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37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
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ZAU controller experienced operational error at 13000 ft when a slow climbing aircraft was not pointed out to an adjacent facility as required by LOA.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 705136 |
| Time | |
| Date | 200607 |
| Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | navaid : bae.vortac |
| State Reference | WI |
| Altitude | msl single value : 13000 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | artcc : zau.artcc |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Aircraft 2 | |
| Controlling Facilities | artcc : zau.artcc |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | SF 340A |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | cruise : level |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | government : faa |
| Function | controller : radar |
| Experience | controller radar : 17 controller time certified in position1 : 13 controller time certified in position2 : 3 |
| ASRS Report | 705136 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | conflict : airborne critical non adherence : required legal separation |
| Independent Detector | atc equipment : conflict alert other controllera |
| Resolutory Action | controller : issued alert controller : issued new clearance flight crew : took evasive action |
| Consequence | faa : investigated |
| Miss Distance | horizontal : 7600 vertical : 400 |
| Supplementary | |
| Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance |
| Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
| Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Narrative:
The recurring problem is the way that O'hare approach; milwaukee approach; and ZAU are currently working northbound departures off ord and sbound departures off mke. Both approach controls own up to 13000 ft. Each approach control climbs their aircraft to 13000 ft and ships it to ZAU. The current LOA states that ZAU is responsible for pointouts to mke on ord northbound departures and to ord on mke sbound departures; regardless of whether we are talking to them or not. The situation that this letter involves was a near-miss on an aircraft off ord that climbed slowly enough to get into mke airspace. Obviously; being the third party; ZAU has no way of knowing about other traffic that either facility may have; and since both own 13000 ft it only makes sense that they should point out their own traffic to each other; or find some other way to solve the problem between themselves. The current situation is inherently dangerous.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZAU CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 13000 FT WHEN A SLOW CLBING ACFT WAS NOT POINTED OUT TO AN ADJACENT FACILITY AS REQUIRED BY LOA.
Narrative: THE RECURRING PROB IS THE WAY THAT O'HARE APCH; MILWAUKEE APCH; AND ZAU ARE CURRENTLY WORKING NBOUND DEPS OFF ORD AND SBOUND DEPS OFF MKE. BOTH APCH CTLS OWN UP TO 13000 FT. EACH APCH CTL CLBS THEIR ACFT TO 13000 FT AND SHIPS IT TO ZAU. THE CURRENT LOA STATES THAT ZAU IS RESPONSIBLE FOR POINTOUTS TO MKE ON ORD NBOUND DEPS AND TO ORD ON MKE SBOUND DEPS; REGARDLESS OF WHETHER WE ARE TALKING TO THEM OR NOT. THE SITUATION THAT THIS LETTER INVOLVES WAS A NEAR-MISS ON AN ACFT OFF ORD THAT CLBED SLOWLY ENOUGH TO GET INTO MKE AIRSPACE. OBVIOUSLY; BEING THE THIRD PARTY; ZAU HAS NO WAY OF KNOWING ABOUT OTHER TFC THAT EITHER FACILITY MAY HAVE; AND SINCE BOTH OWN 13000 FT IT ONLY MAKES SENSE THAT THEY SHOULD POINT OUT THEIR OWN TFC TO EACH OTHER; OR FIND SOME OTHER WAY TO SOLVE THE PROB BTWN THEMSELVES. THE CURRENT SITUATION IS INHERENTLY DANGEROUS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.