to verify and confirm all procedures with dispatch and maintenance. I first went onto the ramp to discuss everything with the mechanic and verify the outflow valve position visually. I then called dispatch and had maintenance patched in to the conversation. We discussed the 2 separate MEL's in detail and everyone was comfortable with our compliance. I was informed today by company headquarters that the FAA is looking into the flight. There may have been an error in the application of the MEL procedure. I fully believe all switch position; altitude restrs; rates of climbs/dscnts and other safety of flight items were followed correctly. Headquarters said the error may have been in the passenger load. There is a note on a chart in the appendix that references passenger load limits of 45 when charting various cabin and crew cabin temperatures. I may have overlooked this reference because it is not in the text outline of the MEL appendix. I think the note should be incorporated in the actual outline text of the MEL and the outline text of the appendix; not just on the chart. Also; I should have scrutinized the MEL appendix charts more.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CAPT DOES NOT FULLY COMPLY WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS OF MEL.

Narrative: CONTRACT MAINT WAS WORKING ON A BLEED AIR AND PRESSURIZATION MEL AT THE GATE WHEN WE WERE GIVEN THE AIRPLANE. THE FO AND I READ THROUGH THE MEL PAPERWORK GIVEN TO US WITH THE RELEASE AND WX. AFTER READING THE WRITE-UP AND DISCUSSING IT WITH THE FO; I FURTHER READ THE MEL/APPENDIX. AS A NEW CAPT; I STILL WANTED TO VERIFY AND CONFIRM ALL PROCS WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT. I FIRST WENT ONTO THE RAMP TO DISCUSS EVERYTHING WITH THE MECH AND VERIFY THE OUTFLOW VALVE POS VISUALLY. I THEN CALLED DISPATCH AND HAD MAINT PATCHED IN TO THE CONVERSATION. WE DISCUSSED THE 2 SEPARATE MEL'S IN DETAIL AND EVERYONE WAS COMFORTABLE WITH OUR COMPLIANCE. I WAS INFORMED TODAY BY COMPANY HEADQUARTERS THAT THE FAA IS LOOKING INTO THE FLT. THERE MAY HAVE BEEN AN ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF THE MEL PROC. I FULLY BELIEVE ALL SWITCH POS; ALT RESTRS; RATES OF CLBS/DSCNTS AND OTHER SAFETY OF FLT ITEMS WERE FOLLOWED CORRECTLY. HEADQUARTERS SAID THE ERROR MAY HAVE BEEN IN THE PAX LOAD. THERE IS A NOTE ON A CHART IN THE APPENDIX THAT REFS PAX LOAD LIMITS OF 45 WHEN CHARTING VARIOUS CABIN AND CREW CABIN TEMPS. I MAY HAVE OVERLOOKED THIS REF BECAUSE IT IS NOT IN THE TEXT OUTLINE OF THE MEL APPENDIX. I THINK THE NOTE SHOULD BE INCORPORATED IN THE ACTUAL OUTLINE TEXT OF THE MEL AND THE OUTLINE TEXT OF THE APPENDIX; NOT JUST ON THE CHART. ALSO; I SHOULD HAVE SCRUTINIZED THE MEL APPENDIX CHARTS MORE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.