Narrative:

On apr/fri/06; both the primary and back-up atop/ocean 21 channels experienced complete simultaneous critical failures. This left ATC controllers without any aircraft position tracking functionality for at least 10 mins. This tracking functionality updates and ensures the position of aircraft operating within the system. During this outage; any aircraft that may have actually experienced a problem resulting in an 'overdue aircraft' report would not have been reported. The failure caused many aircraft operating in the system to indicate to controllers that they were now overdue. This dual failure also resulted in a loss of the conflict probe functionality; which is used to detect and ensure required separation standards that maintain the safety of the system. Beyond the basic safety aspect; requests from users for altitude and route changes could not be processed due to the controller's inability to ensure the position of many aircraft. The above is a recurring situation as on apr/sat/06; both the primary and back-up atop/ocean 21 channels experienced complete simultaneous critical failures for 1 min; and on apr/sun/06; both the primary and back-up atop/ocean 21 channels experienced complete simultaneous critical failures for 18 mins.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZOA CTLR STATES OCEAN ATOPS SYS IS UNRELIABLE.

Narrative: ON APR/FRI/06; BOTH THE PRIMARY AND BACK-UP ATOP/OCEAN 21 CHANNELS EXPERIENCED COMPLETE SIMULTANEOUS CRITICAL FAILURES. THIS LEFT ATC CTLRS WITHOUT ANY ACFT POS TRACKING FUNCTIONALITY FOR AT LEAST 10 MINS. THIS TRACKING FUNCTIONALITY UPDATES AND ENSURES THE POS OF ACFT OPERATING WITHIN THE SYS. DURING THIS OUTAGE; ANY ACFT THAT MAY HAVE ACTUALLY EXPERIENCED A PROB RESULTING IN AN 'OVERDUE ACFT' RPT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN RPTED. THE FAILURE CAUSED MANY ACFT OPERATING IN THE SYS TO INDICATE TO CTLRS THAT THEY WERE NOW OVERDUE. THIS DUAL FAILURE ALSO RESULTED IN A LOSS OF THE CONFLICT PROBE FUNCTIONALITY; WHICH IS USED TO DETECT AND ENSURE REQUIRED SEPARATION STANDARDS THAT MAINTAIN THE SAFETY OF THE SYS. BEYOND THE BASIC SAFETY ASPECT; REQUESTS FROM USERS FOR ALT AND RTE CHANGES COULD NOT BE PROCESSED DUE TO THE CTLR'S INABILITY TO ENSURE THE POS OF MANY ACFT. THE ABOVE IS A RECURRING SITUATION AS ON APR/SAT/06; BOTH THE PRIMARY AND BACK-UP ATOP/OCEAN 21 CHANNELS EXPERIENCED COMPLETE SIMULTANEOUS CRITICAL FAILURES FOR 1 MIN; AND ON APR/SUN/06; BOTH THE PRIMARY AND BACK-UP ATOP/OCEAN 21 CHANNELS EXPERIENCED COMPLETE SIMULTANEOUS CRITICAL FAILURES FOR 18 MINS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.