Narrative:

I was the first officer during the event. When the ground pushback crew checked in on headset; the headset was scratchy and difficult to understand. There was a language barrier between the ground crew and our flight deck. The ground personnel checked in with the walkaround complete. Brakes were released to the tug while checklists were finished and a clearance to push obtained. During the push; the ground crew gave the captain clearance to start both engines and at that time the ACARS weight and balance message came across. I began to transcribe the weight and balance numbers and check takeoff performance data in the FMC while the captain was starting the engines. The tug driver's radio call to set the parking brakes never came. About the time that the second engine start was being completed; the captain remarked 'where is he going?' referring to the tug driver. I looked up to see the lead marshaller standing 30 ft or more off to the right side of the aircraft (probably at the visibility limits to the captain) and the tug moving backwards. The aircraft had started to roll. I stated that the aircraft was starting to roll and began to apply the brakes but the captain was ahead of me and had stopped the aircraft after about 3 ft of travel. A ground supervisor checked in on headset after the event to see if everything was 'all right' on the flight deck. Better training for san jose ground crews on correct pushback procedures. Restricting push crew personnel to those who are fluent in english. Obtaining better headsets for ground personnel. Changing flight crew procedures to completing load and balance information while the aircraft is stopped at the gate or after engine start.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LANGUAGE BARRIER AND FAILURE TO FOLLOW PUSHBACK SOPS RESULTS IN B737-900 TUG DRIVER DISCONNECTING THE TUG WITH BOTH ENGS RUNNING AND THE BRAKES NOT SET.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO DURING THE EVENT. WHEN THE GND PUSHBACK CREW CHKED IN ON HEADSET; THE HEADSET WAS SCRATCHY AND DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. THERE WAS A LANGUAGE BARRIER BTWN THE GND CREW AND OUR FLT DECK. THE GND PERSONNEL CHKED IN WITH THE WALKAROUND COMPLETE. BRAKES WERE RELEASED TO THE TUG WHILE CHKLISTS WERE FINISHED AND A CLRNC TO PUSH OBTAINED. DURING THE PUSH; THE GND CREW GAVE THE CAPT CLRNC TO START BOTH ENGS AND AT THAT TIME THE ACARS WT AND BAL MESSAGE CAME ACROSS. I BEGAN TO TRANSCRIBE THE WT AND BAL NUMBERS AND CHK TKOF PERFORMANCE DATA IN THE FMC WHILE THE CAPT WAS STARTING THE ENGS. THE TUG DRIVER'S RADIO CALL TO SET THE PARKING BRAKES NEVER CAME. ABOUT THE TIME THAT THE SECOND ENG START WAS BEING COMPLETED; THE CAPT REMARKED 'WHERE IS HE GOING?' REFERRING TO THE TUG DRIVER. I LOOKED UP TO SEE THE LEAD MARSHALLER STANDING 30 FT OR MORE OFF TO THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT (PROBABLY AT THE VISIBILITY LIMITS TO THE CAPT) AND THE TUG MOVING BACKWARDS. THE ACFT HAD STARTED TO ROLL. I STATED THAT THE ACFT WAS STARTING TO ROLL AND BEGAN TO APPLY THE BRAKES BUT THE CAPT WAS AHEAD OF ME AND HAD STOPPED THE ACFT AFTER ABOUT 3 FT OF TRAVEL. A GND SUPVR CHKED IN ON HEADSET AFTER THE EVENT TO SEE IF EVERYTHING WAS 'ALL RIGHT' ON THE FLT DECK. BETTER TRAINING FOR SAN JOSE GND CREWS ON CORRECT PUSHBACK PROCS. RESTRICTING PUSH CREW PERSONNEL TO THOSE WHO ARE FLUENT IN ENGLISH. OBTAINING BETTER HEADSETS FOR GND PERSONNEL. CHANGING FLT CREW PROCS TO COMPLETING LOAD AND BAL INFO WHILE THE ACFT IS STOPPED AT THE GATE OR AFTER ENG START.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.