Narrative:

This incident occurred when my repositioning flight from detroit arrived over ithaca only to learn the ILS to runway 32 was not available. The PIC seemed to be under the impression that it was a case of the procedure not being authority/authorized when the tower was closed. While the WX wasn't particularly challenging in and of itself; minimums for the one and only approach the flight was permitted to use dictated a significantly higher ceiling than ithaca was reporting; if the crew expected to break out at the published MDA. If the information regarding the ILS at ith had; in fact; been available to me at the time I planned the flight; then I had violated either crash fire rescue equipment 14; our operations specifications; or both since the WX at this destination was below minimums for the 'active' non precision approach; and thus below minimums for dispatching the flight there in the first place. But even if the visibility had been up -- or came up -- the crew still could not shoot it because doing so would have meant that they would have been landing with a tailwind in excess of 10 KTS; yet another violation of company policy. I had planned the flight based on a functioning ILS at ith -- and had evaluated both the actual and the forecast WX accordingly! I hadn't spent a terrific amount of time looking at alternates; either; and ended up selecting binghamton practically on the basis of a mental FLIP of the coin. Once I established communication with the flight crew -- they were holding over the VOR at that point -- I began rechking my NOTAM sources; anxious to know if I had indeed missed something. There was nothing I could find in terms of a NOTAM indicating any of the facilities at ith were inoperative; had components outs; or were subject to any particular limitations or restrs whatsoever. After holding for a few mins in the vain hope the wind and WX might cooperate and thus make the VOR 14 legal to shoot at last; the PIC and I agreed that elmira was now a better alternate than binghamton. I amended the release over the radio; and diverted the flight to elmira. While all this was going on; both I and the dispatch supervisor on duty began checking the approach plates for ith and looking over the appropriate AFD listings. Before it was over; several of us would end up having telephone conversations with ZNY in an attempt to piece together what had happened over ith. The story that emerged went something like this: prior to going home for the night; ith approach looks at the wind speed and direction at ith; and authorizes center to use whichever one of the several approachs there on the field (in this instance; the VOR 14) is best suited to conditions at that moment. Should the wind or WX change for the worse prior to resumption of service the following morning; an arriving flight might be out of luck; as there is no protocol for declaring any other approach active at ith in the absence of the ith approach folks. ZNY personnel actually encouraged our management to complain to the FAA about these ad hoc overnight 'auths.' in my mind; the possibility we may have committed a technical (and totally unintentional) violation of crash fire rescue equipment 14 pales in comparison to the potential grief that might have resulted had the crew needed to put the airplane on the ground immediately; in truly hard IMC; and deprived themselves of the capabilities of a perfectly functional precision approach because of a mistaken belief that it was not operational.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DISPATCHER RPTS THAT ITH ARPT CLOSED TWR FOR THE NIGHT AND ADVISED APCH IN USE WAS VOR RWY 14. WX REQUIRED THE USE OF ILS RWY 32 WHICH WAS UNAVAILABLE.

