Narrative:

We were entering the dc ADIZ to return to jyo. Having picked up our code; we were 21 NM west of aml; but had not heard that our 'code was observed.' so we decided to let the controller know that we had the airport in sight already (which was a bit unusual in dc; but the visibility was fairly good). The controller advised us code observed and that we had traffic to our right returning to jyo as well; but in another controller's sector. At this point; change to advisory was approved; which is again; highly unusual; but great actually. It would make the events that unfolded much clearer. We switched to advisory and followed a 20 mile extended 45 for the airport; looking for the cessna 172 to our right. We would never actually see the airplane until it turned base for runway 17. The cessna called 10 NM west of the field on CTAF and we reported in behind at 11. The winds were out of the south at 3; and both airplanes were established (as reported) on a recommended 45 entry to midfield downwind for runway 35. The cessna requested intentions for landing and we advised that we would follow the lead of the cessna. The cessna indicated a preference to use runway 35 and we acknowledged that was fine. At about 8 miles out; another aircraft; a diamond; announced they were 6 miles nne of the field and requested an airport advisory. Despite the previous communications on the CTAF; the FBO counter person advised the diamond that they were recommending runway 17 an no information on other aircraft operations was provided. It turns out that the FBO has been advised by the town and possibly tsa to recommend runway 17 for calm wind operations. This is not published in the AFD. With high frequency of training operations to the west; runway 17 is problematic. The diamond announced intentions to join the upwind for runway 17. We then announced a 4 mile 45 to join the upwind; and the cessna advised that it would be joining the upwind for a circuit to downwind to runway 17. The previous plans were out the window. What happened next is very confusing. The diamond reported joining the upwind; and then so did the cessna. I don't believe that either aircraft knew the position of the other and the dusky conditions made spotting aircraft very difficult. The diamond pilot then announced that he was quite disturbed that another aircraft was joining the upwind at the same time he was and announced that he was; 'getting out of there.' the cessna reported a few seconds later turning crosswind for runway 17. At this point we were 1.5 NM from the field and I announced our position and intentions to join the upwind for runway 17. At this point; I saw the diamond heading right for us crossing the threshold heading southwest. I banked the airplane to the right for two reasons; first to turn away and second to increase our visible profile. The diamond widened out and turned to the right also to follow us on downwind. The rest of the pattern operations were normal. Contributing factors to confused pattern operations and near midair collision: 1) late call by the diamond. This is typical in the ADIZ as controllers don't typically release airplanes to CTAF before pilots report field in sight -- and even then ATC will hold communications until the aircraft is closer to the field. 2) non-recommended pattern entry by the diamond -- a straight in landing would have been a better choice than crossing the base leg of the pattern to join the upwind. 3) failure by the diamond pilot to give way initially to aircraft to the right of its position established for landing -- he seemed to rely more on who broadcasted first from his perspective than visual cues. 4) failure of the pilots on the 45 to assert previous intentions to land on runway 35. 5) low shelf on the class B airspace prevents overflying the airport from the west. 6) the dusky grey murk didn't inhibit ground visibility; but made sighting aircraft very difficult. 7) incomplete airport advisory did not account for aircraft already maneuvering to land. 8) unpublished recommendation on airport pattern operations. In summary; this report is being filed because there is a significant safety of flight issue here. It is my conclusion that -- while hoping for the best -- there will be a midair collision at this airport in the near future unless corrective actions are implemented to eliminate as many of the contributing factors listed as above as possible. Frankly; the controversy regarding the pattern operations at this airport have been raging for longer than the past 5 years that I know of; and nothing except for hand-wringing and expressions of hope against hope have been done to improve the safety of pattern operations. The implementation of the dc ADIZ has become an additional factor.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PA28 PLT AT CTAF JYO DESCRIBES A TFC CONFLICT THAT HE EXPERIENCED AND SUGGESTS POSSIBLE MITIGATING PROCS.

