Narrative:

Approximately 1 hour remaining in flight; we received the following caution EICAS messages: hydraulic 2 lo pressure; inboard flight spoilers; inboard spoilerons. We referenced the company flight manual (cfm); hydraulic system 2 lo pressure; and complied with said checklist. One part of the hydraulic system 2 lo pressure checklist asks if the inboard spoilerons and outboard brake pressure was displayed; if so land at nearest suitable airport. The outboard brake pressure was not displayed as a EICAS caution message. We never received the outboard brake pressure message in-flight. Our ED2 hydraulic page synoptic showed outboard brake pressure at 2500 psi; green and steady. However; we calculated available landing distance assuming a worse-case landing factor of 1.80 (80%) if we lost outboard brake pressure prior to touchdown. Per the cfm; 1B flight spoilers cfm required 1.25 (25%) and 1B spoilerons requires 1.25 (25%) landing distance; per those applicable checklists; which were reviewed as well. We notified company via ACARS of our caution messages; clearly stating what EICAS messages were displayed. I had the lead flight attendant come up to the flight deck about our abnormal situation; the possibility that if we lost our outboard brake pressure we would declare an emergency; and in event of loss of control an evacuate/evacuation is possible but to expect a normal approach and landing. I briefed the passenger of our situation; and to expect a longer landing rollout and that the airport crash fire rescue equipment trucks will meet us off the runway; as a precautionary measure. We notified ATC of our hydraulic system loss; and requested the crash fire rescue equipment at the end of the runway. Initially ATC directed us to runway 12; however we requested runway 19R. It was the longest available; with minimal crosswind. I recall wind reported 180 degrees/6 KTS. We configured our flaps at required 20 degrees; and extended the landing gear early to gauge if we would still have ob brake pressure; etc. Normal deployment and down and lock confirmed. My reasoning for configuring early was twofold. Any further warning indications presented themselves; I had ATC in the loop; and crash fire rescue equipment standing by. At approximately 1000 ft AGL; after being cleared to land by tower; we were notified by the controller that they were 'declaring an emergency for us?!' I thought only the pilot could do this; but at less than 1000 ft AGL; flying an aircraft in a different than usual confign; my focus was on airplane control. I thought the emergency call by ATC was not necessary; given only caution messages were displayed and the good inboard/outboard brake pressure indications. Caution messages; by cfm definition; is information which can result in damage or destruction to equipment; if not carefully followed. We followed the EICAS caution message checklists to the letter. Landing was uneventful; with solid inboard/outboard braking. I noticed no diminished braking capacity. We asked and received crash fire rescue equipment 'look-over' of our aircraft and was informed of no smoke; fire; or visible damage. We requested a truck follow us to the gate. I elected to taxi to the gate since I had solid system 3 hydraulic pressure; which regulates our inboard brakes. We constantly monitored brake pressure on our taxi to the gate. At the first indication of loss of inboard brake pressure; we would immediately stop and request a tow to the gate. No loss was noticed and we proceeded to the gate uneventfully. In my opinion we handled this situation with caution and care. If we had lost outboard brake pressure we would have immediately declared an emergency. Had we had landing gear malfunctions we would have declared an emergency. Had we had any flight control malfunction we would have declared an emergency. Since ATC notified us of their declaration of emergency at such a late moment; with both our focus on flight and system monitoring; I elected not to add to the situation by notifying the cabin of a 'brace command;' which is used in an emergency landing. As said earlier; if loss of control was imminent; this would have been applicable.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL600 CREW GETS EICAS CAUTION MESSAGE FOR HYD 2 WHILE IN CRUISE.

