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An A300 was discovered in-flight to have both engine fire switches improperly wires with pt 020 stainless steel wire. Required soft copper break away wire.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 694394 |
| Time | |
| Date | 200604 |
| Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
| State Reference | US |
| Altitude | msl single value : 35000 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | VMC |
| Light | Daylight |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | artcc : zzz.artcc |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | A300 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Navigation In Use | other |
| Flight Phase | cruise : level |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : first officer |
| ASRS Report | 694394 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
| ASRS Report | 694395 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : improper maintenance non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies |
| Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
| Resolutory Action | flight crew : overcame equipment problem |
| Consequence | other |
| Factors | |
| Maintenance | performance deficiency : inspection performance deficiency : installation performance deficiency : unqualified personnel performance deficiency : training performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements |
| Supplementary | |
| Problem Areas | Maintenance Human Performance Environmental Factor Chart Or Publication Aircraft |
| Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
| Situations | |
| Publication | General Proc Manual |
Narrative:
During cruise flight I realized both engine fire switches had been improperly wired with .020 stainless steel safety wire instead of break wire. To confirm this; we attempted to 'break' it (this does not activate the system but only allows the switch 'T' handle to be pulled) and could not. The captain cut the wire and removed it for safety reasons and entered the discrepancy in the logbook. After block-in; the mechanic confirmed the wire was in fact safety wire.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN A300 WAS DISCOVERED INFLT TO HAVE BOTH ENG FIRE SWITCHES IMPROPERLY WIRES WITH PT 020 STAINLESS STEEL WIRE. REQUIRED SOFT COPPER BREAK AWAY WIRE.
Narrative: DURING CRUISE FLT I REALIZED BOTH ENG FIRE SWITCHES HAD BEEN IMPROPERLY WIRED WITH .020 STAINLESS STEEL SAFETY WIRE INSTEAD OF BREAK WIRE. TO CONFIRM THIS; WE ATTEMPTED TO 'BREAK' IT (THIS DOES NOT ACTIVATE THE SYS BUT ONLY ALLOWS THE SWITCH 'T' HANDLE TO BE PULLED) AND COULD NOT. THE CAPT CUT THE WIRE AND REMOVED IT FOR SAFETY REASONS AND ENTERED THE DISCREPANCY IN THE LOGBOOK. AFTER BLOCK-IN; THE MECH CONFIRMED THE WIRE WAS IN FACT SAFETY WIRE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.