Narrative:

On the day of the incident ewr was on the ILS runway 4R approach and visual approachs from the west to land runway 29. Air carrier X called inbound from the west. I instructed him to fly over the runway 4 numbers for a left downwind runway 29. After overflying the airport and descending to land runway 29; air carrier X was sent around because of intersecting runway separation. Inbound about 5-6 mi from the west on an opposite direction approach to the go around was air carrier Y at an altitude of 2000 ft. Also 4 mi to the west was teb traffic on the ILS runway 6 approach. No handoff was taken and there was no xfer of communication on air carrier Y. With teb traffic on the ILS runway 6 and air carrier Y opposite direction approaching the airport and no communication xferred puts the local controller in a situation of guessing how to separate the aircraft. After the go around; I turned air carrier X to the southwest and stopped him at 1500 ft to avoid air carrier Y heading at the airport and to keep him inside the teb traffic; however; the 2 aircraft came within 3 mi and 500 ft of each other. Ewr LOA with N90 states that xfer of communication on visual approachs will be at the teb which is about 8 mi northwest of the airport. There are no other procedures for this approach. Being a controller and not knowing what all aircraft in your control and coming from the approach controller are doing is a safety concern. Another safety concern is running opposite direction approachs to a landing runway. In the event of a go around or missed approach the aircraft are heading right at each other. We need to have procedures written out so all controllers involved know what is going on and what to expect of aircraft approaching and landing at the airport allowing all controllers to make decisions based on known facts instead of hoping for the best.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EWR TWR CTLR HAS OPERROR WHEN ACFT ON GAR FROM RWY 29 IS IN CONFLICT WITH ACFT INBOUND TO EWR ON AN OPPOSITE DIRECTION APCH.

Narrative: ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT EWR WAS ON THE ILS RWY 4R APCH AND VISUAL APCHS FROM THE W TO LAND RWY 29. ACR X CALLED INBOUND FROM THE W. I INSTRUCTED HIM TO FLY OVER THE RWY 4 NUMBERS FOR A L DOWNWIND RWY 29. AFTER OVERFLYING THE ARPT AND DSNDING TO LAND RWY 29; ACR X WAS SENT AROUND BECAUSE OF INTERSECTING RWY SEPARATION. INBOUND ABOUT 5-6 MI FROM THE W ON AN OPPOSITE DIRECTION APCH TO THE GAR WAS ACR Y AT AN ALT OF 2000 FT. ALSO 4 MI TO THE W WAS TEB TFC ON THE ILS RWY 6 APCH. NO HDOF WAS TAKEN AND THERE WAS NO XFER OF COM ON ACR Y. WITH TEB TFC ON THE ILS RWY 6 AND ACR Y OPPOSITE DIRECTION APCHING THE ARPT AND NO COM XFERRED PUTS THE LCL CTLR IN A SITUATION OF GUESSING HOW TO SEPARATE THE ACFT. AFTER THE GAR; I TURNED ACR X TO THE SW AND STOPPED HIM AT 1500 FT TO AVOID ACR Y HDG AT THE ARPT AND TO KEEP HIM INSIDE THE TEB TFC; HOWEVER; THE 2 ACFT CAME WITHIN 3 MI AND 500 FT OF EACH OTHER. EWR LOA WITH N90 STATES THAT XFER OF COM ON VISUAL APCHS WILL BE AT THE TEB WHICH IS ABOUT 8 MI NW OF THE ARPT. THERE ARE NO OTHER PROCS FOR THIS APCH. BEING A CTLR AND NOT KNOWING WHAT ALL ACFT IN YOUR CTL AND COMING FROM THE APCH CTLR ARE DOING IS A SAFETY CONCERN. ANOTHER SAFETY CONCERN IS RUNNING OPPOSITE DIRECTION APCHS TO A LNDG RWY. IN THE EVENT OF A GAR OR MISSED APCH THE ACFT ARE HEADING RIGHT AT EACH OTHER. WE NEED TO HAVE PROCS WRITTEN OUT SO ALL CTLRS INVOLVED KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON AND WHAT TO EXPECT OF ACFT APCHING AND LNDG AT THE ARPT ALLOWING ALL CTLRS TO MAKE DECISIONS BASED ON KNOWN FACTS INSTEAD OF HOPING FOR THE BEST.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.