Narrative:

We were in the air a total of 12 mins with this emergency. Upon raising the gear after departure; we experienced a hydraulic green system failure ECAM; looking at the hydraulic page; we discovered a total loss of green system hydraulic pressure and fluid. I was PF; and said I would continue flying and talk to ATC. I directed the first officer to execute the ECAM procedure. ZZZ1 tower had handed us off to departure control; and they said tower had reported that we had the appearance of smoke from somewhere on the aircraft during takeoff. We then got a report from the flight attendants about unusual noises heard in the cabin. The first officer answered the cabin call; and briefly told them we were pretty busy; had a hydraulic problem; and might well return to ZZZ1. I told ATC the same; and asked for some place to hold while we worked on the problem. The flaps were still in flaps 1 degree; and I had determined to leave them there and maintain existing speed; which was around 175 KIAS. However; the aircraft tried to accelerate in spite of the flap position; resulting in a flap overspd warning. We selected a slower speed to eliminate that distraction. I tried to engage the autoplt but found it would not engage. It was during this time that we got a yellow system overheat; followed by a 'green + yellow' failure ECAM; coupled with a master warning and a 'land as soon as possible' ECAM message. The first officer was tackling the ECAM procedures; but as additional pages came up on the ECAM; the aircraft continued issuing aural warnings in rapid succession; adding to the confusion and workload. I declared an emergency; and we started getting vectors back to ZZZ1 for a landing. ATC asked what altitude we would ike and I said '5000 or 6000 ft.' they cleared us to 6000 ft 'for traffic.' we were turned downwind; then given several headings in fairly quick succession. I was trying to maintain about 190 KIAS. I started programming the mcdu to return us to ZZZ1. No sooner had we reached 6000 ft than ATC issued descent clearance to 3000 ft; then 2600 ft. Without a working autoplt and under the assumption that I might have various other losses in flight envelope protections; I found that I had plenty to do keeping up with the aircraft and ATC; and I was not able to be of much help to the first officer. We had a couple of quick discussions about what the ECAM was telling us; and I remember thinking if we could get the ECAM cleaned up we might not have time to get into the company manual. I think at some point I communicated this idea to the first officer; but cannot remember for sure. The first officer had the company manual out and eventually made an effort to xchk as much of it as possible. However; with a previous indication of a 'land as soon as possible' emergency; we were headed back to ZZZ1 in any case; and my 'mind set' was to complete the highest priority ECAM procedures as time permitted; make sure the gear were down; and get the aircraft onto a runway as soon as possible. I remember worrying that the 'show-stopper' might be that the gear would not be ready by the time landing was imminent. I asked for a specific runway and was told that would be approved. ATC asked how much of a final we wanted; and I said 10 mi. We were now on downwind; descending; and I took a moment to make a brief announcement to the passenger. In retrospect; once we got the hydraulic ptu closed; the yellow system cooled off; we might have reverted to a 'green-only' failure procedure; but we were pretty much committed in our minds to the more serious procedure; and I feel strongly that we were correct in continuing on this course of action. There was no guarantee the yellow system would hold up; and the overheat condition; plus the reports from tower and our own cabin; introduced the possibility of a fire. In any case; I felt we didn't have the time to discuss alternatives; and I cannot say for certain when the yellow system cooled off; but it was fairly late in the game. We were turned to base leg; and given a vector to intercept the localizer with instructions not to fly below 2600 ft until established; then cleared for the approach. I started calling for flaps; and realized that I had no 'F' or 'south' speeds for reference. I cannot recall whether I had other indications of degraded law; but I was hand flying all the way; and not inclined towards further analysis. The first officer was still pretty busy with the ECAM and company manual; so rather than try to bother her for calculated speeds I decided to select a 'reasonable' speed that would keep us above vls and stall speed; but still get us as slow as possible for what would be an overweight landing at 154000 