Narrative:

Ewr airport was accepting ILS approachs to intersecting runways 4R and 11; and lahso procedures were being conducted. The 2 aircraft in question were simultaneously vectored to the intersecting runways. The B757 was on the ILS runway 11; and the H/B767 was on the ILS runway 4R. Since the H/B767 on runway 4R was a foreign carrier; there was no ability to use lahso in this instance; and; therefore; the 2 aircraft should have been sequenced to the airport by approach. There was no sequencing done by the approach control facility; new york TRACON (N90). By the time the runway 11 aircraft contacted the tower; both aircraft were within the FAF's; flying at the same ground speed and no sequence could be made by the local controller. The local controller was forced to make the B757 execute a go around. A subsequent phone call to the N90 supervisor revealed the facility's complete ignorance of the inability of foreign aircraft to use lahso procedures. This problem is one of the many results of the lack of any legitimate rules or procedures for conducting simultaneous ILS approachs to intersecting runways at ewr. In order to correct this problem; the FAA needs to identify what rules and procedures ATC controllers are supposed to use to separate aircraft in these circumstances. Thereafter; controllers and their supervisors at both of these facilities need to be trained on said rules and procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: N90 SEQUENCES A B757 ON THE ILS RWY 11 AND A B767 ON THE ILS RWY 4R. LAHSO OPS WERE IN EFFECT. AS THE B767 WAS A FOREIGN CARRIER; IT WAS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR LAHSO. THE B757 AND THE B767 WERE NOT SEQUENCED IN REGARD TO EACH OTHER; SO EWR ATCT ISSUED A GAR TO THE B757.

Narrative: EWR ARPT WAS ACCEPTING ILS APCHS TO INTERSECTING RWYS 4R AND 11; AND LAHSO PROCS WERE BEING CONDUCTED. THE 2 ACFT IN QUESTION WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY VECTORED TO THE INTERSECTING RWYS. THE B757 WAS ON THE ILS RWY 11; AND THE H/B767 WAS ON THE ILS RWY 4R. SINCE THE H/B767 ON RWY 4R WAS A FOREIGN CARRIER; THERE WAS NO ABILITY TO USE LAHSO IN THIS INSTANCE; AND; THEREFORE; THE 2 ACFT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SEQUENCED TO THE ARPT BY APCH. THERE WAS NO SEQUENCING DONE BY THE APCH CTL FACILITY; NEW YORK TRACON (N90). BY THE TIME THE RWY 11 ACFT CONTACTED THE TWR; BOTH ACFT WERE WITHIN THE FAF'S; FLYING AT THE SAME GND SPD AND NO SEQUENCE COULD BE MADE BY THE LCL CTLR. THE LCL CTLR WAS FORCED TO MAKE THE B757 EXECUTE A GAR. A SUBSEQUENT PHONE CALL TO THE N90 SUPVR REVEALED THE FACILITY'S COMPLETE IGNORANCE OF THE INABILITY OF FOREIGN ACFT TO USE LAHSO PROCS. THIS PROB IS ONE OF THE MANY RESULTS OF THE LACK OF ANY LEGITIMATE RULES OR PROCS FOR CONDUCTING SIMULTANEOUS ILS APCHS TO INTERSECTING RWYS AT EWR. IN ORDER TO CORRECT THIS PROB; THE FAA NEEDS TO IDENT WHAT RULES AND PROCS ATC CTLRS ARE SUPPOSED TO USE TO SEPARATE ACFT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. THEREAFTER; CTLRS AND THEIR SUPVRS AT BOTH OF THESE FACILITIES NEED TO BE TRAINED ON SAID RULES AND PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.