|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1201 To 1800|
|Locale Reference||airport : zzz.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Controlling Facilities||tower : zzz.tower|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||B737-700|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||ground : takeoff roll|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 235|
flight time type : 7500
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 158|
flight time type : 3500
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : less severe|
|Independent Detector||aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : eng bleed trip light|
other flight crewa
other flight crewb
|Resolutory Action||flight crew : rejected takeoff|
All procedures and checklists prior to takeoff were normal. This was going to be a bleeds off takeoff runway 33L at ZZZ. This was selected because the winds were more favorable to this runway; 340 degrees 8 KTS; we had greater stopping margin with bleeds off versus bleeds on; 667 versus 366; and we were already 46 mins late and this was a much shorter taxi. On takeoff; I positioned thrust levers to let engines stabilize; then to takeoff power. Just after getting takeoff power; estimating 40-50 KTS; got master caution and right bleed trip off light. Rejected the takeoff; accomplished the QRH rejected takeoff procedure. After clearing the runway and stopping; we accomplished the QRH procedure for the bleed trip-off (bleeds off takeoff). The trip reset button cleared the light and all indications were normal. We evaluated brake energy and because we were barely moving; this was not a factor. Looked at the MEL to see if there were any dispatch or maintenance items to be met and found none. Because all indications were normal; we elected to continue. The first officer and I were in complete agreement as to this course of action. Subsequent takeoff was uneventful. Knowing that this overpressure problem in the -700 is more common than rare; we elected to do a normal bleeds on takeoff runway 24. Because the second takeoff attempt was not a bleeds off takeoff; I called dispatch and maintenance upon arrival to see if we needed to make any write-ups. I was concerned that everything was normal for me; but what about the next crew that had to fly the aircraft the next morning? Initially the maintenance controller indicated that we probably did not have to do anything; but after further consultation he decided to have me write up the bleed trip-off light. I submitted an irregularity report for the rejected takeoff the next morning and completed the trip yesterday. Today I got a call from the chief pilot to discuss the irregularity report. He suggested that I do this report because we were not sure if maybe I should have gone back to the gate after the rejected takeoff. I did not think that was necessary (and I may be wrong) because at that point in my mind I did not have a malfunction to write up; everything was normal. There was nothing in the MEL; QRH; or fom that I could find to warrant going back to the gate.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B737-700 CREW REJECTED A TKOF FOR AN ENG BLEED TRIP LIGHT AND FAILED TO HAVE MAINT EXAMINE THE ACFT AFTER SUCCESSFULLY RESETTING THE FAULT.
Narrative: ALL PROCS AND CHKLISTS PRIOR TO TKOF WERE NORMAL. THIS WAS GOING TO BE A BLEEDS OFF TKOF RWY 33L AT ZZZ. THIS WAS SELECTED BECAUSE THE WINDS WERE MORE FAVORABLE TO THIS RWY; 340 DEGS 8 KTS; WE HAD GREATER STOPPING MARGIN WITH BLEEDS OFF VERSUS BLEEDS ON; 667 VERSUS 366; AND WE WERE ALREADY 46 MINS LATE AND THIS WAS A MUCH SHORTER TAXI. ON TKOF; I POSITIONED THRUST LEVERS TO LET ENGS STABILIZE; THEN TO TKOF PWR. JUST AFTER GETTING TKOF PWR; ESTIMATING 40-50 KTS; GOT MASTER CAUTION AND R BLEED TRIP OFF LIGHT. REJECTED THE TKOF; ACCOMPLISHED THE QRH REJECTED TKOF PROC. AFTER CLRING THE RWY AND STOPPING; WE ACCOMPLISHED THE QRH PROC FOR THE BLEED TRIP-OFF (BLEEDS OFF TKOF). THE TRIP RESET BUTTON CLRED THE LIGHT AND ALL INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL. WE EVALUATED BRAKE ENERGY AND BECAUSE WE WERE BARELY MOVING; THIS WAS NOT A FACTOR. LOOKED AT THE MEL TO SEE IF THERE WERE ANY DISPATCH OR MAINT ITEMS TO BE MET AND FOUND NONE. BECAUSE ALL INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL; WE ELECTED TO CONTINUE. THE FO AND I WERE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT AS TO THIS COURSE OF ACTION. SUBSEQUENT TKOF WAS UNEVENTFUL. KNOWING THAT THIS OVERPRESSURE PROB IN THE -700 IS MORE COMMON THAN RARE; WE ELECTED TO DO A NORMAL BLEEDS ON TKOF RWY 24. BECAUSE THE SECOND TKOF ATTEMPT WAS NOT A BLEEDS OFF TKOF; I CALLED DISPATCH AND MAINT UPON ARR TO SEE IF WE NEEDED TO MAKE ANY WRITE-UPS. I WAS CONCERNED THAT EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL FOR ME; BUT WHAT ABOUT THE NEXT CREW THAT HAD TO FLY THE ACFT THE NEXT MORNING? INITIALLY THE MAINT CTLR INDICATED THAT WE PROBABLY DID NOT HAVE TO DO ANYTHING; BUT AFTER FURTHER CONSULTATION HE DECIDED TO HAVE ME WRITE UP THE BLEED TRIP-OFF LIGHT. I SUBMITTED AN IRREGULARITY RPT FOR THE REJECTED TKOF THE NEXT MORNING AND COMPLETED THE TRIP YESTERDAY. TODAY I GOT A CALL FROM THE CHIEF PLT TO DISCUSS THE IRREGULARITY RPT. HE SUGGESTED THAT I DO THIS RPT BECAUSE WE WERE NOT SURE IF MAYBE I SHOULD HAVE GONE BACK TO THE GATE AFTER THE REJECTED TKOF. I DID NOT THINK THAT WAS NECESSARY (AND I MAY BE WRONG) BECAUSE AT THAT POINT IN MY MIND I DID NOT HAVE A MALFUNCTION TO WRITE UP; EVERYTHING WAS NORMAL. THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE MEL; QRH; OR FOM THAT I COULD FIND TO WARRANT GOING BACK TO THE GATE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.