pounds. I ended up with a speed selection of 157 KIAS. The first officer asked if I was ready for manual gear extension; and I said to proceed. We were set up on base leg for a 10-mi final; and started extending the landing gear manually. Although we selected flaps 3 degrees for the approach and landing; our indications were showing 'slats only.' we thought we might still have flaps 1 degree because that is what we had at the time of the initial green failure. At this point I chose not ot concern myself with that; because the aircraft was under control; on final; I had a 12000 ft runway on my nose; and I was looking only for '3 down and locked' to complete our landing preparations. It was about this time we got a TA warning for traffic on our left side; probably associated with the municipal airport north of ZZZ1. Just another distraction; but we saw no aircraft between us and the runway; so pressed on. We got 3 green gear indications; and I felt comfortable with the landing at this point; regardless of whatever procedures or alternatives might have remained. I glanced at the ECAM 1 last time and noticed there were no undone steps -- all that remained were the amber annunciations of lost system; but we didn't really have the luxury of time to discuss them. I also believe I noticed at that point that the yellow system was depicted in amber on the ECAM hydraulics page; but showing pressure of about 2850. I cannot recall whether the overheat message was still there. I felt that if the yellow system was working; any components it provided should be regarded as 'icing on the cake' but not counted upon. The first officer recognized how close we were to landing and very correctly stopped executing anything else in the company manual in order to back me up with the appropriate approach callouts. We completed the landing checklist and made an overweight landing on runway. Sink rate was a little more than I wanted; but not what could be called a hard landing. Brakes worked as advertised; although we assumed we had limited applications available; and it took almost of the 12000 ft runway to stop the aircraft. We were able to use #2 reverser on rollout; which confirms the notion that the yellow system may have been at least partially available after all. After I got the airplane stopped; I thought I might be able to clear the runway; given the width of that runway and taxiway; but about /12 way into that maneuver I decided it was not worth the risk of losing the brakes against the extra thrust that would have been required for differential braking; so stopped the aircraft about 1/2 way off the runway. Fire crews were standing by; and they requested we shut down the engines so they could install chocks and set up a fan to cool our brakes; which had reached almost 700 degrees. They reported a considerable amount of fluid on the taxiway; but saw no indications of fire. We started the APU and shut down the engines. I had the first officer ask the passenger to remain seated; and I made a subsequent announcement reassuring them that we were in no further immediate danger. When maintenance personnel arrived; we threw the landing gear pins to them from the cockpit. They pinned the gear; and we were towed to the gate. I made a lengthy announcement to the passenger during the tow; which they seemed to appreciate. After we got to the gate; maintenance found a severed hydraulic line in the left wheel well. Looking back on this incident; I think the yellow system overheat was caused by the ptu trying to pressurize the green system; but since it had no green fluid to work with; it quickly overheated from the combination of elapsed time before we were able to shut it off; as well as the warm local temperatures. This overheated the entire yellow system; which in turn triggered the 'double failure' master warning. So the probable sequence of ECAM events was 'green failure;' 'ptu overheat;' 'yellow system overheat;' and then 'green + yellow' emergency. (I should stress once again that I was not able to confirm all that was going on with the ECAM messages once I had made the 'land as soon as possible' decision). Once the yellow system cooled down; it was possibly back in business and we were technically no longer in a 'double failure.' however; I could not afford to piece all of this together at the time -- I had the airplane under control with the 'double failure' assumptions we had made; and proceeded to get it onto the runway as quickly as I could. With the information and time that I had; I would do the same if I had it to do over.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLT CREW HAS LOSS OF GREEN HYD SYS DURING TKOF; DECLARES EMER AND RETURNS FOR LNDG.