Narrative: THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED WHEN MY REPOSITIONING FLT FROM DETROIT ARRIVED OVER ITHACA ONLY TO LEARN THE ILS TO RWY 32 WAS NOT AVAILABLE. THE PIC SEEMED TO BE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS A CASE OF THE PROC NOT BEING AUTH WHEN THE TWR WAS CLOSED. WHILE THE WX WASN'T PARTICULARLY CHALLENGING IN AND OF ITSELF; MINIMUMS FOR THE ONE AND ONLY APCH THE FLT WAS PERMITTED TO USE DICTATED A SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER CEILING THAN ITHACA WAS RPTING; IF THE CREW EXPECTED TO BREAK OUT AT THE PUBLISHED MDA. IF THE INFO REGARDING THE ILS AT ITH HAD; IN FACT; BEEN AVAILABLE TO ME AT THE TIME I PLANNED THE FLT; THEN I HAD VIOLATED EITHER CFR 14; OUR OPS SPECS; OR BOTH SINCE THE WX AT THIS DEST WAS BELOW MINIMUMS FOR THE 'ACTIVE' NON PRECISION APCH; AND THUS BELOW MINIMUMS FOR DISPATCHING THE FLT THERE IN THE FIRST PLACE. BUT EVEN IF THE VISIBILITY HAD BEEN UP -- OR CAME UP -- THE CREW STILL COULD NOT SHOOT IT BECAUSE DOING SO WOULD HAVE MEANT THAT THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN LNDG WITH A TAILWIND IN EXCESS OF 10 KTS; YET ANOTHER VIOLATION OF COMPANY POLICY. I HAD PLANNED THE FLT BASED ON A FUNCTIONING ILS AT ITH -- AND HAD EVALUATED BOTH THE ACTUAL AND THE FORECAST WX ACCORDINGLY! I HADN'T SPENT A TERRIFIC AMOUNT OF TIME LOOKING AT ALTERNATES; EITHER; AND ENDED UP SELECTING BINGHAMTON PRACTICALLY ON THE BASIS OF A MENTAL FLIP OF THE COIN. ONCE I ESTABLISHED COM WITH THE FLT CREW -- THEY WERE HOLDING OVER THE VOR AT THAT POINT -- I BEGAN RECHKING MY NOTAM SOURCES; ANXIOUS TO KNOW IF I HAD INDEED MISSED SOMETHING. THERE WAS NOTHING I COULD FIND IN TERMS OF A NOTAM INDICATING ANY OF THE FACILITIES AT ITH WERE INOP; HAD COMPONENTS OUTS; OR WERE SUBJECT TO ANY PARTICULAR LIMITATIONS OR RESTRS WHATSOEVER. AFTER HOLDING FOR A FEW MINS IN THE VAIN HOPE THE WIND AND WX MIGHT COOPERATE AND THUS MAKE THE VOR 14 LEGAL TO SHOOT AT LAST; THE PIC AND I AGREED THAT ELMIRA WAS NOW A BETTER ALTERNATE THAN BINGHAMTON. I AMENDED THE RELEASE OVER THE RADIO; AND DIVERTED THE FLT TO ELMIRA. WHILE ALL THIS WAS GOING ON; BOTH I AND THE DISPATCH SUPVR ON DUTY BEGAN CHKING THE APCH PLATES FOR ITH AND LOOKING OVER THE APPROPRIATE AFD LISTINGS. BEFORE IT WAS OVER; SEVERAL OF US WOULD END UP HAVING TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH ZNY IN AN ATTEMPT TO PIECE TOGETHER WHAT HAD HAPPENED OVER ITH. THE STORY THAT EMERGED WENT SOMETHING LIKE THIS: PRIOR TO GOING HOME FOR THE NIGHT; ITH APCH LOOKS AT THE WIND SPD AND DIRECTION AT ITH; AND AUTHORIZES CTR TO USE WHICHEVER ONE OF THE SEVERAL APCHS THERE ON THE FIELD (IN THIS INSTANCE; THE VOR 14) IS BEST SUITED TO CONDITIONS AT THAT MOMENT. SHOULD THE WIND OR WX CHANGE FOR THE WORSE PRIOR TO RESUMPTION OF SVC THE FOLLOWING MORNING; AN ARRIVING FLT MIGHT BE OUT OF LUCK; AS THERE IS NO PROTOCOL FOR DECLARING ANY OTHER APCH ACTIVE AT ITH IN THE ABSENCE OF THE ITH APCH FOLKS. ZNY PERSONNEL ACTUALLY ENCOURAGED OUR MGMNT TO COMPLAIN TO THE FAA ABOUT THESE AD HOC OVERNIGHT 'AUTHS.' IN MY MIND; THE POSSIBILITY WE MAY HAVE COMMITTED A TECHNICAL (AND TOTALLY UNINTENTIONAL) VIOLATION OF CFR 14 PALES IN COMPARISON TO THE POTENTIAL GRIEF THAT MIGHT HAVE RESULTED HAD THE CREW NEEDED TO PUT THE AIRPLANE ON THE GND IMMEDIATELY; IN TRULY HARD IMC; AND DEPRIVED THEMSELVES OF THE CAPABILITIES OF A PERFECTLY FUNCTIONAL PRECISION APCH BECAUSE OF A MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT IT WAS NOT OPERATIONAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.