Narrative: WE WERE ENTERING THE DC ADIZ TO RETURN TO JYO. HAVING PICKED UP OUR CODE; WE WERE 21 NM W OF AML; BUT HAD NOT HEARD THAT OUR 'CODE WAS OBSERVED.' SO WE DECIDED TO LET THE CTLR KNOW THAT WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT ALREADY (WHICH WAS A BIT UNUSUAL IN DC; BUT THE VISIBILITY WAS FAIRLY GOOD). THE CTLR ADVISED US CODE OBSERVED AND THAT WE HAD TFC TO OUR R RETURNING TO JYO AS WELL; BUT IN ANOTHER CTLR'S SECTOR. AT THIS POINT; CHANGE TO ADVISORY WAS APPROVED; WHICH IS AGAIN; HIGHLY UNUSUAL; BUT GREAT ACTUALLY. IT WOULD MAKE THE EVENTS THAT UNFOLDED MUCH CLEARER. WE SWITCHED TO ADVISORY AND FOLLOWED A 20 MILE EXTENDED 45 FOR THE ARPT; LOOKING FOR THE CESSNA 172 TO OUR R. WE WOULD NEVER ACTUALLY SEE THE AIRPLANE UNTIL IT TURNED BASE FOR RWY 17. THE CESSNA CALLED 10 NM W OF THE FIELD ON CTAF AND WE RPTED IN BEHIND AT 11. THE WINDS WERE OUT OF THE S AT 3; AND BOTH AIRPLANES WERE ESTABLISHED (AS RPTED) ON A RECOMMENDED 45 ENTRY TO MIDFIELD DOWNWIND FOR RWY 35. THE CESSNA REQUESTED INTENTIONS FOR LNDG AND WE ADVISED THAT WE WOULD FOLLOW THE LEAD OF THE CESSNA. THE CESSNA INDICATED A PREFERENCE TO USE RWY 35 AND WE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WAS FINE. AT ABOUT 8 MILES OUT; ANOTHER ACFT; A DIAMOND; ANNOUNCED THEY WERE 6 MILES NNE OF THE FIELD AND REQUESTED AN ARPT ADVISORY. DESPITE THE PREVIOUS COMMUNICATIONS ON THE CTAF; THE FBO COUNTER PERSON ADVISED THE DIAMOND THAT THEY WERE RECOMMENDING RWY 17 AN NO INFO ON OTHER ACFT OPERATIONS WAS PROVIDED. IT TURNS OUT THAT THE FBO HAS BEEN ADVISED BY THE TOWN AND POSSIBLY TSA TO RECOMMEND RWY 17 FOR CALM WIND OPERATIONS. THIS IS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE AFD. WITH HIGH FREQUENCY OF TRAINING OPERATIONS TO THE W; RWY 17 IS PROBLEMATIC. THE DIAMOND ANNOUNCED INTENTIONS TO JOIN THE UPWIND FOR RWY 17. WE THEN ANNOUNCED A 4 MILE 45 TO JOIN THE UPWIND; AND THE CESSNA ADVISED THAT IT WOULD BE JOINING THE UPWIND FOR A CIRCUIT TO DOWNWIND TO RWY 17. THE PREVIOUS PLANS WERE OUT THE WINDOW. WHAT HAPPENED NEXT IS VERY CONFUSING. THE DIAMOND RPTED JOINING THE UPWIND; AND THEN SO DID THE CESSNA. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT EITHER ACFT KNEW THE POSITION OF THE OTHER AND THE DUSKY CONDITIONS MADE SPOTTING ACFT VERY DIFFICULT. THE DIAMOND PLT THEN ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS QUITE DISTURBED THAT ANOTHER ACFT WAS JOINING THE UPWIND AT THE SAME TIME HE WAS AND ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS; 'GETTING OUT OF THERE.' THE CESSNA RPTED A FEW SECONDS LATER TURNING XWIND FOR RWY 17. AT THIS POINT WE WERE 1.5 NM FROM THE FIELD AND I ANNOUNCED OUR POSITION AND INTENTIONS TO JOIN THE UPWIND FOR RWY 17. AT THIS POINT; I SAW THE DIAMOND HEADING RIGHT FOR US XING THE THRESHOLD HEADING SW. I BANKED THE AIRPLANE TO THE R FOR TWO REASONS; FIRST TO TURN AWAY AND SECOND TO INCREASE OUR VISIBLE PROFILE. THE DIAMOND WIDENED OUT AND TURNED TO THE R ALSO TO FOLLOW US ON DOWNWIND. THE REST OF THE PATTERN OPERATIONS WERE NORMAL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO CONFUSED PATTERN OPERATIONS AND NMAC: 1) LATE CALL BY THE DIAMOND. THIS IS TYPICAL IN THE ADIZ AS CTLRS DON'T TYPICALLY RELEASE AIRPLANES TO CTAF BEFORE PLTS RPT FIELD IN SIGHT -- AND EVEN THEN ATC WILL HOLD COMS UNTIL THE ACFT IS CLOSER TO THE FIELD. 2) NON-RECOMMENDED PATTERN ENTRY BY THE DIAMOND -- A STRAIGHT IN LNDG WOULD HAVE BEEN A BETTER CHOICE THAN CROSSING THE BASE LEG OF THE PATTERN TO JOIN THE UPWIND. 3) FAILURE BY THE DIAMOND PLT TO GIVE WAY INITIALLY TO ACFT TO THE RIGHT OF ITS POSITION ESTABLISHED FOR LNDG -- HE SEEMED TO RELY MORE ON WHO BROADCASTED FIRST FROM HIS PERSPECTIVE THAN VISUAL CUES. 4) FAILURE OF THE PLTS ON THE 45 TO ASSERT PREVIOUS INTENTIONS TO LAND ON RWY 35. 5) LOW SHELF ON THE CLASS B AIRSPACE PREVENTS OVERFLYING THE ARPT FROM THE W. 6) THE DUSKY GREY MURK DIDN'T INHIBIT GND VISIBILITY; BUT MADE SIGHTING ACFT VERY DIFFICULT. 7) INCOMPLETE ARPT ADVISORY DID NOT ACCOUNT FOR ACFT ALREADY MANEUVERING TO LAND. 8) UNPUBLISHED RECOMMENDATION ON ARPT PATTERN OPERATIONS. IN SUMMARY; THIS RPT IS BEING FILED BECAUSE THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT SAFETY OF FLT ISSUE HERE. IT IS MY CONCLUSION THAT -- WHILE HOPING FOR THE BEST -- THERE WILL BE A MIDAIR COLLISION AT THIS ARPT IN THE NEAR FUTURE UNLESS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE IMPLEMENTED TO ELIMINATE AS MANY OF THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS LISTED AS ABOVE AS POSSIBLE. FRANKLY; THE CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE PATTERN OPERATIONS AT THIS ARPT HAVE BEEN RAGING FOR LONGER THAN THE PAST 5 YEARS THAT I KNOW OF; AND NOTHING EXCEPT FOR HAND-WRINGING AND EXPRESSIONS OF HOPE AGAINST HOPE HAVE BEEN DONE TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY OF PATTERN OPERATIONS. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DC ADIZ HAS BECOME AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.