Narrative:

Day #2 of a 3-DAY trip; first day of 2 with this first officer. First time I have flown with this first officer. Leg #3 of 5 scheduled flts this day. All 1-2 hours fairly short flts. First officer was PF on this flight to sdf; briefed ILS runway 35L approach at cruise altitude after receiving ATIS and calculating landing data on opc. Did not write down that GS was OTS and not sure whether it was on ATIS or not; but do remember there being numerous taxi closures on it. First officer did not brief the 4.5 DME intermediate leveloff and I; the pilot monitoring; did not catch it either; so we set '663' for decision altitude on altimeters for the ILS approach. Approach control cleared us for the ILS runway 35L approach; GS out; and then we corrected the decision altitude to 900 ft at that time; while in IMC on approach; but did not catch the 4.5 DME leveloff at 1400 ft. After starting the descent at the FAF at 7.6 DME; we obtained visual contact with the airport; runway and terrain; and upon reaching about 1400 ft MSL; I commented that the terrain was getting closer and the first officer commented that we may get a terrain warning; but still did not notice the 1400 ft altitude intermediate leveloff. Then approaching 1000 ft MSL; we received the 'terrain' GPWS warning; took evasive action by the PF disconnecting the autoplt and climbing and the pilot monitoring telling the PF to correct the flight path. We both had visual contact with the terrain; and did not feel it was a dangerous situation; but did then notice the 1400 ft intermediate leveloff on the approach chart. We did not feel we had to do a go around; and after correcting the flight path; we continued the visual approach to landing. We also did not receive any warnings from approach control or tower about any altitude or terrain conflicts. Check and circle the NOTAMS that are pertinent to all possible approachs to the destination airport. I thought we would be doing the runway 17R approach; and did not sufficiently look at the other approachs before we left the gate. I also did not write down all of the taxiway closures and inoperative approach components; if the ATIS did say the GS was OTS. I also now circled the 4.5 DME intermediate leveloff on my approach chart and will be more diligent on non-precision approachs in the future. Supplemental information from acn 706574: we were on arrival into sdf and were expecting an ILS to runway 35L. The ATIS was reporting 2000 ft broken; so I briefed a precision approach and expected to break out accordingly. However; ATC cleared us for the localizer to runway 35L. Apparently the GS was OTS; but we were unaware of this. I very quickly briefed the step-downs for the localizer and continued the approach. As I descended from 2400 to 900 ft (the GS out minimums for the approach) we broke out into visual conditions and both made comments about how low we appeared. About then the GPWS alerted; 'too low; terrain; too low; terrain.' I immediately disconnected the autoplt and climbed to silence the terrain alert. We were VMC; so I safely continued the approach and landed. It was then that the captain realized that we were supposed to level off at an intermediate step-down altitude of 1400 ft until 4.5 DME. This step-down was overlooked by both of us. More attention should have been paid to the NOTAMS for this flight. Had we noticed that the GS was OTS sooner; we would have briefed the correct approach and I (as the pilot flying the airplane) would have deliberately briefed the step-down altitudes. In the past; I have noticed that we can be a bit lazy about NOTAMS; but in this particular case; it made a huge difference. The key is to not have to rush anything.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 ON A NON PRECISION APCH TO SDF GOT A GPWS TERRAIN ALERT BECAUSE THEY DSNDED BELOW A CHARTED INTERMEDIATE ALT.

