Narrative:

Descending through 10000 ft on approach to ZZZ night IMC. In contact with ZZZ1 approach; who had given us the descent and vectors to join the localizer for the ILS to ZZZ. At approximately 9000 ft; new hire first officer starts the APU; per standard procedure in the CRJ200. APU fire message illuminates and fire bell sounds. Complied with aircraft emergency procedures checklist and company flight manual; and fire extinguished. Reported fire indication to ZZZ1 approach and requested crash fire rescue equipment trucks on arrival in ZZZ. Task saturated with IMC night approach; emergency procedure compliance and in compensating for inexperience of new; low time first officer -- read as 'having to do the first officer's job; too; since he was freaking out with the APU fire.' made sure cabin crew (brand new; less than 10 hours; flight attendant) was briefed and prepared for evacuate/evacuation; and landed aircraft without further incident. Local rescue personnel reported no evidence of fire from aircraft; so we taxied to the gate; briefed the passenger about what had happened and deplaned normally at the gate. I may not have formally declared an emergency with ATC. In the flurry of activity of trying to get a potentially burning airplane to the airport safely at night; in IMC with an inexperienced crew; I may not have uttered the phrase 'I am declaring an emergency.' however; I requested the trucks in ZZZ and ZZZ1 approach did ask for fuel and souls on board. I assumed that an emergency had been declared on my behalf; though ZZZ1 approach did not confirm this; nor did the controller ever ask if we were declaring an emergency. To eliminate confusion in future incidents; I would suggest that ATC eliminate any ambiguity with the phrase 'an emergency has been declared on your behalf;' or ask directly 'are you declaring an emergency.' contributing to this incident were airline's current practices of scheduling without regard to pilot sleep cycle. I was on duty from XA00-XA30 immediately preceding this incident; released from XA31-XI50; and assigned this trip; which is a continuous duty overnight that starts at XI50 and ends at XY00. Legal? Yes. Smart? No. Additional contributions to this incident are the foolish duty time regulations set by the FAA and airlines' strict adherence to the minimum legal requirement. 16 hour duty days are common; reduced rest is scheduled; sleep cycles are ignored. 30 hours in 7 days is routinely pushed. Is it safe for a crew to leave at XK00; stay on duty all night and fly back at XS00 the next morning? What would the passenger say if they knew that their crew had slept only 2-3 hours before flying? So long as this is legal; carriers will schedule it. The FAA needs to set safe minimum rest requirements. Further contributions: inadequate maintenance. The incident aircraft had sustained an APU fire indication 2 days prior to this incident. The crew did not blow the fire bottle; and the aircraft was signed off by maintenance with 'no evidence of fire; could not duplicate.' after this incident; in which the fire bottle was discharged; the APU was inspected by contract maintenance; no evidence of fire was noted and the aircraft was dispatched the next morning with the APU disabled. High frequency operations; lack of qualified mechanics; no spares; and an 'MEL it and fly' mentality contributed heavily to this incident. Finally; airlines practice of considering a 350 hour total time 19 and 20 yr old pilot to be sufficiently qualified to crew a regional jet in high density operations and all WX conditions contributed to this and other less and more serious incidents. A 20 yr old pilot has frequently never seen the inside of a cloud when he or she hits the line on the east coast. They have never had to seriously use a radio with ATC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL65 FLT CREW DURING ILS APCH HAS AN APU FIRE WARNING; DECLARES EMER AND LANDS.

