Narrative:

Construction of lethal hazards up to the very edge of the runway. Nighttime: in daylight I would probably have recognized my excessive speed and taxi run easily. Failure to use resources available: I could have had the passenger (a private pilot) consult with me beforehand; and also call out the airspds during taxi. Had I done the former; we'd probably have never done the taxi. And the latter; especially if coupled with an agreement for an abort signal at a given (safe) IAS; would have avoided the accident. Human factors: fatigue; stress from non flying-related; and impatience to 'go flying' may all have contributed to erroneous decision-making. Other things: at a certain number of hours; pilots may get a little too informal and relaxed about margins; planning out the numbers; etc. And yet; the pilot does not have the immense experience that would keep him out of trouble; or let him instantly see his situation and escape from trouble. This may be a factor here. In looking at the incident I believe that in this incident; as well as others at whp and other airports; not enough consideration (or blame) is given to the danger factors of close-in obstructions and how they cut the safety margin for error. At a safer airport there would have been no incident at all. Building obstructions to the very edge of a runway is; in my opinion; can amount reckless endangerment of life and property. Some people; less reticent than myself; would call it attempted murder. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he had not taken the time to calculate his accelerate stop distance prior to initiating this high speed run to clear carbon from his engine's valves. Prior to aborting the run a gust of wind got his aircraft momentarily airborne and after touchdown he had insufficient runway remaining to stop the aircraft without going through a fence or causing a ground loop. He chose the ground loop and subsequently damaged the nose strut and an adjacent engine mount. The right wingtip was damaged as well. The reporter further stated that he is concerned about the FAA allowing structures and power lines to encroach on the safety margins pilots need for takeoff and landing. Whp's runway 12 is displaced 729 ft for power lines. Some airports are worse. The FAA has not yet classified this incident but required the reporter to take an oral and will require a flight check before he is allowed to fly again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PA28 PLT ATTEMPTING A HIGH SPD TAXI TO CLR ENG VALVE CARBON BECAME AIRBORNE WITH INSUFFICIENT STOP DISTANCE. HE GND LOOPED HIS ACFT CAUSING STRUT AND WING DAMAGE.

Narrative: CONSTRUCTION OF LETHAL HAZARDS UP TO THE VERY EDGE OF THE RWY. NIGHTTIME: IN DAYLIGHT I WOULD PROBABLY HAVE RECOGNIZED MY EXCESSIVE SPD AND TAXI RUN EASILY. FAILURE TO USE RESOURCES AVAILABLE: I COULD HAVE HAD THE PAX (A PVT PLT) CONSULT WITH ME BEFOREHAND; AND ALSO CALL OUT THE AIRSPDS DURING TAXI. HAD I DONE THE FORMER; WE'D PROBABLY HAVE NEVER DONE THE TAXI. AND THE LATTER; ESPECIALLY IF COUPLED WITH AN AGREEMENT FOR AN ABORT SIGNAL AT A GIVEN (SAFE) IAS; WOULD HAVE AVOIDED THE ACCIDENT. HUMAN FACTORS: FATIGUE; STRESS FROM NON FLYING-RELATED; AND IMPATIENCE TO 'GO FLYING' MAY ALL HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ERRONEOUS DECISION-MAKING. OTHER THINGS: AT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF HRS; PLTS MAY GET A LITTLE TOO INFORMAL AND RELAXED ABOUT MARGINS; PLANNING OUT THE NUMBERS; ETC. AND YET; THE PLT DOES NOT HAVE THE IMMENSE EXPERIENCE THAT WOULD KEEP HIM OUT OF TROUBLE; OR LET HIM INSTANTLY SEE HIS SITUATION AND ESCAPE FROM TROUBLE. THIS MAY BE A FACTOR HERE. IN LOOKING AT THE INCIDENT I BELIEVE THAT IN THIS INCIDENT; AS WELL AS OTHERS AT WHP AND OTHER ARPTS; NOT ENOUGH CONSIDERATION (OR BLAME) IS GIVEN TO THE DANGER FACTORS OF CLOSE-IN OBSTRUCTIONS AND HOW THEY CUT THE SAFETY MARGIN FOR ERROR. AT A SAFER ARPT THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO INCIDENT AT ALL. BUILDING OBSTRUCTIONS TO THE VERY EDGE OF A RWY IS; IN MY OPINION; CAN AMOUNT RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT OF LIFE AND PROPERTY. SOME PEOPLE; LESS RETICENT THAN MYSELF; WOULD CALL IT ATTEMPTED MURDER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HE HAD NOT TAKEN THE TIME TO CALCULATE HIS ACCELERATE STOP DISTANCE PRIOR TO INITIATING THIS HIGH SPD RUN TO CLR CARBON FROM HIS ENG'S VALVES. PRIOR TO ABORTING THE RUN A GUST OF WIND GOT HIS ACFT MOMENTARILY AIRBORNE AND AFTER TOUCHDOWN HE HAD INSUFFICIENT RWY REMAINING TO STOP THE ACFT WITHOUT GOING THROUGH A FENCE OR CAUSING A GND LOOP. HE CHOSE THE GND LOOP AND SUBSEQUENTLY DAMAGED THE NOSE STRUT AND AN ADJACENT ENG MOUNT. THE R WINGTIP WAS DAMAGED AS WELL. THE RPTR FURTHER STATED THAT HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE FAA ALLOWING STRUCTURES AND PWR LINES TO ENCROACH ON THE SAFETY MARGINS PLTS NEED FOR TKOF AND LNDG. WHP'S RWY 12 IS DISPLACED 729 FT FOR PWR LINES. SOME ARPTS ARE WORSE. THE FAA HAS NOT YET CLASSIFIED THIS INCIDENT BUT REQUIRED THE RPTR TO TAKE AN ORAL AND WILL REQUIRE A FLT CHK BEFORE HE IS ALLOWED TO FLY AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.