Narrative:

While en route from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2 spda fail EICAS message appeared. Flight crew referred to the QRH; and the message was listed as a 'crew awareness' EICAS message. Flight crew took note; and began monitoring nearest suitable airports; just in case additional failures occurred. Approximately 3 mins after the spda fail crew awareness message appeared; the recirculation fans (#1 and #2 forward cargo) stopped functioning. No additional EICAS messages appeared. Flight crew reviewed electronic circuit breakers to see if any additional information could be gathered from the circuit breaker indications. All electrical busses except for AC #2 and dc ess #2 were affected. All other busses had 'unk' indications on approximately 50% or more of the circuit breakers. Flight crew considered the possibility that we might lose additional system; and briefed the flight attendants to prepare for a possible emergency. No further malfunctions noted for approximately 20 mins. Just after the flight crew had the discussion about ZZZ2 now being the nearest suitable airport; 3 EICAS messages came up. They were as follows: cargo aft fire system fail; cargo forward fire system fail; ams control fail. Captain xferred flight controls and communications to first officer and referenced QRH. Captain referenced the cargo (forward or aft) fire system fail checklist in the QRH. This checklist said to 'land at the nearest suitable airport.' as ZZZ2 had been determined as the nearest suitable airport; the flight crew reaffirmed that fact; considering the descent required after passing over the mountains. The flight crew also communicated with the dispatcher through the ACARS; and the dispatcher agreed that ZZZ2 was the nearest suitable. Direct routing was requested from and granted by ATC. (Routing was later updated to direct ZZZ3 direct ZZZ2 to allow for descent past the mountains.) flight crew declared emergency; and gave nature of emergency to ATC. Arff was requested on the runway. Captain then initiated the ams control fail checklist from the QRH. WX was VFR; and icing conditions were avoided per the QRH. Descent to 10000 ft or safe altitude was listed as the next action in the QRH. Descent to MVA was requested and granted. Descent was initiated immediately. No further messages presented until landing gear was lowered; at which time brake control fault was presented. Captain accomplished this checklist; and the follow-on flight control/brake malfunction preliminary landing checklist. Bleed #1 overpressure and bleed #2 overpressure caution messages appeared during this time as well. We elected to abandon the approach and circle visually at 6000 ft (FAF altitude) to allow time to complete all checklists. Bleeds were selected off; left off for 1 min as per QRH procedure. Bleeds were then selected 'on;' one at a time. When the messages bleed #1; (#2) overpressure messages stayed annunciated; the bleeds were once again selected 'off' per the QRH. The xbleed was also pushed out; per the QRH. The next item on the checklist was to reduce the associated thrust lever to idle. As both engines were affected; the crew determined that it was prudent to keep the engines operating; and not continue to the 'engine out preliminary landing checklist;' as prescribed by the bleed #1 (#2) overpressure checklist from the poh. Following completion of applicable checklists we completed a flaps full landing per QRH procedures. Upon touchdown engine #1 no dispatch; engine #2 no dispatch; engine #1 rev tla fail; and engine #2 rev tla fail messages appeared. Thrust reversers were not available during rollout. Wheel brakes and ground spoilers functioned normally. Captain stopped the aircraft straight ahead on the runway. We then shut down the #2 engine to allow arff crew to inspect the cargo compartments. Following shutdown of the #2 engine we attempted to assess the condition of the aircraft system; but no information was available on any EICAS system pages. All items on all of the block diagrams appeared as yellow dashes. After it was confirmed that the aircraft appeared safe we attempted to taxi to the terminal; but were unable to engage the nosewheel steering. We again stopped the plane and requested a tug to pull us to the gate. At this time we kept the #1 engine running as itwas the only available power source. We decided against starting the APU since no electrical information regarding bus or battery status was available. Upon reaching the gate the ground crew applied external power to the plane; and the captain selected it on and shut down the #1 engine. When the engine was shut down the ground power did not come on line and the aircraft went dark. We tried to reselect the power but it would not come on. Since it was bright daylight we shut the plane down while the last passenger deplaned. The ramp then informed us that the RAT had deployed when we shut the engine down.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ700 FLT CREW HAS MULTIPLE EICAS MESSAGES AND DECLARES EMER AND LANDS.

