Narrative:

On the first leg of an far part 135 check ride with 2 FAA observers on board; we had the right engine set to simulate zero thrust from about 25 mi out at cruise altitude of 5000 ft. Before departure; I talked to a copilot who had flown to the airport in the morning and he said there was a hefty increase in airspeed about 1/2 way down final approach; followed by a noticeable drop off which almost felt like windshear. We were vectored to final approach course by center with about a 3 mi turn on outside the FAF. The sic asked me if I wanted to take a closer vector and I did not realize that he had been coached to do so by the inspector. Thinking that he was advocating the close turn on because of concern about how long we had run the good engine at MCP; I accepted the 'suggestion' against my better judgement. This distraction and the ensuing difficulty in getting the clearance from center caused me to be later than normal in extending the gear. At about 1 mi from the FAF; I announced 'gear down' (a carry over from yrs of part 121 operations); and extended the landing gear. I very clearly remember moving the gear handle down with my right hand to the bottom stop and both the sic and the inspector very emphatically stated that they remember seeing me put the gear handle down. I then intercepted the GS at about 115 KTS (a bit fast for my normal approach profile). The sic then asked if I wanted the before landing checklist; to which I said yes. I remember listening to him read the entire checklist. I do not remember responding '3 green (gear lights) and 1 in the mirror' to the landing gear prompt; but do remember him saying '3 green.' I was distraction with the airspeed building much faster than normal; so I initially retarded the 'good' throttle to almost idle. Since none of this made sense from past experience in the airplane I became concerned that I was experiencing the initial airspeed bump in the airspeed of 'windshear' type anomaly mentioned above; so I put some power back in on the good engine. About 100-150 ft above; MDA; I was approaching full scale deflection on the GS and about 10-15 KTS fast; so I began thinking the go around procedure and just before I initiated it; I heard the words; 'take off the hood.' I quickly did so and was in a position to land so I continued the landing with some power on since I was nervous about the possibility of windshear. The next thing I heard was the sound of the propellers hitting the runway. The gear was not down! I continued the landing because of the concern of propeller damage; shut everything off and began telling at the other 3 occupants to get out. We all safely left the airplane via normal exits. There was no fire and no injuries. The airplane was lifted so that I could manually extend the gear and be towed off the runway. This is a story of classic break in the normal chain and failure to follow normal SOP because of distrs. I cannot imagine that it is possible to convey the terrible feeling that ensued from this incident. I can only hope that others will learn from my mistake and not repeat it.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA31 FLT CREW LANDS GEAR UP ON A PART 135 CHK RIDE.

Narrative: ON THE FIRST LEG OF AN FAR PART 135 CHK RIDE WITH 2 FAA OBSERVERS ON BOARD; WE HAD THE R ENG SET TO SIMULATE ZERO THRUST FROM ABOUT 25 MI OUT AT CRUISE ALT OF 5000 FT. BEFORE DEP; I TALKED TO A COPLT WHO HAD FLOWN TO THE ARPT IN THE MORNING AND HE SAID THERE WAS A HEFTY INCREASE IN AIRSPD ABOUT 1/2 WAY DOWN FINAL APCH; FOLLOWED BY A NOTICEABLE DROP OFF WHICH ALMOST FELT LIKE WINDSHEAR. WE WERE VECTORED TO FINAL APCH COURSE BY CTR WITH ABOUT A 3 MI TURN ON OUTSIDE THE FAF. THE SIC ASKED ME IF I WANTED TO TAKE A CLOSER VECTOR AND I DID NOT REALIZE THAT HE HAD BEEN COACHED TO DO SO BY THE INSPECTOR. THINKING THAT HE WAS ADVOCATING THE CLOSE TURN ON BECAUSE OF CONCERN ABOUT HOW LONG WE HAD RUN THE GOOD ENG AT MCP; I ACCEPTED THE 'SUGGESTION' AGAINST MY BETTER JUDGEMENT. THIS DISTR AND THE ENSUING DIFFICULTY IN GETTING THE CLRNC FROM CTR CAUSED ME TO BE LATER THAN NORMAL IN EXTENDING THE GEAR. AT ABOUT 1 MI FROM THE FAF; I ANNOUNCED 'GEAR DOWN' (A CARRY OVER FROM YRS OF PART 121 OPS); AND EXTENDED THE LNDG GEAR. I VERY CLRLY REMEMBER MOVING THE GEAR HANDLE DOWN WITH MY R HAND TO THE BOTTOM STOP AND BOTH THE SIC AND THE INSPECTOR VERY EMPHATICALLY STATED THAT THEY REMEMBER SEEING ME PUT THE GEAR HANDLE DOWN. I THEN INTERCEPTED THE GS AT ABOUT 115 KTS (A BIT FAST FOR MY NORMAL APCH PROFILE). THE SIC THEN ASKED IF I WANTED THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST; TO WHICH I SAID YES. I REMEMBER LISTENING TO HIM READ THE ENTIRE CHKLIST. I DO NOT REMEMBER RESPONDING '3 GREEN (GEAR LIGHTS) AND 1 IN THE MIRROR' TO THE LNDG GEAR PROMPT; BUT DO REMEMBER HIM SAYING '3 GREEN.' I WAS DISTR WITH THE AIRSPD BUILDING MUCH FASTER THAN NORMAL; SO I INITIALLY RETARDED THE 'GOOD' THROTTLE TO ALMOST IDLE. SINCE NONE OF THIS MADE SENSE FROM PAST EXPERIENCE IN THE AIRPLANE I BECAME CONCERNED THAT I WAS EXPERIENCING THE INITIAL AIRSPD BUMP IN THE AIRSPD OF 'WINDSHEAR' TYPE ANOMALY MENTIONED ABOVE; SO I PUT SOME PWR BACK IN ON THE GOOD ENG. ABOUT 100-150 FT ABOVE; MDA; I WAS APCHING FULL SCALE DEFLECTION ON THE GS AND ABOUT 10-15 KTS FAST; SO I BEGAN THINKING THE GAR PROC AND JUST BEFORE I INITIATED IT; I HEARD THE WORDS; 'TAKE OFF THE HOOD.' I QUICKLY DID SO AND WAS IN A POS TO LAND SO I CONTINUED THE LNDG WITH SOME PWR ON SINCE I WAS NERVOUS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF WINDSHEAR. THE NEXT THING I HEARD WAS THE SOUND OF THE PROPS HITTING THE RWY. THE GEAR WAS NOT DOWN! I CONTINUED THE LNDG BECAUSE OF THE CONCERN OF PROP DAMAGE; SHUT EVERYTHING OFF AND BEGAN TELLING AT THE OTHER 3 OCCUPANTS TO GET OUT. WE ALL SAFELY LEFT THE AIRPLANE VIA NORMAL EXITS. THERE WAS NO FIRE AND NO INJURIES. THE AIRPLANE WAS LIFTED SO THAT I COULD MANUALLY EXTEND THE GEAR AND BE TOWED OFF THE RWY. THIS IS A STORY OF CLASSIC BREAK IN THE NORMAL CHAIN AND FAILURE TO FOLLOW NORMAL SOP BECAUSE OF DISTRS. I CANNOT IMAGINE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO CONVEY THE TERRIBLE FEELING THAT ENSUED FROM THIS INCIDENT. I CAN ONLY HOPE THAT OTHERS WILL LEARN FROM MY MISTAKE AND NOT REPEAT IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.