Narrative: WE WERE IN THE AIR A TOTAL OF 12 MINS WITH THIS EMER. UPON RAISING THE GEAR AFTER DEP; WE EXPERIENCED A HYD GREEN SYS FAILURE ECAM; LOOKING AT THE HYD PAGE; WE DISCOVERED A TOTAL LOSS OF GREEN SYS HYD PRESSURE AND FLUID. I WAS PF; AND SAID I WOULD CONTINUE FLYING AND TALK TO ATC. I DIRECTED THE FO TO EXECUTE THE ECAM PROC. ZZZ1 TWR HAD HANDED US OFF TO DEP CTL; AND THEY SAID TWR HAD RPTED THAT WE HAD THE APPEARANCE OF SMOKE FROM SOMEWHERE ON THE ACFT DURING TKOF. WE THEN GOT A RPT FROM THE FLT ATTENDANTS ABOUT UNUSUAL NOISES HEARD IN THE CABIN. THE FO ANSWERED THE CABIN CALL; AND BRIEFLY TOLD THEM WE WERE PRETTY BUSY; HAD A HYD PROB; AND MIGHT WELL RETURN TO ZZZ1. I TOLD ATC THE SAME; AND ASKED FOR SOME PLACE TO HOLD WHILE WE WORKED ON THE PROB. THE FLAPS WERE STILL IN FLAPS 1 DEG; AND I HAD DETERMINED TO LEAVE THEM THERE AND MAINTAIN EXISTING SPD; WHICH WAS AROUND 175 KIAS. HOWEVER; THE ACFT TRIED TO ACCELERATE IN SPITE OF THE FLAP POS; RESULTING IN A FLAP OVERSPD WARNING. WE SELECTED A SLOWER SPD TO ELIMINATE THAT DISTR. I TRIED TO ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT BUT FOUND IT WOULD NOT ENGAGE. IT WAS DURING THIS TIME THAT WE GOT A YELLOW SYS OVERHEAT; FOLLOWED BY A 'GREEN + YELLOW' FAILURE ECAM; COUPLED WITH A MASTER WARNING AND A 'LAND ASAP' ECAM MESSAGE. THE FO WAS TACKLING THE ECAM PROCS; BUT AS ADDITIONAL PAGES CAME UP ON THE ECAM; THE ACFT CONTINUED ISSUING AURAL WARNINGS IN RAPID SUCCESSION; ADDING TO THE CONFUSION AND WORKLOAD. I DECLARED AN EMER; AND WE STARTED GETTING VECTORS BACK TO ZZZ1 FOR A LNDG. ATC ASKED WHAT ALT WE WOULD IKE AND I SAID '5000 OR 6000 FT.' THEY CLRED US TO 6000 FT 'FOR TFC.' WE WERE TURNED DOWNWIND; THEN GIVEN SEVERAL HDGS IN FAIRLY QUICK SUCCESSION. I WAS TRYING TO MAINTAIN ABOUT 190 KIAS. I STARTED PROGRAMMING THE MCDU TO RETURN US TO ZZZ1. NO SOONER HAD WE REACHED 6000 FT THAN ATC ISSUED DSCNT CLRNC TO 3000 FT; THEN 2600 FT. WITHOUT A WORKING AUTOPLT AND UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT I MIGHT HAVE VARIOUS OTHER LOSSES IN FLT ENVELOPE PROTECTIONS; I FOUND THAT I HAD PLENTY TO DO KEEPING UP WITH THE ACFT AND ATC; AND I WAS NOT ABLE TO BE OF MUCH HELP TO THE FO. WE HAD A COUPLE OF QUICK DISCUSSIONS ABOUT WHAT THE ECAM WAS TELLING US; AND I REMEMBER THINKING IF WE COULD GET THE ECAM CLEANED UP WE MIGHT NOT HAVE TIME TO GET INTO THE COMPANY MANUAL. I THINK AT SOME POINT I COMMUNICATED THIS IDEA TO THE FO; BUT CANNOT REMEMBER FOR SURE. THE FO HAD THE COMPANY MANUAL OUT AND EVENTUALLY MADE AN EFFORT TO XCHK AS MUCH OF IT AS POSSIBLE. HOWEVER; WITH A PREVIOUS INDICATION OF A 'LAND ASAP' EMER; WE WERE HEADED BACK TO ZZZ1 IN ANY CASE; AND MY 'MIND SET' WAS TO COMPLETE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY ECAM PROCS AS TIME PERMITTED; MAKE SURE THE GEAR WERE DOWN; AND GET THE ACFT ONTO A RWY ASAP. I REMEMBER WORRYING THAT THE 'SHOW-STOPPER' MIGHT BE THAT THE GEAR WOULD NOT BE READY BY THE TIME LNDG WAS IMMINENT. I ASKED FOR A SPECIFIC RWY AND WAS TOLD THAT WOULD BE APPROVED. ATC ASKED HOW MUCH OF A FINAL