Narrative: WHILE ENRTE FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2 SPDA FAIL EICAS MESSAGE APPEARED. FLT CREW REFERRED TO THE QRH; AND THE MESSAGE WAS LISTED AS A 'CREW AWARENESS' EICAS MESSAGE. FLT CREW TOOK NOTE; AND BEGAN MONITORING NEAREST SUITABLE ARPTS; JUST IN CASE ADDITIONAL FAILURES OCCURRED. APPROX 3 MINS AFTER THE SPDA FAIL CREW AWARENESS MESSAGE APPEARED; THE RECIRCULATION FANS (#1 AND #2 FORWARD CARGO) STOPPED FUNCTIONING. NO ADDITIONAL EICAS MESSAGES APPEARED. FLT CREW REVIEWED ELECTRONIC CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO SEE IF ANY ADDITIONAL INFO COULD BE GATHERED FROM THE CIRCUIT BREAKER INDICATIONS. ALL ELECTRICAL BUSSES EXCEPT FOR AC #2 AND DC ESS #2 WERE AFFECTED. ALL OTHER BUSSES HAD 'UNK' INDICATIONS ON APPROX 50% OR MORE OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS. FLT CREW CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE MIGHT LOSE ADDITIONAL SYS; AND BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE EMER. NO FURTHER MALFUNCTIONS NOTED FOR APPROX 20 MINS. JUST AFTER THE FLT CREW HAD THE DISCUSSION ABOUT ZZZ2 NOW BEING THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT; 3 EICAS MESSAGES CAME UP. THEY WERE AS FOLLOWS: CARGO AFT FIRE SYS FAIL; CARGO FORWARD FIRE SYS FAIL; AMS CTL FAIL. CAPT XFERRED FLT CTLS AND COMS TO FO AND REFED QRH. CAPT REFED THE CARGO (FORWARD OR AFT) FIRE SYS FAIL CHKLIST IN THE QRH. THIS CHKLIST SAID TO 'LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT.' AS ZZZ2 HAD BEEN DETERMINED AS THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT; THE FLT CREW REAFFIRMED THAT FACT; CONSIDERING THE DSCNT REQUIRED AFTER PASSING OVER THE MOUNTAINS. THE FLT CREW ALSO COMMUNICATED WITH THE DISPATCHER THROUGH THE ACARS; AND THE DISPATCHER AGREED THAT ZZZ2 WAS THE NEAREST SUITABLE. DIRECT ROUTING WAS REQUESTED FROM AND GRANTED BY ATC. (ROUTING WAS LATER UPDATED TO DIRECT ZZZ3 DIRECT ZZZ2 TO ALLOW FOR DSCNT PAST THE MOUNTAINS.) FLT CREW DECLARED EMER; AND GAVE NATURE OF EMER TO ATC. ARFF WAS REQUESTED ON THE RWY. CAPT THEN INITIATED THE AMS CTL FAIL CHKLIST FROM THE QRH. WX WAS VFR; AND ICING CONDITIONS WERE AVOIDED PER THE QRH. DSCNT TO 10000 FT OR SAFE ALT WAS LISTED AS THE NEXT ACTION IN THE QRH. DSCNT TO MVA WAS REQUESTED AND GRANTED. DSCNT WAS INITIATED IMMEDIATELY. NO FURTHER MESSAGES PRESENTED UNTIL LNDG GEAR WAS LOWERED; AT WHICH TIME BRAKE CTL FAULT WAS PRESENTED. CAPT ACCOMPLISHED THIS CHKLIST; AND THE FOLLOW-ON FLT