Narrative:

While on a visual approach to rcr airport runway 11 a normal left hand pattern was executed with a turn to final approach on the GS as indicated by the PAPI. The power and pitch trim was adjusted and set for the reference speed calculated for the aircraft's landing weight. While passing 500 ft AGL the aircraft was stabilized on speed and GS. To the best of my knowledge we maintained adequate speed and began to settle slightly below the GS. Following procedure I reduced the thrust to idle at 50 ft above the ground and the aircraft seemed to settle as I released some back pressure on the control wheel. The aircraft developed a higher than usual sink rate; as indicated by the visual closure rate with the ground. At this point I began to pull back on the control wheel with little response I increased back pressure and applied power to both engines and the aircraft settled until the stick shaker started to activate. The descent was arrested just as the main wheels lightly contacted the surface just prior to the end of the runway without depressing the surface of the soil. The aircraft crossed the runway threshold airborne and on the centerline of the runway where the aircraft was landed and stopped. Postflt inspection revealed tall grass from the approach end of the runway was around the main aircraft brakes. A thorough postflt inspection of the aircraft and clearway prior to the runway was conducted to ensure no damage was caused to the aircraft or airport property. Perception of the narrower than usual runway may have been a contributing factor. Even though the visual effects of landing on a runway narrower than usually used were discussed prior to this landing event; I feel that the visual sensation of being higher than you are while looking at a runway that is narrower than those most commonly used in our operation allowed me to make an error in judgement of the aircraft's ht above the ground. Compounding this problem was attempting to conduct the visual approach on reference speed without adding additional speed for safe aircraft controllability in wind changes even though surface winds were light. Strict adherence to vertical guidance system such as the PAPI at rcr and the precise control of aircraft speed will help me avoid making this mistake again. Supplemental information from acn 700367: as captain and PNF I should have spent less time watching the obstacles out the right window and more time making speed and altitude correcting callouts in the last 500 ft. I did not make any pitch or power corrections for my first officer because I believed the corrections he made would have given us the desired results.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BEECHJET 400 FLT CREW LANDS SHORT OF THE RWY AT RCR.

Narrative: WHILE ON A VISUAL APCH TO RCR ARPT RWY 11 A NORMAL L HAND PATTERN WAS EXECUTED WITH A TURN TO FINAL APCH ON THE GS AS INDICATED BY THE PAPI. THE PWR AND PITCH TRIM WAS ADJUSTED AND SET FOR THE REF SPD CALCULATED FOR THE ACFT'S LNDG WT. WHILE PASSING 500 FT AGL THE ACFT WAS STABILIZED ON SPD AND GS. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE WE MAINTAINED ADEQUATE SPD AND BEGAN TO SETTLE SLIGHTLY BELOW THE GS. FOLLOWING PROC I REDUCED THE THRUST TO IDLE AT 50 FT ABOVE THE GND AND THE ACFT SEEMED TO SETTLE AS I RELEASED SOME BACK PRESSURE ON THE CTL WHEEL. THE ACFT DEVELOPED A HIGHER THAN USUAL SINK RATE; AS INDICATED BY THE VISUAL CLOSURE RATE WITH THE GND. AT THIS POINT I BEGAN TO PULL BACK ON THE CTL WHEEL WITH LITTLE RESPONSE I INCREASED BACK PRESSURE AND APPLIED PWR TO BOTH ENGS AND THE ACFT SETTLED UNTIL THE STICK SHAKER STARTED TO ACTIVATE. THE DSCNT WAS ARRESTED JUST AS THE MAIN WHEELS LIGHTLY CONTACTED THE SURFACE JUST PRIOR TO THE END OF THE RWY WITHOUT DEPRESSING THE SURFACE OF THE SOIL. THE ACFT CROSSED THE RWY THRESHOLD AIRBORNE AND ON THE CTRLINE OF THE RWY WHERE THE ACFT WAS LANDED AND STOPPED. POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALED TALL GRASS FROM THE APCH END OF THE RWY WAS AROUND THE MAIN ACFT BRAKES. A THOROUGH POSTFLT INSPECTION OF THE ACFT AND CLEARWAY PRIOR TO THE RWY WAS CONDUCTED TO ENSURE NO DAMAGE WAS CAUSED TO THE ACFT OR ARPT PROPERTY. PERCEPTION OF THE NARROWER THAN USUAL RWY MAY HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. EVEN THOUGH THE VISUAL EFFECTS OF LNDG ON A RWY NARROWER THAN USUALLY USED WERE DISCUSSED PRIOR TO THIS LNDG EVENT; I FEEL THAT THE VISUAL SENSATION OF BEING HIGHER THAN YOU ARE WHILE LOOKING AT A RWY THAT IS NARROWER THAN THOSE MOST COMMONLY USED IN OUR OP ALLOWED ME TO MAKE AN ERROR IN JUDGEMENT OF THE ACFT'S HT ABOVE THE GND. COMPOUNDING THIS PROB WAS ATTEMPTING TO CONDUCT THE VISUAL APCH ON REF SPD WITHOUT ADDING ADDITIONAL SPD FOR SAFE ACFT CONTROLLABILITY IN WIND CHANGES EVEN THOUGH SURFACE WINDS WERE LIGHT. STRICT ADHERENCE TO VERT GUIDANCE SYS SUCH AS THE PAPI AT RCR AND THE PRECISE CTL OF ACFT SPD WILL HELP ME AVOID MAKING THIS MISTAKE AGAIN. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 700367: AS CAPT AND PNF I SHOULD HAVE SPENT LESS TIME WATCHING THE OBSTACLES OUT THE R WINDOW AND MORE TIME MAKING SPD AND ALT CORRECTING CALLOUTS IN THE LAST 500 FT. I DID NOT MAKE ANY PITCH OR PWR CORRECTIONS FOR MY FO BECAUSE I BELIEVED THE CORRECTIONS HE MADE WOULD HAVE GIVEN US THE DESIRED RESULTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.