Narrative:

On final approach to detroit metropolitan inside the OM for runway 21L. We received a terrain alert from the GPWS. After realizing the cause the PF (the first officer) announced 'continue.' I became aware that the final flap confign was not selected. And the thrust reversers unarmed. Recognizing our position; I elected to continue without a confign change. The landing was uneventful with a higher than normal touchdown speed. Upon landing; I armed the reversers and we used them to exit the runway. Our debrief consisted of both decisions at the time of the alert to continue considering our proximity to the landing flare. Contributing factors were checklist discipline. A checklist was not called for at the proper time; and neither crew member verified usage.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 FLT CREW HAS GPWS WARNING ON FINAL.

Narrative: ON FINAL APCH TO DETROIT METRO INSIDE THE OM FOR RWY 21L. WE RECEIVED A TERRAIN ALERT FROM THE GPWS. AFTER REALIZING THE CAUSE THE PF (THE FO) ANNOUNCED 'CONTINUE.' I BECAME AWARE THAT THE FINAL FLAP CONFIGN WAS NOT SELECTED. AND THE THRUST REVERSERS UNARMED. RECOGNIZING OUR POS; I ELECTED TO CONTINUE WITHOUT A CONFIGN CHANGE. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL WITH A HIGHER THAN NORMAL TOUCHDOWN SPD. UPON LNDG; I ARMED THE REVERSERS AND WE USED THEM TO EXIT THE RWY. OUR DEBRIEF CONSISTED OF BOTH DECISIONS AT THE TIME OF THE ALERT TO CONTINUE CONSIDERING OUR PROX TO THE LNDG FLARE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE CHKLIST DISCIPLINE. A CHKLIST WAS NOT CALLED FOR AT THE PROPER TIME; AND NEITHER CREW MEMBER VERIFIED USAGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.