Narrative: DAY #2 OF A 3-DAY TRIP; FIRST DAY OF 2 WITH THIS FO. FIRST TIME I HAVE FLOWN WITH THIS FO. LEG #3 OF 5 SCHEDULED FLTS THIS DAY. ALL 1-2 HRS FAIRLY SHORT FLTS. FO WAS PF ON THIS FLT TO SDF; BRIEFED ILS RWY 35L APCH AT CRUISE ALT AFTER RECEIVING ATIS AND CALCULATING LNDG DATA ON OPC. DID NOT WRITE DOWN THAT GS WAS OTS AND NOT SURE WHETHER IT WAS ON ATIS OR NOT; BUT DO REMEMBER THERE BEING NUMEROUS TAXI CLOSURES ON IT. FO DID NOT BRIEF THE 4.5 DME INTERMEDIATE LEVELOFF AND I; THE PLT MONITORING; DID NOT CATCH IT EITHER; SO WE SET '663' FOR DECISION ALT ON ALTIMETERS FOR THE ILS APCH. APCH CTL CLRED US FOR THE ILS RWY 35L APCH; GS OUT; AND THEN WE CORRECTED THE DECISION ALT TO 900 FT AT THAT TIME; WHILE IN IMC ON APCH; BUT DID NOT CATCH THE 4.5 DME LEVELOFF AT 1400 FT. AFTER STARTING THE DSCNT AT THE FAF AT 7.6 DME; WE OBTAINED VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE ARPT; RWY AND TERRAIN; AND UPON REACHING ABOUT 1400 FT MSL; I COMMENTED THAT THE TERRAIN WAS GETTING CLOSER AND THE FO COMMENTED THAT WE MAY GET A TERRAIN WARNING; BUT STILL DID NOT NOTICE THE 1400 FT ALT INTERMEDIATE LEVELOFF. THEN APCHING 1000 FT MSL; WE RECEIVED THE 'TERRAIN' GPWS WARNING; TOOK EVASIVE ACTION BY THE PF DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT AND CLBING AND THE PLT MONITORING TELLING THE PF TO CORRECT THE FLT PATH. WE BOTH HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE TERRAIN; AND DID NOT FEEL IT WAS A DANGEROUS SITUATION; BUT DID THEN NOTICE THE 1400 FT INTERMEDIATE LEVELOFF ON THE APCH CHART. WE DID NOT FEEL WE HAD TO DO A GAR; AND AFTER CORRECTING THE FLT PATH; WE CONTINUED THE VISUAL APCH TO LNDG. WE ALSO DID NOT RECEIVE ANY WARNINGS FROM APCH CTL OR TWR ABOUT ANY ALT OR TERRAIN CONFLICTS. CHK AND CIRCLE THE NOTAMS THAT ARE PERTINENT TO ALL POSSIBLE APCHS TO THE DEST ARPT. I THOUGHT WE WOULD BE DOING THE RWY 17R APCH; AND DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY LOOK AT THE OTHER APCHS BEFORE WE LEFT THE GATE. I ALSO DID NOT WRITE DOWN ALL OF THE TXWY CLOSURES AND INOP APCH COMPONENTS; IF THE ATIS DID SAY THE GS WAS OTS. I ALSO NOW CIRCLED THE 4.5 DME INTERMEDIATE LEVELOFF ON MY APCH CHART AND WILL BE MORE DILIGENT ON NON-PRECISION APCHS IN THE FUTURE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 706574: WE WERE ON ARR INTO SDF AND WERE EXPECTING AN ILS TO RWY 35L. THE ATIS WAS RPTING 2000 FT BROKEN; SO I BRIEFED A PRECISION APCH AND EXPECTED TO BREAK OUT ACCORDINGLY. HOWEVER; ATC CLRED US FOR THE LOC TO RWY 35L. APPARENTLY THE GS WAS OTS; BUT WE WERE UNAWARE OF THIS. I VERY QUICKLY BRIEFED THE STEP-DOWNS FOR THE LOC AND CONTINUED THE APCH. AS I DSNDED FROM 2400 TO 900 FT (THE GS OUT MINIMUMS FOR THE APCH) WE BROKE OUT INTO VISUAL CONDITIONS AND BOTH MADE COMMENTS ABOUT HOW LOW WE APPEARED. ABOUT THEN THE GPWS ALERTED; 'TOO LOW; TERRAIN; TOO LOW; TERRAIN.' I IMMEDIATELY DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND CLBED TO SILENCE THE TERRAIN ALERT. WE WERE VMC; SO I SAFELY CONTINUED THE APCH AND LANDED. IT WAS THEN THAT THE CAPT REALIZED THAT WE WERE SUPPOSED TO LEVEL OFF AT AN INTERMEDIATE STEP-DOWN ALT OF 1400 FT UNTIL 4.5 DME. THIS STEP-DOWN WAS OVERLOOKED BY BOTH OF US. MORE ATTN SHOULD HAVE BEEN PAID TO THE NOTAMS FOR THIS FLT. HAD WE NOTICED THAT THE GS WAS OTS SOONER; WE WOULD HAVE BRIEFED THE CORRECT APCH AND I (AS THE PLT FLYING THE AIRPLANE) WOULD HAVE DELIBERATELY BRIEFED THE STEP-DOWN ALTS. IN THE PAST; I HAVE NOTICED THAT WE CAN BE A BIT LAZY ABOUT NOTAMS; BUT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE; IT MADE A HUGE DIFFERENCE. THE KEY IS TO NOT HAVE TO RUSH ANYTHING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.