Narrative: APPROX 1 HR REMAINING IN FLT; WE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING CAUTION EICAS MESSAGES: HYD 2 LO PRESSURE; INBOARD FLT SPOILERS; INBOARD SPOILERONS. WE REFED THE COMPANY FLT MANUAL (CFM); HYD SYS 2 LO PRESSURE; AND COMPLIED WITH SAID CHKLIST. ONE PART OF THE HYD SYS 2 LO PRESSURE CHKLIST ASKS IF THE INBOARD SPOILERONS AND OUTBOARD BRAKE PRESSURE WAS DISPLAYED; IF SO LAND AT NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. THE OUTBOARD BRAKE PRESSURE WAS NOT DISPLAYED AS A EICAS CAUTION MESSAGE. WE NEVER RECEIVED THE OUTBOARD BRAKE PRESSURE MESSAGE INFLT. OUR ED2 HYD PAGE SYNOPTIC SHOWED OUTBOARD BRAKE PRESSURE AT 2500 PSI; GREEN AND STEADY. HOWEVER; WE CALCULATED AVAILABLE LNDG DISTANCE ASSUMING A WORSE-CASE LNDG FACTOR OF 1.80 (80%) IF WE LOST OUTBOARD BRAKE PRESSURE PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN. PER THE CFM; 1B FLT SPOILERS CFM REQUIRED 1.25 (25%) AND 1B SPOILERONS REQUIRES 1.25 (25%) LNDG DISTANCE; PER THOSE APPLICABLE CHKLISTS; WHICH WERE REVIEWED AS WELL. WE NOTIFIED COMPANY VIA ACARS OF OUR CAUTION MESSAGES; CLRLY STATING WHAT EICAS MESSAGES WERE DISPLAYED. I HAD THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT COME UP TO THE FLT DECK ABOUT OUR ABNORMAL SITUATION; THE POSSIBILITY THAT IF WE LOST OUR OUTBOARD BRAKE PRESSURE WE WOULD DECLARE AN EMER; AND IN EVENT OF LOSS OF CTL AN EVAC IS POSSIBLE BUT TO EXPECT A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG. I BRIEFED THE PAX OF OUR SITUATION; AND TO EXPECT A LONGER LNDG ROLLOUT AND THAT THE ARPT CFR TRUCKS WILL MEET US OFF THE RWY; AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE. WE NOTIFIED ATC OF OUR HYD SYS LOSS; AND REQUESTED THE CFR AT THE END OF THE RWY. INITIALLY ATC DIRECTED US TO RWY 12; HOWEVER WE REQUESTED RWY 19R. IT WAS THE LONGEST AVAILABLE; WITH MINIMAL XWIND. I RECALL WIND RPTED 180 DEGS/6 KTS. WE CONFIGURED OUR FLAPS AT REQUIRED 20 DEGS; AND EXTENDED THE LNDG GEAR EARLY TO GAUGE IF WE WOULD STILL HAVE OB BRAKE PRESSURE; ETC. NORMAL DEPLOYMENT AND DOWN AND LOCK CONFIRMED. MY REASONING FOR CONFIGURING EARLY WAS TWOFOLD. ANY FURTHER WARNING INDICATIONS PRESENTED THEMSELVES; I HAD ATC IN THE LOOP; AND CFR STANDING BY. AT APPROX 1000 FT AGL; AFTER BEING CLRED TO LAND BY TWR; WE WERE NOTIFIED BY THE CTLR THAT THEY WERE 'DECLARING AN EMER FOR US?!' I THOUGHT ONLY THE PLT COULD DO THIS; BUT AT LESS THAN 1000 FT AGL; FLYING AN ACFT IN A DIFFERENT THAN USUAL CONFIGN; MY FOCUS WAS ON AIRPLANE CTL. I THOUGHT THE EMER CALL BY ATC WAS NOT NECESSARY; GIVEN ONLY CAUTION MESSAGES WERE DISPLAYED AND THE GOOD INBOARD/OUTBOARD BRAKE PRESSURE INDICATIONS. CAUTION MESSAGES; BY CFM DEFINITION; IS INFO WHICH CAN RESULT IN DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION TO EQUIP; IF NOT CAREFULLY FOLLOWED. WE FOLLOWED THE EICAS CAUTION MESSAGE CHKLISTS TO THE LETTER. LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL; WITH SOLID INBOARD/OUTBOARD BRAKING. I NOTICED NO DIMINISHED BRAKING CAPACITY. WE ASKED AND RECEIVED CFR 'LOOK-OVER' OF OUR ACFT AND WAS INFORMED OF NO SMOKE; FIRE; OR VISIBLE DAMAGE. WE REQUESTED A TRUCK FOLLOW US TO THE GATE. I ELECTED TO TAXI TO THE GATE SINCE I HAD SOLID SYS 3 HYD PRESSURE; WHICH REGULATES OUR INBOARD BRAKES. WE CONSTANTLY MONITORED BRAKE PRESSURE ON OUR TAXI TO THE GATE. AT THE FIRST INDICATION OF LOSS OF INBOARD BRAKE PRESSURE; WE WOULD IMMEDIATELY STOP AND REQUEST A TOW TO THE GATE. NO LOSS WAS NOTICED AND WE PROCEEDED TO THE GATE UNEVENTFULLY. IN MY OPINION WE HANDLED THIS SITUATION WITH CAUTION AND CARE. IF WE HAD LOST OUTBOARD BRAKE PRESSURE WE WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY DECLARED AN EMER. HAD WE HAD LNDG GEAR MALFUNCTIONS WE WOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER. HAD WE HAD ANY FLT CTL MALFUNCTION WE WOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER. SINCE ATC NOTIFIED US OF THEIR DECLARATION OF EMER AT SUCH A LATE MOMENT; WITH BOTH OUR FOCUS ON FLT AND SYS MONITORING; I ELECTED NOT TO ADD TO THE SITUATION BY NOTIFYING THE CABIN OF A 'BRACE COMMAND;' WHICH IS USED IN AN EMER LNDG. AS SAID EARLIER; IF LOSS OF CTL WAS IMMINENT; THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN APPLICABLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.