CTL/BRAKE MALFUNCTION PRELIMINARY LNDG CHKLIST. BLEED #1 OVERPRESSURE AND BLEED #2 OVERPRESSURE CAUTION MESSAGES APPEARED DURING THIS TIME AS WELL. WE ELECTED TO ABANDON THE APCH AND CIRCLE VISUALLY AT 6000 FT (FAF ALT) TO ALLOW TIME TO COMPLETE ALL CHKLISTS. BLEEDS WERE SELECTED OFF; LEFT OFF FOR 1 MIN AS PER QRH PROC. BLEEDS WERE THEN SELECTED 'ON;' ONE AT A TIME. WHEN THE MESSAGES BLEED #1; (#2) OVERPRESSURE MESSAGES STAYED ANNUNCIATED; THE BLEEDS WERE ONCE AGAIN SELECTED 'OFF' PER THE QRH. THE XBLEED WAS ALSO PUSHED OUT; PER THE QRH. THE NEXT ITEM ON THE CHKLIST WAS TO REDUCE THE ASSOCIATED THRUST LEVER TO IDLE. AS BOTH ENGS WERE AFFECTED; THE CREW DETERMINED THAT IT WAS PRUDENT TO KEEP THE ENGS OPERATING; AND NOT CONTINUE TO THE 'ENG OUT PRELIMINARY LNDG CHKLIST;' AS PRESCRIBED BY THE BLEED #1 (#2) OVERPRESSURE CHKLIST FROM THE POH. FOLLOWING COMPLETION OF APPLICABLE CHKLISTS WE COMPLETED A FLAPS FULL LNDG PER QRH PROCS. UPON TOUCHDOWN ENG #1 NO DISPATCH; ENG #2 NO DISPATCH; ENG #1 REV TLA FAIL; AND ENG #2 REV TLA FAIL MESSAGES APPEARED. THRUST REVERSERS WERE NOT AVAILABLE DURING ROLLOUT. WHEEL BRAKES AND GND SPOILERS FUNCTIONED NORMALLY. CAPT STOPPED THE ACFT STRAIGHT AHEAD ON THE RWY. WE THEN SHUT DOWN THE #2 ENG TO ALLOW ARFF CREW TO INSPECT THE CARGO COMPARTMENTS. FOLLOWING SHUTDOWN OF THE #2 ENG WE ATTEMPTED TO ASSESS THE CONDITION OF THE ACFT SYS; BUT NO INFO WAS AVAILABLE ON ANY EICAS SYS PAGES. ALL ITEMS ON ALL OF THE BLOCK DIAGRAMS APPEARED AS YELLOW DASHES. AFTER IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT THE ACFT APPEARED SAFE WE ATTEMPTED TO TAXI TO THE TERMINAL; BUT WERE UNABLE TO ENGAGE THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING. WE AGAIN STOPPED THE PLANE AND REQUESTED A TUG TO PULL US TO THE GATE. AT THIS TIME WE KEPT THE #1 ENG RUNNING AS ITWAS THE ONLY AVAILABLE PWR SOURCE. WE DECIDED AGAINST STARTING THE APU SINCE NO ELECTRICAL INFO REGARDING BUS OR BATTERY STATUS WAS AVAILABLE. UPON REACHING THE GATE THE GND CREW APPLIED EXTERNAL PWR TO THE PLANE; AND THE CAPT SELECTED IT ON AND SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG. WHEN THE ENG WAS SHUT DOWN THE GND PWR DID NOT COME ON LINE AND THE ACFT WENT DARK. WE TRIED TO RESELECT THE PWR BUT IT WOULD NOT COME ON. SINCE IT WAS BRIGHT DAYLIGHT WE SHUT THE PLANE DOWN WHILE THE LAST PAX DEPLANED. THE RAMP THEN INFORMED US THAT THE RAT HAD DEPLOYED WHEN WE SHUT THE ENG DOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.