Narrative: DSNDING THROUGH 10000 FT ON APCH TO ZZZ NIGHT IMC. IN CONTACT WITH ZZZ1 APCH; WHO HAD GIVEN US THE DSCNT AND VECTORS TO JOIN THE LOC FOR THE ILS TO ZZZ. AT APPROX 9000 FT; NEW HIRE FO STARTS THE APU; PER STANDARD PROC IN THE CRJ200. APU FIRE MESSAGE ILLUMINATES AND FIRE BELL SOUNDS. COMPLIED WITH ACFT EMER PROCS CHKLIST AND COMPANY FLT MANUAL; AND FIRE EXTINGUISHED. RPTED FIRE INDICATION TO ZZZ1 APCH AND REQUESTED CFR TRUCKS ON ARR IN ZZZ. TASK SATURATED WITH IMC NIGHT APCH; EMER PROC COMPLIANCE AND IN COMPENSATING FOR INEXPERIENCE OF NEW; LOW TIME FO -- READ AS 'HAVING TO DO THE FO'S JOB; TOO; SINCE HE WAS FREAKING OUT WITH THE APU FIRE.' MADE SURE CABIN CREW (BRAND NEW; LESS THAN 10 HRS; FLT ATTENDANT) WAS BRIEFED AND PREPARED FOR EVAC; AND LANDED ACFT WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. LCL RESCUE PERSONNEL RPTED NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE FROM ACFT; SO WE TAXIED TO THE GATE; BRIEFED THE PAX ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND DEPLANED NORMALLY AT THE GATE. I MAY NOT HAVE FORMALLY DECLARED AN EMER WITH ATC. IN THE FLURRY OF ACTIVITY OF TRYING TO GET A POTENTIALLY BURNING AIRPLANE TO THE ARPT SAFELY AT NIGHT; IN IMC WITH AN INEXPERIENCED CREW; I MAY NOT HAVE UTTERED THE PHRASE 'I AM DECLARING AN EMER.' HOWEVER; I REQUESTED THE TRUCKS IN ZZZ AND ZZZ1 APCH DID ASK FOR FUEL AND SOULS ON BOARD. I ASSUMED THAT AN EMER HAD BEEN DECLARED ON MY BEHALF; THOUGH ZZZ1 APCH DID NOT CONFIRM THIS; NOR DID THE CTLR EVER ASK IF WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER. TO ELIMINATE CONFUSION IN FUTURE INCIDENTS; I WOULD SUGGEST THAT ATC ELIMINATE ANY AMBIGUITY WITH THE PHRASE 'AN EMER HAS BEEN DECLARED ON YOUR BEHALF;' OR ASK DIRECTLY 'ARE YOU DECLARING AN EMER.' CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT WERE AIRLINE'S CURRENT PRACTICES OF SCHEDULING WITHOUT REGARD TO PLT SLEEP CYCLE. I WAS ON DUTY FROM XA00-XA30 IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THIS INCIDENT; RELEASED FROM XA31-XI50; AND ASSIGNED THIS TRIP; WHICH IS A CONTINUOUS DUTY OVERNIGHT THAT STARTS AT XI50 AND ENDS AT XY00. LEGAL? YES. SMART? NO. ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS INCIDENT ARE THE FOOLISH DUTY TIME REGS SET BY THE FAA AND AIRLINES' STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE MINIMUM LEGAL REQUIREMENT. 16 HR DUTY DAYS ARE COMMON; REDUCED REST IS SCHEDULED; SLEEP CYCLES ARE IGNORED. 30 HRS IN 7 DAYS IS ROUTINELY PUSHED. IS IT SAFE FOR A CREW TO LEAVE AT XK00; STAY ON DUTY ALL NIGHT AND FLY BACK AT XS00 THE NEXT MORNING? WHAT WOULD THE PAX SAY IF THEY KNEW THAT THEIR CREW HAD SLEPT ONLY 2-3 HRS BEFORE FLYING? SO LONG AS THIS IS LEGAL; CARRIERS WILL SCHEDULE IT. THE FAA NEEDS TO SET SAFE MINIMUM REST REQUIREMENTS. FURTHER CONTRIBUTIONS: INADEQUATE MAINT. THE INCIDENT ACFT HAD SUSTAINED AN APU FIRE INDICATION 2 DAYS PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT. THE CREW DID NOT BLOW THE FIRE BOTTLE; AND THE ACFT WAS SIGNED OFF BY MAINT WITH 'NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE; COULD NOT DUPLICATE.' AFTER THIS INCIDENT; IN WHICH THE FIRE BOTTLE WAS DISCHARGED; THE APU WAS INSPECTED BY CONTRACT MAINT; NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE WAS NOTED AND THE ACFT WAS DISPATCHED THE NEXT MORNING WITH THE APU DISABLED. HIGH FREQ OPS; LACK OF QUALIFIED MECHS; NO SPARES; AND AN 'MEL IT AND FLY' MENTALITY CONTRIBUTED HEAVILY TO THIS INCIDENT. FINALLY; AIRLINES PRACTICE OF CONSIDERING A 350 HR TOTAL TIME 19 AND 20 YR OLD PLT TO BE SUFFICIENTLY QUALIFIED TO CREW A REGIONAL JET IN HIGH DENSITY OPS AND ALL WX CONDITIONS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS AND OTHER LESS AND MORE SERIOUS INCIDENTS. A 20 YR OLD PLT HAS FREQUENTLY NEVER SEEN THE INSIDE OF A CLOUD WHEN HE OR SHE HITS THE LINE ON THE EAST COAST. THEY HAVE NEVER HAD TO SERIOUSLY USE A RADIO WITH ATC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.