WE WANTED; AND I SAID 10 MI. WE WERE NOW ON DOWNWIND; DSNDING; AND I TOOK A MOMENT TO MAKE A BRIEF ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX. IN RETROSPECT; ONCE WE GOT THE HYD PTU CLOSED; THE YELLOW SYS COOLED OFF; WE MIGHT HAVE REVERTED TO A 'GREEN-ONLY' FAILURE PROC; BUT WE WERE PRETTY MUCH COMMITTED IN OUR MINDS TO THE MORE SERIOUS PROC; AND I FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE WERE CORRECT IN CONTINUING ON THIS COURSE OF ACTION. THERE WAS NO GUARANTEE THE YELLOW SYS WOULD HOLD UP; AND THE OVERHEAT CONDITION; PLUS THE RPTS FROM TWR AND OUR OWN CABIN; INTRODUCED THE POSSIBILITY OF A FIRE. IN ANY CASE; I FELT WE DIDN'T HAVE THE TIME TO DISCUSS ALTERNATIVES; AND I CANNOT SAY FOR CERTAIN WHEN THE YELLOW SYS COOLED OFF; BUT IT WAS FAIRLY LATE IN THE GAME. WE WERE TURNED TO BASE LEG; AND GIVEN A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE LOC WITH INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO FLY BELOW 2600 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED; THEN CLRED FOR THE APCH. I STARTED CALLING FOR FLAPS; AND REALIZED THAT I HAD NO 'F' OR 'S' SPDS FOR REF. I CANNOT RECALL WHETHER I HAD OTHER INDICATIONS OF DEGRADED LAW; BUT I WAS HAND FLYING ALL THE WAY; AND NOT INCLINED TOWARDS FURTHER ANALYSIS. THE FO WAS STILL PRETTY BUSY WITH THE ECAM AND COMPANY MANUAL; SO RATHER THAN TRY TO BOTHER HER FOR CALCULATED SPDS I DECIDED TO SELECT A 'REASONABLE' SPD THAT WOULD KEEP US ABOVE VLS AND STALL SPD; BUT STILL GET US AS SLOW AS POSSIBLE FOR WHAT WOULD BE AN OVERWT LNDG AT 154000 LBS. I ENDED UP WITH A SPD SELECTION OF 157 KIAS. THE FO ASKED IF I WAS READY FOR MANUAL GEAR EXTENSION; AND I SAID TO PROCEED. WE WERE SET UP ON BASE LEG FOR A 10-MI FINAL; AND STARTED EXTENDING THE LNDG GEAR MANUALLY. ALTHOUGH WE SELECTED FLAPS 3 DEGS FOR THE APCH AND LNDG; OUR INDICATIONS WERE SHOWING 'SLATS ONLY.' WE THOUGHT WE MIGHT STILL HAVE FLAPS 1 DEG BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT WE HAD AT THE TIME OF THE INITIAL GREEN FAILURE. AT THIS POINT I CHOSE NOT OT CONCERN MYSELF WITH THAT; BECAUSE THE ACFT WAS UNDER CTL; ON FINAL; I HAD A 12000 FT RWY ON MY NOSE; AND I WAS LOOKING ONLY FOR '3 DOWN AND LOCKED' TO COMPLETE OUR LNDG PREPARATIONS. IT WAS ABOUT THIS TIME WE GOT A TA WARNING FOR TFC ON OUR L SIDE; PROBABLY ASSOCIATED WITH THE MUNICIPAL ARPT N OF ZZZ1. JUST ANOTHER DISTR; BUT WE SAW NO ACFT BTWN US AND THE RWY; SO PRESSED ON. WE GOT 3 GREEN GEAR INDICATIONS; AND I FELT COMFORTABLE WITH THE LNDG AT THIS POINT; REGARDLESS OF WHATEVER PROCS OR ALTERNATIVES MIGHT HAVE REMAINED. I GLANCED AT THE ECAM 1 LAST TIME AND NOTICED THERE WERE NO UNDONE STEPS -- ALL THAT REMAINED WERE THE AMBER ANNUNCIATIONS OF LOST SYS; BUT WE DIDN'T REALLY HAVE THE LUXURY OF TIME TO DISCUSS THEM. I ALSO BELIEVE I NOTICED AT THAT POINT THAT THE YELLOW SYS WAS DEPICTED IN AMBER ON THE ECAM HYDS PAGE; BUT SHOWING PRESSURE OF ABOUT 2850. I CANNOT RECALL WHETHER THE OVERHEAT MESSAGE WAS STILL THERE. I FELT THAT IF THE YELLOW SYS WAS WORKING; ANY COMPONENTS IT PROVIDED SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 'ICING ON THE CAKE' BUT NOT COUNTED UPON. THE FO RECOGNIZED HOW CLOSE WE WERE TO LNDG AND VERY CORRECTLY STOPPED EXECUTING ANYTHING ELSE IN THE COMPANY MANUAL IN ORDER TO BACK ME UP WITH THE APPROPRIATE APCH CALLOUTS. WE COMPLETED THE LNDG CHKLIST AND MADE AN OVERWT LNDG ON RWY. SINK RATE WAS A LITTLE MORE THAN I WANTED; BUT NOT WHAT COULD BE CALLED A HARD LNDG. BRAKES WORKED AS ADVERTISED; ALTHOUGH WE ASSUMED WE HAD LIMITED APPLICATIONS AVAILABLE; AND IT TOOK ALMOST OF THE 12000 FT RWY TO STOP THE ACFT. WE WERE ABLE TO USE #2 REVERSER ON ROLLOUT; WHICH CONFIRMS THE NOTION THAT THE YELLOW SYS MAY HAVE BEEN AT LEAST PARTIALLY AVAILABLE AFTER ALL. AFTER I GOT THE AIRPLANE STOPPED; I THOUGHT I MIGHT BE ABLE TO CLR THE RWY; GIVEN THE WIDTH OF THAT RWY AND TXWY; BUT ABOUT /12 WAY INTO THAT MANEUVER I DECIDED IT WAS NOT WORTH THE RISK OF LOSING THE BRAKES AGAINST THE EXTRA THRUST THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED FOR DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING; SO STOPPED THE ACFT ABOUT 1/2 WAY OFF THE RWY. FIRE CREWS WERE STANDING BY; AND THEY REQUESTED WE SHUT DOWN THE ENGS SO THEY COULD INSTALL CHOCKS AND SET UP A FAN TO COOL OUR BRAKES; WHICH HAD REACHED ALMOST 700 DEGS. THEY RPTED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF FLUID ON THE TXWY; BUT SAW NO INDICATIONS OF FIRE. WE STARTED THE APU AND SHUT DOWN THE ENGS. I HAD THE FO ASK THE PAX TO REMAIN SEATED; AND I MADE A SUBSEQUENT ANNOUNCEMENT REASSURING THEM THAT WE WERE IN NO FURTHER IMMEDIATE DANGER. WHEN MAINT PERSONNEL ARRIVED; WE THREW THE LNDG GEAR PINS TO THEM FROM THE COCKPIT. THEY PINNED THE GEAR; AND WE WERE TOWED TO THE GATE. I MADE A LENGTHY ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX DURING THE TOW; WHICH THEY SEEMED TO APPRECIATE. AFTER WE GOT TO THE GATE; MAINT FOUND A SEVERED HYD LINE IN THE L WHEEL WELL. LOOKING BACK ON THIS INCIDENT; I THINK THE YELLOW SYS OVERHEAT WAS CAUSED BY THE PTU TRYING TO PRESSURIZE THE GREEN SYS; BUT SINCE IT HAD NO GREEN FLUID TO WORK WITH; IT QUICKLY OVERHEATED FROM THE COMBINATION OF ELAPSED TIME BEFORE WE WERE ABLE TO SHUT IT OFF; AS WELL AS THE WARM LCL TEMPS. THIS OVERHEATED THE ENTIRE YELLOW SYS; WHICH IN TURN TRIGGERED THE 'DOUBLE FAILURE' MASTER WARNING. SO THE PROBABLE SEQUENCE OF ECAM EVENTS WAS 'GREEN FAILURE;' 'PTU OVERHEAT;' 'YELLOW SYS OVERHEAT;' AND THEN 'GREEN + YELLOW' EMER. (I SHOULD STRESS ONCE AGAIN THAT I WAS NOT ABLE TO CONFIRM ALL THAT WAS GOING ON WITH THE ECAM MESSAGES ONCE I HAD MADE THE 'LAND ASAP' DECISION). ONCE THE YELLOW SYS COOLED DOWN; IT WAS POSSIBLY BACK IN BUSINESS AND WE WERE TECHNICALLY NO LONGER IN A 'DOUBLE FAILURE.' HOWEVER; I COULD NOT AFFORD TO PIECE ALL OF THIS TOGETHER AT THE TIME -- I HAD THE AIRPLANE UNDER CTL WITH THE 'DOUBLE FAILURE' ASSUMPTIONS WE HAD MADE; AND PROCEEDED TO GET IT ONTO THE RWY AS QUICKLY AS I COULD. WITH THE INFO AND TIME THAT I HAD; I WOULD DO THE SAME IF I HAD IT TO DO OVER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.