Narrative:

Dispatched to ZZZ with a WX packet and release that did not require an alternate/alternate fuel load. Upon arrival WX deteriorated without forewarning or en route notification from dispatch to plan for an alternate. ATIS reported 800 ft broken with good visibility. Runway xx closed at ZZZ and no precision approach available. Runway yy in use and VOR and GPS to runway yy available. Executed VOR yy approach with missed approach. Runway visible past runway approach end past broken cloud layer. Estimated needed 100 ft below VOR MDA to adequate visual reference to runway yy. Opted for localizer zz since MDA was 220 ft below VOR yy MDA. Executed localizer zz to a missed approach and this time cloud obscuration appeared worse on this side of airport. Stressed low fuel at this point to ATC and given urgent handling by ATC. Asked for nearby suitable alternates. ATC advised ZZZ1 was 30 miles away. We asked for ZZZ1 WX and ATC advised they didn't have WX for ZZZ1 and that they would get WX. Time was critical and fuel was getting low. We didn't have approach plates for ZZZ1 and requested frequencies; etc for ZZZ1 approach. At this point we felt we needed to make a quick prudent and safe decision: requested short final to GPS yy and in the event of map alternate instructions to ZZZ1. We felt strongly that we would see the runway environment on the GPS approach at no lower than 500 ft due to prior VOR yy approach and ceiling now reported at 600 ft. We executed a nice stabilized GPS yy approach; first officer called runway in sight at 600 ft and I continued the approach visually to an uneventful landing. During taxi; the low fuel EICAS warning appeared. We are trained to do GPS apches during initial and recurrent training events and we are not authorized to do them under normal circumstances. We feel our circumstance and judgement dictated such a decision to arrive at this safe and uneventful conclusion.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reason the GPS yy was not used in the first place is that GPS apches are not currently in the company's operations manual although crews are trained to do GPS apches.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB145 CREW GETS INTO LOW FUEL SITUATION AFTER TWO MISSED APCHES AT PNS.

Narrative: DISPATCHED TO ZZZ WITH A WX PACKET AND RELEASE THAT DID NOT REQUIRE AN ALTERNATE/ALTERNATE FUEL LOAD. UPON ARR WX DETERIORATED WITHOUT FOREWARNING OR ENRTE NOTIFICATION FROM DISPATCH TO PLAN FOR AN ALTERNATE. ATIS REPORTED 800 FT BROKEN WITH GOOD VIS. RWY XX CLOSED AT ZZZ AND NO PRECISION APCH AVAILABLE. RWY YY IN USE AND VOR AND GPS TO RWY YY AVAILABLE. EXECUTED VOR YY APCH WITH MISSED APCH. RWY VISIBLE PAST RWY APCH END PAST BROKEN CLOUD LAYER. ESTIMATED NEEDED 100 FT BELOW VOR MDA TO ADEQUATE VISUAL REFERENCE TO RWY YY. OPTED FOR LOC ZZ SINCE MDA WAS 220 FT BELOW VOR YY MDA. EXECUTED LOC ZZ TO A MISSED APCH AND THIS TIME CLOUD OBSCURATION APPEARED WORSE ON THIS SIDE OF ARPT. STRESSED LOW FUEL AT THIS POINT TO ATC AND GIVEN URGENT HANDLING BY ATC. ASKED FOR NEARBY SUITABLE ALTERNATES. ATC ADVISED ZZZ1 WAS 30 MILES AWAY. WE ASKED FOR ZZZ1 WX AND ATC ADVISED THEY DIDN'T HAVE WX FOR ZZZ1 AND THAT THEY WOULD GET WX. TIME WAS CRITICAL AND FUEL WAS GETTING LOW. WE DIDN'T HAVE APCH PLATES FOR ZZZ1 AND REQUESTED FREQUENCIES; ETC FOR ZZZ1 APCH. AT THIS POINT WE FELT WE NEEDED TO MAKE A QUICK PRUDENT AND SAFE DECISION: REQUESTED SHORT FINAL TO GPS YY AND IN THE EVENT OF MAP ALTERNATE INSTRUCTIONS TO ZZZ1. WE FELT STRONGLY THAT WE WOULD SEE THE RWY ENVIRONMENT ON THE GPS APCH AT NO LOWER THAN 500 FT DUE TO PRIOR VOR YY APCH AND CEILING NOW REPORTED AT 600 FT. WE EXECUTED A NICE STABILIZED GPS YY APCH; FO CALLED RWY IN SIGHT AT 600 FT AND I CONTINUED THE APCH VISUALLY TO AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. DURING TAXI; THE LOW FUEL EICAS WARNING APPEARED. WE ARE TRAINED TO DO GPS APCHES DURING INITIAL AND RECURRENT TRAINING EVENTS AND WE ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO DO THEM UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES. WE FEEL OUR CIRCUMSTANCE AND JUDGEMENT DICTATED SUCH A DECISION TO ARRIVE AT THIS SAFE AND UNEVENTFUL CONCLUSION.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REASON THE GPS YY WAS NOT USED IN THE FIRST PLACE IS THAT GPS APCHES ARE NOT CURRENTLY IN THE COMPANY'S OPS MANUAL ALTHOUGH CREWS ARE TRAINED TO DO GPS APCHES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.